BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
        
 
        
 
        WILLARD DUFFIELD,
 
        
 
            Claimant,                    File No. 771083
 
        
 
        vs.                                  A P P E A L
 
        
 
        IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY,          D E C I S I O N
 
        
 
            Employer,
 
        
 
        and
 
        
 
        STATE OF IOWA,
 
        
 
            Insurance Carrier,
 
            Defendants.
 
        
 
        
 
                                 STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
        
 
        Defendants appeal from an arbitration decision awarding permanent 
 
        total disability benefits and medical expenses.
 
        
 
        The record on appeal consists of the transcript of the 
 
        arbitration hearing and joint exhibits 1 through 28.
 
        
 
                                      ISSUES
 
        
 
        The issues on appeal are whether claimant suffered an injury that 
 
        arose out of and in the course of his employment; whether there 
 
        is a causal connection between claimant's injury and his alleged 
 
        disability; the extent of claimant's alleged disability; and 
 
        whether the medical expenses are related to the injury.
 
        
 
                                 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
 
        
 
        The arbitration decision adequately and accurately reflects the 
 
        pertinent evidence and it will not be totally reiterated herein.
 
        
 
        Briefly stated, claimant began work for defendants in 1977 as an 
 
        electrical and refrigeration maintenance engineer. Prior to that 
 
        time he had done automotive, electrical, and refrigeration work. 
 
        Claimant has a high school education and attended a trade school 
 
        for about one year. In 1980, he was diagnosed to have significant 
 
        coronary artery disease. In October 1980, he underwent 
 
        angiography and bypass surgery after which he returned to work 
 
        full time.
 
        
 
        DUFFIELD V. IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY
 
        Page 2
 
        
 
        
 
        Sometime prior to April 1984 claimant's employer, Iowa State 
 
        Penitentiary (hereinafter prison), began an internal 
 
        investigation of employees as a result of allegations of 
 
        wrongdoing. Prior investigations by prison officers and 
 
        authorities had resulted in what the claimant characterized as 
 
        employees being "locked out." The investigation in 1984 
 
        eventually involved the department in which claimant worked and 
 
        he was the last employee to be interviewed.
 

 
        
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
        Claimant testified on April 5, 1984 he was told by Major Harry 
 
        Grabowski who was in charge of the internal investigative section 
 
        of the prison to report for an interview. Claimant's union 
 
        steward accompanied claimant at claimant's request. Claimant 
 
        stated that he was bothered by the presence of the four 
 
        investigators and that he thought they were going to try to take 
 
        his job away. Claimant informed the investigative team that he 
 
        had heart problems and that he did not feel he should have to go 
 
        through the interrogation. Claimant was requested to make a 
 
        statement to that effect and the interview was postponed. 
 
        Claimant further testified he told a personnel officer for the 
 
        prison that he was scared and he "felt like a sick rabbit with 
 
        four hound dogs after [him]." Claimant was requested to get a 
 
        statement from his doctor. he obtained a statement from his 
 
        doctor, Artemio Santiago, M.D., dated April 6, 1984, which stated 
 
        that claimant "may return to his maintenance work at Iowa State 
 
        Prison as stress does not, or will not, prevent him from doing 
 
        his normal duties, or any extra duties that may be required of 
 
        him." (Joint Exhibit 23)
 
        
 
        On May 3, 1984 while claimant was eating at work, he was called 
 
        by Grabowski to report to his office. Claimant again had the 
 
        union steward accompany him. Grabowski and one other investigator 
 
        were there. The interview started and-claimant testified that he 
 
        was shook up, started getting arm pain and some chest pain, and 
 
        he felt his blood pressure was terrible. Claimant informed the 
 
        investigators that he felt bad and the interview was stopped. The 
 
        transcription of the recording of the interview indicated that 
 
        the interview lasted two minutes. Claimant stated he had not had 
 
        chest and arm pain since his prior bypass surgery. Claimant went 
 
        to the prison hospital where his blood pressure was checked. He 
 
        then went to see Dr. Santiago and went home. Claimant stated that 
 
        he started having chest pains and he took four "nitros" but still 
 
        had chest pains. He called Dr. Santiago and Dr. Santiago told him 
 
        to go to the hospital.
 
        
 
        Claimant was admitted to the Fort Madison Community Hospital on 
 
        May 3, 1984 at 1:55 p.m. He was discharged on May 15, 1984 and 
 
        the final diagnosis stated: "Acute inferior wall myocardial 
 
        infarction. Complete heart block. Temporary pacemaker, resolved." 
 
        (Jt. Ex. 10) The discharge summary states in part: ''After 
 
        several hours in the SCU patient went into 3rd degree AV block,
 
        
 
        DUFFIELD V. IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY
 
        Page 3
 
        
 
        
 
        ventricular rate dropped to 30. Patient was brought down to 
 
        fluroscopy for pacemaker placement." (Jt. Ex. 10)
 
        
 
        Claimant had frequent angina and was seen by the Cardiology 
 
        Clinic at the University of Iowa Hospitals on June 6, 1984. J. L. 
 
        Ehrenhaft, M.D., Professor and Chairman, Division of Thoracic and 
 
        Cardiovascular Surgery, University of Iowa Hospitals, described 
 
        the care claimant received in a letter dated June 16, 1984 which 
 
        reads in relevant parts:
 
        
 
        He has had recurrent angina which was rather incapacitating and 
 
        was not manageable by medication alone. For this reason the 
 
        patient underwent coronary arteriography again on June 11, 1984. 
 
        At that time it was found that the patient's vein graft to the 
 
        circumflex system had clotted. The left anterior descending graft 
 
        was still open, and the graft which had been placed previously 
 
        into the right coronary artery also had clotted. There was 
 
        progression of the native vessel disease as well. From previous 
 

 
        
 
 
 
 
 
        exploration of this patient we knew that there were no further 
 
        vessels to be grafted over the posterior surface of the heart. 
 
        The left anterior descending coronary artery was still open and 
 
        functioning and it was decided after some discussion to reoperate 
 
        upon the patient and possibly place a graft into a branch of the 
 
        right coronary artery or possibly the posterior descending 
 
        coronary vessel. reexplored this patient on June 15, 1984 and 
 
        were able to place one vein bypass graft into a very small 
 
        posterior descending artery branch of the right coronary 
 
        vessel..I do not know but I am hopeful that the single vein 
 
        bypass graft will be of some benefit to the patient. Obviously 
 
        this is a situation where we cannot promise lengthy relief of 
 
        symptoms.
 
        
 
        (Jt. Ex. 8)
 
        
 
        Claimant and his wife testified that before claimant's condition 
 
        in May 1984 he did not have physical limitations but after that 
 
        time he was unable to do activities such as carrying groceries or 
 
        firewood, lifting or repairing things, walking, climbing a 
 
        ladder, hunting, running a vacuum cleaner, operating a garden 
 
        tiller or lawnmower, chopping or splitting firewood, hoeing in 
 
        the garden, raking the yard, or digging with a shovel or spade. 
 
        Claimant admitted that he had not investigated the possibility of 
 
        a job other than at the prison nor of being re-educated for 
 
        another type of job. He also admitted he never contacted the 
 
        prison for light duty work or vocational training.
 
        
 
        DUFFIELD V. IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY
 
        Page 4
 
        
 
        
 
        Dr. Santiago testified:
 
        
 
        A. After the hospitalization he persist [sic] to have chest pain. 
 
        The activity was very limited and so eventually he was referred 
 
        to University of Iowa and was seen at the Cardiology Department, 
 
        and let's see -- And finally a by-pass was done on June 15th, 
 
        1984.
 
        
 
        Q. And after the by-pass, did you also follow up with him?
 
        
 
        A. Uh-huh.
 
        
 
        Q. And could you explain to us what that follow-up consisted of 
 
        then?
 
        
 
        A. Well, he -- I'd been seeing him quite regularly in the office 
 
        and -- all this time. He -- In spite of the --
 
        
 
        He improved for a while, and then the condition gradually worsens 
 
        again to the point that even mild activity or just being nervous 
 
        or upset will bring on chest pain. So to the point that he became 
 
        disabled.
 
        
 
        Q. Okay. Doctor, do you have an opinion, within a reasonable 
 
        degree of medical certainty, as to whether or not Mr. Duffield 
 
        has a permanent impairment?
 
        
 
        A. Yes, it is my opinion that he is permanently disabled because 
 
        of the disability of his heart condition.
 
        
 
        Q. And by that do you mean totally disabled?
 
        
 
        A. Totally disabled.
 
        
 

 
        
 
 
 
 
 
        Q. Do you have an opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical 
 
        certainty, as to whether or not the stress that he had related he 
 
        had on the job would have aggravated that pre-existing condition? 
 
        In other words whether or not it is -- his disability today is 
 
        causally connected to that incident or stress in terms of 
 
        aggravating the previous condition to cause that?
 
        
 
        A. The time factor is there, you know. Usually there's always 
 
        something that will bring on a chest
 
        
 
        DUFFIELD V. IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY
 
        Page 5
 
        
 
        
 
        pain or bring on a heart attack. In this particular case I think 
 
        the time factor is there, you know. He was under a lot of stress.
 
        
 
        Q. So is it your opinion then that it would have aggravated that 
 
        condition or been caused from it?
 
        
 
        A. Yeah, stress will definitely aggravate or bring on heart 
 
        attack.
 
        
 
        (Santiago Deposition, pp. 6-8; Jt. Ex. 16)
 
        
 
        Claimant was evaluated by Craig Blaine Rypma, who had a doctoral 
 
        degree in clinical psychology. Dr. Rypma described claimant as a 
 
        dependent individual who tended to become very easily attached to 
 
        other individuals and experiences extreme anxiety at the 
 
        possibility of losing or being rejected by those relationships he 
 
        has developed. He opined that claimant would be extremely anxious 
 
        about being involved in the internal investigation. He stated 
 
        that individuals with personalities like claimant's are seen as 
 
        denying physical symptomatology and that his advice to medical 
 
        personnel would be to pay extremely close attention to complaints 
 
        of physical ailments because when claimant complains physical 
 
        symptomatology is obviously there and is bothering him.
 
        
 
        Claimant was evaluated by Randolph R. Rough, M.D., and Dr. Rough 
 
        opined in a letter dated September 16, 1985 that claimant was 
 
        "quite disabled by angina pectoris."
 
        
 
                                 APPLICABLE LAW
 
        
 
        The citations of law in the arbitration decision are appropriate 
 
        to the issues and evidence.
 
        
 
                                      ANALYSIS
 
        
 
        The first issue to be discussed is whether claimant suffered an 
 
        injury that arose out of and in the course of his employment. The 
 
        record discloses that claimant was concerned about the internal 
 
        investigation and that he thought he might lose his job. Claimant 
 
        had the type of personality that would perceive his situation as 
 
        threatening and stressful. Claimant had been able to work with no 
 
        restrictions for over three years following his first bypass 
 
        operation. His myocardial infarction occurred when he experienced 
 
        stress relating to the internal investigation. For the claimant 
 
        the stress of the internal investigation was greater than his 
 
        regular employment or his nonemployment life. Claimant has 
 
        suffered an injury that arose out of and in the course of his 
 
        employment.
 
        
 
        The second issue to be discussed is whether there is a
 
        
 
        DUFFIELD V. IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY
 

 
        
 
 
 
 
 
        Page 6
 
        
 
        
 
        causal connection between claimant's injury and his alleged 
 
        disability. Dr. Santiago was of the opinion that there was a 
 
        relationship between the stress claimant experienced and his 
 
        injury. It was also Dr. Santiago's opinion that the stress and 
 
        the heart attack resulted in claimant being totally "disabled." 
 
        While the doctor is not qualified to make a determination of 
 
        disability, it is obvious that the doctor viewed claimant's 
 
        impaired condition as permanent. Claimant has had recurrent 
 
        angina pain severe enough that he is unable to do physical 
 
        activities. It should also be noted that the myocardial 
 
        infarction occurred within a matter of hours after the attempted 
 
        interview with the investigation team on May 3, 1984. As 
 
        discussed in Exhibit 14 "the development of myocardial infarction 
 
        rarely occurs as a result of physical effort alone." (Ex. 14, p. 
 
        314) and "[t]he shorter the time interval between the exposure to 
 
        a potentially noxious stimulus and the appearance of clinical or 
 
        pathologic evidence of new heart disease or dysfunction, the more 
 
        likely is there to be a causal relationship. Conversely, the 
 
        farther apart they are in time, the less likely is a cause and 
 
        effect relationship." (Ex. 14, p. 316) Claimant has proved that 
 
        there is a causal relationship between his work injury and his 
 
        disability.
 
        
 
        The next issue to be discussed is the extent of claimant's 
 
        disability. Claimant argues that claimant is totally disabled and 
 
        agrees with the deputy's conclusion that claimant made a prima 
 
        facie case of total disability under the "odd-lot" doctrine. 
 
        Defendants seem to argue that claimant cannot be totally disabled 
 
        because he is 59 years old and has retired. Age is merely one 
 
        factor in determining industrial disability. In the instant case 
 
        claimant has demonstrated that he is an older worker, he has 
 
        limited education and training, his prior work history is manual 
 
        or physical labor, and he cannot perform physical activities 
 
        without angina pain. Dr. Santiago opined- that claimant was 
 
        totally "disabled." Even though the doctor used the term 
 
        disabled, it is apparent that it was his opinion that claimant 
 
        was significantly impaired by his heart condition. After his 
 
        myocardial infarction claimant's angina pain was caused by both 
 
        nervousness and mild physical activity. There has been no medical 
 
        evidence nor other evidence that contradicts claimant's evidence 
 
        of his inability to perform even mild physical activity without 
 
        the angina pain. In fact, there has been no showing that claimant 
 
        has been offered any employment, including light duty work, by 
 
        defendants. Claimant does not need to prove that his physical 
 
        impairment is 100 percent to prove he is permanently totally 
 
        disabled. See Dieoerich v. Tri-City Railway Co., 219 Iowa 587, 
 
        258 N.W. 899 (1935). When all factors and evidence are 
 
        considered claimant has proved by the greater weight of evidence 
 
        that he is permanently and totally disabled. Because claimant 
 
        has proved that he is permanently and totally disabled, it not 
 
        necessary to consider whether claimant is an "odd-lot" employee.
 
        
 
        DUFFIELD V. IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY
 
        Page 7
 
        
 
        
 
        The last issue to be resolved is whether medical expenses are 
 
        related to the injury. Defendants argue that there is no causal 
 
        connection between claimant's injury and treatment after he was 
 
        released from the Fort Madison Community Hospital on May 15, 
 
        1984. The evidence in this case indicates that claimant had 
 
        angina pain as a result of his myocardial infarction. The 
 
        majority of the medical expenses defendants dispute is for the 
 

 
        
 
 
 
 
 
        treatment by the University of Iowa Hospitals after claimant's 
 
        discharge from the Fort Madison Community Hospital. The coronary 
 
        bypass operation performed there and follow-up care was an 
 
        attempt to alleviate claimant's pain which was caused by his work 
 
        injury. The remaining medical expense includes medications and 
 
        doctor office visits reasonably related to treatment of 
 
        claimant's angina pain.
 
        
 
                                 FINDINGS OF FACT
 
        
 
        1. Claimant was born on July 10, 1927 and was 59 years of 
 
        
 
        2. Claimant has a high school education and has had one year of 
 
        trade school.
 
        
 
        3. Prior to working for the prison, claimant had done physical 
 
        type work such as automotive, electrical and refrigeration work.
 
        
 
        4. Claimant was employed as an electrical and refrigeration 
 
        maintenance engineer by the prison from May 3, 1977 until October 
 
        19, 1984 at which time he retired.
 
        
 
        5. Sometime prior to April 1984 the prison began an internal 
 
        investigation into wrongdoing by the employees of the prison.
 
        
 
        6. Claimant was one of the employees who was to be interviewed 25 
 
        part of the internal investigation.
 
        
 
        7. On May 3, 1984, claimant was to be interviewed but the 
 
        interview was not conducted because claimant complained of arm 
 
        and chest pain.
 
        
 
        8. Claimant perceived the investigation as possibly resulting in 
 
        his loss of employment with the prison.
 
        
 
        9. Claimant experienced stress at work relating to the internal 
 
        investigation that was greater than stress in his regular 
 
        employment or his nonemployment life.
 
        
 
        10. Claimant suffered a myocardial infarction within several 
 
        hours after his interview was called off.
 
        
 
        11. Claimant had had bypass surgery in December 1980 but
 
        
 
        DUFFIELD V. IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY
 
        Page 8
 
        
 
        
 
        had returned to work without any restrictions after that surgery.
 
        
 
        12. Claimant underwent hospital and surgical treatment to relieve 
 
        angina pain, but he continues to have angina pain.
 
        
 
        13. The angina pain is a permanent condition.
 
        
 
        14. Claimant can no longer do physical activities because of the 
 
        angina pain. Nervousness can also cause claimant's angina pain.
 
        
 
        15. On May 3, 1984, claimant suffered an injury that arose out of 
 
        and in the course of his employment with the prison.
 
        
 
        16. The work injury of May 3, 1984 is a cause of permanent 
 
        physical impairment.
 
        
 
        17. The work injury of May 3, 1984 is a cause of claimant's 
 
        current permanent and total loss of earning capacity.
 

 
        
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
        18. Claimant has incurred reasonable medical expenses for the 
 
        treatment of his work injury in the amount of $42,528.11 as 
 
        listed in the list of medical expenses attached to the prehearing 
 
        report filed in this case.
 
        
 
                                 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
 
        
 
        Claimant has proved by the greater weight of evidence that on May 
 
        3, 1984 he suffered an injury that arose out of and in the course 
 
        of his employment.
 
        
 
        Claimant has proved by the greater weight of evidence that there 
 
        is a causal connection between his injury and his permanent 
 
        disability.
 
        
 
        Claimant has proved by the greater weight of evidence that he is 
 
        permanently and totally disabled.
 
        
 
        Claimant has proved by the greater weight of evidence that he is 
 
        entitled to reasonable and necessary medical treatment for his 
 
        injury.
 
        
 
        WHEREFORE, the decision of the deputy is affirmed and modified.
 
        
 
                                      ORDER
 
        
 
        THEREFORE, it is ordered:
 
        
 
        That defendants pay to claimant permanent total disability 
 
        benefits during the period of his disability at the rate of two 
 
        hundred fifteen and 72/100 dollars ($215.72) per week from May
 
        
 
        DUFFIELD V. IOWA STATE PENITENTIARY
 
        Page 9
 
        
 
        
 
        3, 1984.
 
        
 
        That defendants pay claimant the medical expenses to the provider 
 
        and in the amounts listed in the attachment to the prehearing 
 
        report.
 
        
 
        That defendants pay accrued weekly benefits in a lump sum and 
 
        shall receive credit against this award for all benefits 
 
        previously paid.
 
        
 
        That defendants receive credit for previous payments of benefits 
 
        under a nonoccupational group insurance plan, if applicable and 
 
        appropriate under Iowa Code section 85.38(2).
 
        
 
        That defendants pay interest on benefits awarded herein as set 
 
        forth in Iowa Code section 85.30.
 
        
 
        That defendants pay costs of this action including the costs of 
 
        the appeal and transcription of the arbitration hearing pursuant 
 
        to Division of Industrial Services Rule 343-4.33.
 
        
 
        That defendants file activity reports on the payment of this 
 
        award as requested by this agency pursuant to the Division of 
 
        Industrial Services Rule 343-3.1.
 
        
 
        Signed and filed this 21st day of September, 1988.
 
        
 
        
 
        
 

 
        
 
 
 
 
 
                                          DAVID E. LINQUIST
 
                                       INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
        
 
        
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                    BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
         
 
         EDDIE L. HARRISON,
 
         
 
              Claimant,
 
         
 
         VS.
 
                                                        File No. 771088
 
         BUESING AUTOMOTIVE, INC.,
 
                                                          A P P E A L
 
         
 
              Employer,
 
                                                        D E C I S I 0 N
 
         and
 
         
 
         BITUMINOUS INSURANCE COMPANY,
 
         
 
              Insurance Carrier,
 
              Defendants.
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
                              STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
         
 
              Claimant appeals from an arbitration decision awarding 
 
         temporary total disability benefits but denying permanent partial 
 
         disability benefits because he did not establish that his work 
 
         injury has resulted in any loss in his earning capacity.
 
         
 
              The record on appeal consists of the transcript of the 
 
         arbitration hearing together with claimant's exhibits 1 through 
 
         16; defendants' exhibits A through T and the briefs filed on 
 
         appeal.
 
         
 
              Claimant states the following issue on appeal: "Whether or 
 
         not the deputy erred in finding that the claimant-appellant did 
 
         not sustain any permanent partial disability as the result of the 
 
         accident of December 30th, 1983.O
 
         
 
                              REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE
 
         
 
              The arbitration decision adequately and accurately reflects 
 
         the pertinent evidence it will not be totally reiterated herein.
 
         
 
              On December 30, 1983 claimant sustained a work injury to 
 
         his low back when he slipped and fell on some ice in the 
 
         parking lot maintained by defendant-Buesing Automotive, Inc. 
 
         (hereinafter Buesing) for its employees.  As a result of this 
 
         injury, claimant has suffered a slight permanent partial 
 
         impairment to the body.  Claimant also has work restrictions 
 
         against lifting in excess of
 

 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         HARRISON V. BUESING AUTOMOTIVE,INC.
 
         Page   2
 
         
 
         
 
         50 pounds and repetitive bending and twisting.  Although 
 
         claimant is functionally impaired, he has successfully returned 
 
         to his normal work activity.  He was discharged from his 
 
         employment with Buesing for reasons unrelated to this claim.  
 
         Claimant is now self-employed.  Claimant's normal work activity 
 
         does not require heavy lifting or repetitive bending and 
 
         twisting but generally involves sitting in front of a work 
 
         bench.
 
         
 
         
 
                                 APPLICABLE LAW
 
         
 
              The citations of law in the arbitration decision are 
 
         appropriate to the issue and evidence.
 
         
 
                                     ANALYSIS
 
         
 
              Claimant's brief seems to indicate that claimant is entitled 
 
         to industrial disability because he now works longer hours in his 
 
         own business to make the same amount of money he did when he 
 
         worked for defendant, Buesing.  As revealed in the deputy's 
 
         decision claimant's change of employment was nonrelated to his 
 
         injury.  Therefore, the change in claimant's income as a result 
 
         of his change of employment is irrelevant to the determination of 
 
         claimant's industrial disability.
 
         
 
              There are no weighting guidelines that indicate how each of 
 
         the factors are to be considered.  There are no guidelines which 
 
         give, for example, age a weighted value of ten percent of the 
 
         total value, education a value of fifteen percent of total, 
 
         motivation - five percent; work experience - thirty percent, etc.  
 
         Neither does a rating of functional impairment directly correlate 
 
         to a degree of industrial disability to the body as a whole.  In 
 
         other words, there are no formulae which can be applied and then 
 
         added up to determine the degree of industrial disability.  It 
 
         therefore becomes necessary for the deputy or commissioner to 
 
         draw upon prior experience, general and specialized knowledge to 
 
         make the finding with regard to degree of industrial disability.  
 
         See Peterson v. Truck Haven Cafe, Inc., (Appeal Decision, 
 
         February 28, 1985); Christensen v. Hagen, Inc., (Appeal Decision, 
 
         March 26, 1985)
 
         
 
              Vijay Verma, M.D., opined that claimant has a 10 percent 
 
         permanent impairment to his body as a result of the work injury 
 
         and resulting surgery.  Dr. Verma indicates that claimant had 
 
         minimal impairment because claimant had a good recovery from the 
 
         surgery.  It is also disclosed that Dr. Verma placed restrictions 
 
         on claimant's lifting, bending and bending with twisting from 
 
         side to side.  Dr. Verma felt claimant could return to his former 
 
         work and the evidence reveals that claimant did so.
 
         
 
              Claimant has not shown that he has had an actual reduction 
 
         in earning as a result of his injury.  However, reduction in 
 
         earnings is only one of the considerations in determining 
 
         reduction of earning capacity.
 
         
 

 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         HARRISON V. BUESING AUTOMOTIVE,INC.
 
         Page   3
 
         
 
         
 
              The physical restrictions imposed on claimant as well as his 
 
         back surgery would discourage some employers from hiring 
 
         claimant.  The fact that claimant may not ever have to seek 
 
         employment from other employers does not completely negate the 
 
         effect of the injury on claimant's earning capacity.  It is 
 
         determined that as a result of his injury, claimant has an 
 
         industrial disability of four percent.
 
         
 
                                 FINDINGS OF FACT
 
         
 
              1.  Claimant is a credible witness.
 
         
 
              2.  Claimant worked for Buesing for 21 years until being 
 
         terminated in September 1984 for reasons unrelated to his claimed 
 
         work injury.
 
         
 
              3.  Claimant's job on December 30, 1983 consisted of the 
 
         repair of electric automotive generators, starters, and electric 
 
         motors.
 
         
 
              4.  On December 30, 1983 while returning from a lunch break 
 
         at 12:45 p.m., claimant fell in the parking lot maintained by 
 
         Buesing for its employees and injured his low back resulting in a 
 
         herniated disc at the L4-5 level of the spine.
 
         
 
              5.  Buesing was informed by claimant on December 30, 1983 of 
 
         the time and place of the fall resulting in the injury to his 
 
         back.
 
         
 
              6.  Claimant did not become aware of the compensable nature 
 
         of his injury until a few days before Buesing's first 
 
         notification by claimant of his claim herein.
 
         
 
              7.  As a result of the work injury, claimant underwent a 
 
         surgical operation termed a lumbar hemilaminectomy, L4-5, with 
 
         removal of the extruded disc and decompression of the nerve 
 
         root.
 
         
 
              8.  Prior to the work injury of December 30, 1983, claimant 
 
         was in auto accidents in which he injured his head and cervical 
 
         spine but suffered no permanent damage to his spine from these 
 
         injuries and was able to fully resume his work activity following 
 
         a period of recovery.
 
         
 
              9.  Prior to December 30, 1983, claimant had no permanent 
 
         physical impairments or ascertainable disabilities.
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
              10.  As a result of his work injury of December 30, 1983, 
 
         claimant has suffered a slight permanent partial impairment to 
 
         the body as a whole.
 
         
 
              11.  As a result of the work injury of December 30, 1983, 
 
         claimant has work restrictions against lifting in excess of 50 
 
         pounds, repetitive bending, and repetitive twisting.
 
         
 
              12.  Despite his functional impairment and work 
 
         restrictions, claimant is physically able to return to his normal 
 

 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         HARRISON V. BUESING AUTOMOTIVE,INC.
 
         Page   4
 
         
 
         
 
         work activity and has done so.
 
         
 
              13.  Claimant has not suffered a significant loss in actual 
 
         earnings from employment due to his work injury.  Claimant's 
 
         normal work activity does not involve heavy lifting, repetitive 
 
         bending, repetitive twisting, and for the most part involves 
 
         sitting in front of a work bench.
 
         
 
              14.  Claimant is motivated to remain gainfully employed and 
 
         is currently working from 12 to 17 hours per day in the same type 
 
         of work that he was performing at the time of the work injury.
 
         
 
              15.  Claimant is 46 years of age, has a high school 
 
         education with one year of college and has above average 
 
         intelligence.
 
         
 
              16.  Vocational rehabilitation is unnecessary as claimant 
 
         has returned to his normal occupation.
 
         
 
             17.  Claimant has suffered a loss of earning capacity as a 
 
         result of his work injury of December 30, 1983.
 
         
 
              18.  Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, as a result of 
 
         his work injury of December 30, 1983, claimant was absent from 
 
         work for treatment of his back condition from January 8, 1984 
 
         through February 26, 1984.
 
         
 
              19.  Pursuant to the parties' stipulation, claimant's rate 
 
         of compensation is $252.52 per week.
 
         
 
              20.  Claimant has incurred medical expenses for the 
 
         treatment of his back condition as a result of his work injury on 
 
         December 30, 1983 in the total amount of $7,797.97, but 
 
         defendants are eligible for a credit in the amount of $7,007.97 
 
         under Iowa Code section 85.38(2) for prior payments of expenses 
 
         under a nonoccupational group insurance plan.
 
         
 
                                CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
 
         
 
              On December 30, 1983 claimant suffered an injury arising out 
 
         of and in the course of employment at Buesing.
 
         
 
              Defendants had notice of claimant's injury.
 
         
 
              The injury of December 30, 1983 resulted in claimant having 
 
         an industrial disability of four percent.
 
         
 
              Claimant is entitled to healing period disability benefits 
 
         in the amount of 7 1/7 weeks.
 
         
 
              Claimant is entitled to medical benefits in the amount of 
 
         $790.
 
         
 
              WHEREFORE, the decision of the deputy is affirmed and 
 
         modified.
 
         
 
                                      ORDER
 
         
 
              THEREFORE, it is ordered:
 

 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         HARRISON V. BUESING AUTOMOTIVE,INC.
 
         Page   5
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
              That defendants shall pay to claimant seven and one-seventh 
 
         (7 1/7) weeks of healing period disability benefits at the rate 
 
         of two hundred fifty-two and 52/100 dollars ($252.52) per week 
 
         and twenty (20) weeks of permanent partial disability benefits at 
 
         a rate of two hundred fifty-two and 52/100 dollars ($252.52) per 
 
         week.
 
         
 
              That defendants shall pay to claimant the sum of seven 
 
         hundred ninety dollars ($790) as reimbursement for medical 
 
         expenses.
 
         
 
              That defendants shall pay accrued weekly benefits in a lump 
 
         sum.
 
         
 
              That defendants shall pay interest on benefits awarded 
 
         herein as set forth in Iowa Code section 85.30.
 
         
 
              That defendants shall pay the costs of this proceeding.
 
         
 
              That defendants shall file activity reports on the payment 
 
         of this award as requested by this agency pursuant to Division of 
 
         Industrial Services Rule 500-3.1.
 
         
 
         
 
              Signed and filed this 27th day of July, 1987.
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
                                             DAVID E. LINQUIST
 
                                             ACTING INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
         
 
         
 
         Copies To:
 
         
 
         Mr. John H. Westensee
 
         Attorney at Law
 
         1703 Second Avenue
 
         Plaza Office Building
 
         Rock Island, Illinois 61201
 
         
 
         Mr. Larry L. Shepler
 
         Attorney at Law
 
         111 East Third Street
 
         600 Union Arcade Building
 
         Davenport, Iowa 52801-1550
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                    1402.40 - 1803
 
                                                    Filed July 27, 1987
 
                                                    DAVID E. LINQUIST
 
         
 
                     BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
         
 
         
 
         EDDIE L. HARRISON,
 
         
 
              Claimant,
 
         
 
         VS.
 
                                                      File No. 771088
 
         
 
         BUESING AUTOMOTIVE, INC.,
 
                                                        A P P E A L
 
         
 
              Employer,
 
                                                      D E C I S I 0 N
 
         and
 
         
 
         BITUMINOUS INSURANCE COMPANY,
 
         
 
              Insurance Carrier,
 
              Defendants.
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         1402.40 - 1803
 
         
 
              Although claimant suffered no loss in actual earnings, he 
 
         did suffer a loss of earning capacity because the physical 
 
         restrictions imposed on claimant as well as his back surgery 
 
         would discourage some employers from hiring claimant.  Industrial 
 
         disability found to be four percent.  Affirmed and modified.