Page   1
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            before the iowa industrial commissioner
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                      :
 
            CHARLES BARLOON,    :
 
                      :
 
                 Claimant, :
 
                      :        File No. 777364
 
            vs.       :
 
                      :
 
            WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES,    :     A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                      :
 
                 Employer, :        D E C I S I O N
 
                      :
 
            and       :
 
                      :
 
            SENTRY INSURANCE,   :
 
                      :
 
                 Insurance Carrier,  :
 
                 Defendants.    :
 
            ___________________________________________________________
 
            INTRODUCTION
 
            This is a proceeding in arbitration brought by Charles 
 
            Barloon, claimant, against Winnebago Industries, employer, 
 
            and Sentry Insurance, insurance carrier, for benefits as a 
 
            result of an injury which occurred on October 8, 1984.  A 
 
            hearing was held in Mason City, Iowa, on August 17, 1990, 
 
            and the case was fully submitted at the close of the 
 
            hearing.  Claimant was represented by Charles H. Levad and 
 
            defendants were represented by Harry W. Dahl.  The record 
 
            consists of the testimony of Charles Barloon, claimant, 
 
            Hazel Barloon, claimant's wife, Rosemary Helwig, claimant's 
 
            witness, William D. Price, maintenance superintendent, 
 
            Darrell J. Bonner, manager of health, safety and workers' 
 
            compensation; claimant's exhibits 1 through 57; and 
 
            defendants' exhibits 1 through 5.  Defendants and claimant 
 
            ordered a copy of the transcript.  Defendants agreed to 
 
            supply a copy for the industrial commissioner's file.  
 
            Defendants' attorney submitted a statement of disputes at 
 
            the beginning of the hearing.  Defendants' attorney 
 
            submitted an excellent posthearing brief.  Claimant's 
 
            attorney did not file a brief.
 
            stipulations
 
            The parties stipulated to the following matters:
 
            That an employer-employee relationship existed between 
 
            claimant and employer at the time of the injury.
 
            That claimant sustained an injury on October 8, 1984, which 
 
            arose out of and in the course of employment with employer.
 
            That the injury was the cause of both temporary and 
 
            permanent disability.
 
            That claimant is entitled to and was paid temporary 
 
            disability benefits for 33.714 weeks of healing period 
 
            benefits for various periods of time between October 9, 1984 
 

 
            
 
            Page   2
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            and November 27, 1985, and that temporary disability 
 
            benefits are no longer a disputed matter in this case at 
 
            this time.
 
            That the rate of compensation in the event of an award of 
 
            benefits is $192.72 per week.
 
            That defendants seek no credit for employee nonoccupational 
 
            group health plan benefits paid to claimant prior to 
 
            hearing.
 
            That defendants paid to claimant 59.4 weeks of permanent 
 
            partial disability benefits prior to hearing at the rate of 
 
            $192.72 per week, for a total amount of $11,447.56 based 
 
            upon a 27 percent permanent functional impairment rating to 
 
            the left lower extremity.
 
            That there are no bifurcated claims.
 
            That the issue of credit under Iowa Code section 85.38(2), 
 
            as shown on the hearing assignment order, was withdrawn by 
 
            defendants at the time of the hearing.
 
            That defendants have paid medical benefits believed by them 
 
            to be caused by a scheduled member injury to the left leg 
 
            but that certain other medical benefits remain disputed in 
 
            this case.
 
            issues
 
            The parties submitted the following issues for determination 
 
            at the time of the hearing:
 
            1.  Whether claimant is entitled to permanent disability 
 
            benefits and, if so, the nature and extent of benefits to 
 
            which he is entitled, more specifically, the issue is 
 
            whether claimant received a scheduled member injury to the 
 
            left lower extremity or whether claimant received an 
 
            industrial disability to the body as a whole; and,
 
            2.  Whether claimant is entitled to certain medical expenses 
 
            presented in claimant's exhibits 31, 33, 34 and 37.
 
            findings of fact
 
            causal connection - nature - entitlement - permanent 
 
            disability
 
            It is determined that claimant sustained a scheduled member 
 
            disability and did not sustain an industrial disability to 
 
            the body as a whole.
 
            Claimant received an extremely severe crush injury to his 
 
            left lower extremity when his waist and left knee and lower 
 
            leg were caught between a fork lift and a flatbed trailer on 
 
            October 8, 1984 (Transcript, pp. 38-41)  He sustained a 
 
            nondisplaced fracture of the fibula bone below his left knee 
 
            (Tr., p. 88).
 
            Subsequently, claimant suffered pulmonary emboli (blood 
 
            clots) which were believed to be caused by the left lower 
 
            leg injury.  Claimant testified by his prehearing deposition 
 
            that one of them occurred in December of 1984 to his lower 
 
            left rear lung and the other one occurred in January of 1985 
 
            to the middle rear lobe of his right lung (Defendants' 
 
            Exhibit 3, page 20; Tr., pp. 44-48).  The medical evidence 
 
            shows that claimant was hospitalized at Forest City 
 
            Community Hospital from January 14, 1985 to January 24, 
 
            1985, for pulmonary embolism, right chest (Claimant's 
 

 
            
 
            Page   3
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            Exhibit 41, pp. 1-27).
 
            W. David Clark, M.D., stated on February 11, 1985 that in 
 
            his clinical judgment it is more likely that the injury of 
 
            October 8 did have a contributory role in the pulmonary 
 
            embolus than a judgment that it did not play a contributory 
 
            role.  He said one of the things that is clinically 
 
            investigated is to identify an injury or abnormality to the 
 
            lower extremities.  He concluded, "I have to believe that 
 
            this injury to his leg in October increased the likelihood 
 
            of him experiencing a pulmonary embulus later on."  (Cl. Ex. 
 
            42)
 
            Later, Samuel E. Stubbs, M.D., wrote to claimant on May 8, 
 
            1985 that he found changes in the right lower lobe 
 
            consistent with pulmonary embolus.  Dr. Stubbs told 
 
            claimant, "Regarding your pulmonary emboli, you will recall, 
 
            we did not make any additional evaluation of that problem 
 
            leaving it to the physicians there who are treating you."  
 
            (Cl. Ex. 19 and 44)
 
            Robert C. Haakenson, M.D., claimant's family physician, 
 
            testified by deposition on September 22, 1989, "There's no 
 
            impairment on account of the embolus, because the lung 
 
            corrects that, and he is breathing fine.  The impairment is 
 
            the persistent disability or damage left from the old injury 
 
            in his leg."  (Def. Ex. 2, pp. 4-5)
 
            Claimant was treated by A. J. Wolbrink, M.D., an orthopedic 
 
            surgeon, on several occasions for his left leg (Cl. Ex. 9, 
 
            28 and 39).  Claimant eventually saw Donald C. Campbell II, 
 
            M.D., at the Mayo Clinic in consultation, beginning on April 
 
            19, 1985.  Dr. Campbell submitted several reports, most of 
 
            which appear in evidence several times in claimant's 
 
            exhibits.  A nerve conduction study of the left lower 
 
            extremity showed no evidence of neurologic abnormality (Cl. 
 
            Ex. 5, p. 2).  His x-rays reveal a healed or healing 
 
            fracture of the left fibula.  His examination disclosed 
 
            impaired gait, loss of range of motion of the ankle, and 
 
            atrophy of the entire foot and leg.  He described his 
 
            diagnosis as residuals of a crush injury to the left leg.  
 
            He suspected that claimant sustained damage to the contents 
 
            of the posterior and deep posterior compartments, primarily 
 
            muscle damage, with resulting fibrosis and scarring.  Dr. 
 
            Campbell concluded on May 1, 1985, "He has sustained a very 
 
            serious injury, and his situation is complicated by the fact 
 
            that the appearance of the leg does not reflect how very 
 
            serious this injury actually was."  (Cl. Ex. 5, p. 2)  He 
 
            further stated that claimant's duties at work should be 
 
            restricted to desk work with minimal walking.  He should 
 
            elevate his foot often, at least ten minutes out of every 
 
            hour (Cl. Ex. 5, p. 3).  After claimant was taken off of 
 
            blood thinners, a needle EMG examination on November 26, 
 
            1985 did not suggest any peripheral neuropathy or other 
 
            neurologic abnormality (Cl. Ex. 5, p. 4).  On December 9, 
 
            1985, Dr. Campbell said that claimant's injuries are 
 
            permanent.  He assessed a 14 percent permanent functional 
 
            impairment to the body as a whole (Cl. Ex. 5, p. 5; Def. Ex. 
 

 
            
 
            Page   4
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            5, p. 2).  On January 9, 1986, Dr. Campbell translated that 
 
            his 14 percent whole body rating would translate to a 27 
 
            percent permanent functional impairment rating of the left 
 
            leg (Def. Ex. 5, p. 1).
 
            Claimant has voiced numerous other complaints which are 
 
            recorded by numerous other doctors.  Dr. Campbell thought 
 
            some of them might be the result of compensation or abnormal 
 
            use of other parts of the body because of problems with the 
 
            left lower extremity (Cl. Ex. 5, p. 8).  Among other things, 
 
            claimant complained of pain from his left leg to his left 
 
            armpit and his left shoulder and the whole left side of his 
 
            body.  Claimant has complained of and has been examined for 
 
            pain to the right leg and ankle.  His family physician, Dr. 
 
            Haakenson, testified, "The portions of his anatomy that are 
 
            impaired are limited to that left leg, primarily below the 
 
            knee.  I'm not aware of anything measurable or that you can 
 
            document in other parts of his body."  (Def. Ex. 2, p. 5)
 
            Dr. Haakenson further testified:
 
               In reading recently in one of the major textbooks on 
 
            neurology and pain disorders, I believe that this patient 
 
            fit the current description of something called chronic 
 
            benign intractable pain syndrome.  And this is just a 
 
            description of this kind of situation.  Where there has been 
 
            an injury with or without complications and persistent pain 
 
            that does not quit.
 
            
 
            (Def. Ex. 2, p. 6)
 
            This description, chronic benign intractable pain syndrome, 
 
            gives claimant's complaints a diagnostic description in 
 
            medical terminology, but neither Dr. Haakenson nor any other 
 
            doctors who mentioned chronic pain syndrome stated that this 
 
            condition was the cause of any functional impairment, either 
 
            temporary or permanent.
 
            After the period of temporary disability, claimant returned 
 
            to work and worked for employer for a period of 
 
            approximately three or three and one-half years within the 
 
            restrictions imposed by Dr. Campbell.  It was claimant who 
 
            voluntarily terminated his employment on November 18, 1988, 
 
            after his workers' compensation benefits terminated, in 
 
            order to pursue social security benefits (Def. Ex. 4).  
 
            Claimant acknowledged in his testimony that he did, in fact, 
 
            quit his employment in order to apply for social security 
 
            disability benefits (Tr., p. 71).  Initially, social 
 
            security benefits were denied, but on appeal they were 
 
            granted (Tr., p. 61).  Several of claimant's physicians, to 
 
            mention only Dr. Wolbrink, Dr. Campbell and Dr. Haakenson, 
 
            have clearly stated that claimant's chronic pain syndrome 
 
            would be alleviated if the workers' compensation lawsuit 
 
            were settled (Def. Ex. 2, p. 7).
 
            Richard E. Finlayson, M.D., a psychiatrist at the Mayo 
 
            Clinic, stated on February 29, 1988 that the psychological 
 
            or emotional component of this complaint was possibly 
 
            effected by excessive medication use, more specifically, 
 
            Darvocet.  He recommended a milder medication, Elavil (Cl. 
 

 
            
 
            Page   5
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            Ex. 47).  Claimant stated at the hearing that he was now 
 
            taking Dolavid, which was a non-narcotic medication because 
 
            he had to get away from the narcotic medications which he 
 
            had taken for a long period of time.
 
            Claimant was also examined by Sant M. S. Hayreh, M.D., a 
 
            neurologist, on December 22, 1986.  He commented that 
 
            claimant smokes one pack of cigarettes a week, drinks two or 
 
            three cans of beer a day, and also drinks about one and 
 
            one-half pots of coffee a day.  He concluded, (1) that 
 
            claimant had persistent leg pain, and (2) the episode of 
 
            tunnel vision on December 18, 1986 was most likely 
 
            functional in nature associated with an anxiety attack.  He 
 
            recommended that claimant quit smoking, quit drinking 
 
            coffee, eat meals on a regular basis, begin a low fat diet, 
 
            and restrict his medications to aspirin (Cl. Ex. 49).
 
            Dr. Haakenson further testified as follows:  "He describes a 
 
            wide variety of body aches and pains and weakness and 
 
            different sensations from time to time.  They do not follow 
 
            any consistent pattern.  And I have encouraged him to see 
 
            other specialists, trying to track these down.  There has 
 
            been no firm answer or documentation that there are physical 
 
            problems in other parts of the body."  (Def. Ex. 2, p. 8)
 
            Claimant saw John R. Walker, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, 
 
            for an evaluation and Dr. Walker reported on April 8, 1988, 
 
            in a very detailed medical report which concluded that 
 
            claimant sustained a permanent impairment of 20 percent of 
 
            the whole man.  Dr. Walker had no further recommendation for 
 
            claimant (Cl. Ex. 29).  Dr. Walker sent his findings to the 
 
            social security disability division on July 22, 1988 (Cl. 
 
            Ex. 6).
 
            Dr. Walker further testified by deposition on September 28, 
 
            1989.  Dr. Walker said he did find some atrophy of the left 
 
            forearm but he did not see how you could connect a crush 
 
            injury to the left leg to the left hand or forearm (Def. Ex. 
 
            1, p. 8).  He said that he could not connect the complaints 
 
            of dorsal back pain to the left leg (Cl. Ex. 1, p. 8).  He 
 
            said claimant told him that the physical therapist said it 
 
            was due to bad posture (Def. Ex. 1, p. 7).  Dr. Walker was 
 
            not able to connect up his right ankle complaints with this 
 
            injury (Def. Ex. 1, p. 7).  He did find that claimant 
 
            sustained a serious injury to his left lower extremity and 
 
            on this occasion he evaluated claimant with having a 
 
            permanent partial impairment of 40 percent to the left lower 
 
            extremity based upon his own personal judgment and based to 
 
            some extent on the Guides to Evaluation of Permanent 
 
            Impairment, American Medical Association (Def. Ex. 1, pp. 
 
            9-10).  He reiterated he could not connect the left arm 
 
            injury to the left leg (Def. Ex. 1, p. 10).  He said other 
 
            doctors had attributed the left shoulder injury to muscle 
 
            strain (Def. Ex. 1, p. 11).
 
            In summary, claimant has established an injury to his left 
 
            lower extremity.  There is no convincing evidence from any 
 
            doctor that the injury extends to the body as a whole.  
 
            There is no permanent injury to his lungs.  There was no 
 

 
            
 
            Page   6
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            evidence that the chronic benign intractable pain syndrome 
 
            suggested by Dr. Haakenson is the cause of any permanent 
 
            impairment.  Wherefore, it is determined that claimant has 
 
            sustained a permanent impairment to the lower left extremity 
 
            of 27 percent which entitled claimant to 59.4 weeks of 
 
            permanent partial disability benefits under Iowa Code 
 
            section 85.34(2)(o).  The commencement date of permanent 
 
            partial disability benefits begins on November 27, 1985 at 
 
            the conclusion of healing period.  Iowa Code section 
 
            85.34(2).
 
            medical expenses
 
            Claimant presented a bill in the amount of $280.92 in order 
 
            to have a fabricated ramp made to load his electric car, 
 
            called a pace saver, into and out of his vehicle (Tr., pp. 
 
            79 & 80).  Defendants have refused to pay this bill.  It is 
 
            determined that claimant is entitled to recover this 
 
            expense.  Dr. Campbell clearly recommended that claimant use 
 
            the pace saver, itself (Cl. Ex. 2, p. 9).  Dr. Wolbrink 
 
            recommended a pace saver as "medically necessary."  (Cl. Ex. 
 
            39, p. 2)  The purpose of the pace saver was to enable 
 
            claimant to get to the plant from a distant parking lot when 
 
            his close-in parking privileges had been revoked by employer 
 
            for overall security reasons at the plant.  It is determined 
 
            that the pace saver electric car would be of little value to 
 
            claimant of he were not able to transport it to and from 
 
            work.  Wherefore, it is determined that claimant is entitled 
 
            to payment for the fabricated ramp in the amount of $280.92, 
 
            which enabled claimant to take it to and from work (Cl. Ex. 
 
            31).
 
            Claimant has submitted expenses for radiology and treatment 
 
            to his right ankle and knee (Cl. Ex. 33).  Claimant did not 
 
            establish that his right leg complaints were caused by the 
 
            injury of October 8, 1984.  Therefore, these expenses cannot 
 
            be awarded to claimant (Tr., pp. 81-84).
 
            Claimant has submitted several drug expenses totaling 
 
            $382.26 from Snyder Drugs (Cl. Ex. 34).  Claimant testified 
 
            generally that these expenses were due to this injury but 
 
            there is no evidence from the prescriptions themselves or 
 
            otherwise that they were caused by the injury to the left 
 
            lower extremity which occurred on October 8, 1984 (Tr. Ex. 
 
            80 & 81).  These expenses are denied.
 
            Claimant presented bills from Mayo Clinic for October 16, 
 
            1987, March 11, 1988, and August 12, 1988 (Cl. Ex. 37).  
 
            None of these are itemized bills.  They are all balance due 
 
            bills.  Even though claimant made the general statement that 
 
            they were associated with this injury, there was no specific 
 
            evidence what these charges are for or that they were caused 
 
            by the injury to the left lower extremity on October 8, 1984 
 
            (Tr., p. 85).
 
            Wherefore, the only allowance for medical expenses is for 
 
            the fabricated ramp to load and unload the pace saver in the 
 
            amount of $280.92.
 
            conclusions of law
 
            Wherefore, based upon the evidence presented, and the 
 

 
            
 
            Page   7
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            foregoing and following principles of law, these conclusions 
 
            of law are made:
 
            That the injury of October 8, 1984 was the cause of 
 
            permanent disability to claimant's left lower extremity.  
 
            Bodish v. Fischer, Inc., 257 Iowa 516, 133 N.W.2d 867 
 
            (1965); Lindahl v. L. O. Boggs, 236 Iowa 296, 18 N.W.2d 607 
 
            (1945).
 
            That claimant proved that the injury was to a scheduled 
 
            member.  Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(o).
 
            That claimant did not sustain the burden of proof by a 
 
            preponderance of the evidence that the injury to his left 
 
            lower extremity extended to the body as a whole.  Dailey v. 
 
            Pooley Lumber Co., 233 Iowa 758, 10 N.W.2d 569 (1943); 
 
            Soukup v. Shores Co., 222 Iowa 272, 268 N.W. 598 (1936).
 
            That claimant is entitled to 59.4 weeks of permanent partial 
 
            disability benefits based upon a 27 percent permanent 
 
            partial impairment to the left leg.  Iowa Code section 
 
            85.34(2)(o).
 
            That claimant has sustained the burden of proof that he is 
 
            entitled to $280.92 in medical expenses for the fabricated 
 
            ramp to load and unload the pace saver.
 
            That claimant did not sustain the burden of proof by a 
 
            preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to recover 
 
            the expenses to the right leg (Cl. Ex. 33) or the pharmacy 
 
            expenses (Cl. Ex. 34) or the Mayo Clinic bills (Cl. Ex. 37).
 

 
            
 
            Page   8
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            order
 
            THEREFORE, it is ordered:
 
            That no further amounts are due to claimant from defendants 
 
            for workers' compensation weekly benefits because the 
 
            parties have stipulated that defendants paid claimant his 
 
            entitlement to temporary disability benefits prior to 
 
            hearing and permanent partial disability benefits of 
 
            fifty-nine point four (59.4) weeks of permanent disability 
 
            benefits have also already been paid to claimant prior to 
 
            hearing.
 
            That defendants pay to claimant or the provider of services 
 
            two hundred eighty and 92/100 dollars ($280.92) for the 
 
            fabricated ramp for the pace saver.
 
            That the costs of this action are charged to defendants, 
 
            pursuant to Division of Industrial Services Rule 343-4.33.
 
            That defendants file any claim reports requested by this 
 
            agency, pursuant to Division of Industrial Services Rule 
 
            343-3.1.
 
            
 
            Signed and filed this ______ day of November, 1990.
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                      ______________________________
 
                      WALTER R. McMANUS, JR.
 
                      DEPUTY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            
 
            Copies to:
 
            
 
            Mr Charles H Levad
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            15 1st St NE  Ste 302
 
            Mason City IA 50401
 
            
 
            Mr Harry W Dahl Sr
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            974 73rd St  Ste 16
 
            Des Moines IA 50312
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
                   51401; 51402.40; 51402.60
 
                   51703; 51803.1; 52501
 
                   Filed November 2, 1990
 
                   Walter R. McManus, Jr.
 
         before the iowa industrial commissioner
 
         ____________________________________________________________
 
                   :
 
         CHARLES BARLOON,    :
 
                   :
 
              Claimant, :
 
                   :        File No. 777364
 
         vs.       :
 
                   :
 
         WINNEBAGO INDUSTRIES,    :     A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                   :
 
              Employer, :        D E C I S I O N
 
                   :
 
         and       :
 
                   :
 
         SENTRY INSURANCE,   :
 
                   :
 
              Insurance Carrier,  :
 
              Defendants.    :
 
         ___________________________________________________________
 
         
 
         51401; 51402.40; 51402.60; 51703; 51803.1
 
         It was determined that claimant sustained an injury to his left 
 
         lower leg and that none of his other many symptoms and complaints 
 
         were proven to be caused by this injury.
 
         Claimant was awarded 27% of the left leg based on treating 
 
         physician's evaluation.  Evaluating physician's 40% evaluation 
 
         was ignored because the evaluation report was not well reasoned, 
 
         explained, reliable or realistic with respect to the 40% rating.
 
         Defendants had already paid claimant the amount of the award 
 
         prior to hearing and were entitled to an offset for this amount.  
 
         Therefore, claimant took nothing as weekly benefits.
 
         
 
         52501
 
         Claimant did prove he was entitled to the cost of installing a 
 
         ramp onto his vehicle so he could take his pace saver to and from 
 
         work.  Two doctors confirmed the need for a pace saver.  It was 
 
         of little value if claimant could not take it to and from work.
 
         Bills for other parts of the body were rejected.
 
         Pharmacy bills that could not be connected to this injury by 
 
         medical evidence were rejected.  Claimant's very general 
 
         statement that they were for this injury was not sufficient to 
 
         warrant payment of the bills.
 
         Balance due bills from the Mayo Clinic which did not show what 
 
         they were for were rejected because there was no way to connect 
 
         them to the injury in this case.
 
         
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
         
 
         
 
         HARRIET DEN HARTOG,
 
         Executor of the Estate of
 
         LARRY DEN HARTOG, Deceased,
 
                                                     File No. 777409
 
              Claimant,
 
                                                  A R B I T R A T I O N
 
         vs.
 
                                                    D E C I S I O N
 
         FARMERS COOP OIL ASSOC.,
 
         
 
              Employer,                                 F I L E D
 
         
 
         and                                           MAR 04 1988
 
         
 
         FARMLAND MUTUAL,                     IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
         
 
              Insurance Carrier,
 
              Defendants.
 
         
 
         
 
                                   INTRODUCTION
 
         
 
              This is a hearing in arbitration brought by Harriet Den 
 
         Hartog, executor of the estate of Larry Den Hartog, claimant, 
 
         against Farmers Coop Oil Company, employer, and Farmland Mutual 
 
         Insurance Company, insurance carrier, defendants, for benefits as 
 
         a result of an alleged injury that occurred on May 16, 1984.  A 
 
         hearing was held on May 20, 1987 at Des Moines, Iowa and the case 
 
         was fully submitted at the close of the hearing.  The record 
 
         consists of the testimony of Harriet Den Hartog (claimant), 
 
         William J. Muilenburg (coop manager), claimant's exhibits A 
 
         through Z, AA through ZZ, AAA through ZZZ, AAAA, BBBB, and CCCC 
 
         and defendants' exhibits 1 through 13.  Both counsel submitted 
 
         outstanding briefs.
 
         
 
                                STIPULATIONS
 
         
 
              The parties stipulated to the following matters.
 
         
 
              That an employer-employee relationship existed between 
 
         claimant and employer at the time of the alleged injury.
 
         
 
              That if it is determined that claimant sustained an injury 
 
         arising out of and in the course of his employment with employer, 
 
         then it is stipulated that the injury was the cause of temporary 
 
         disability and that claimant is entitled to temporary disability 
 
         benefits from May 16, 1984 through October 31, 1984.
 
         
 
              That the type of permanent disability, if the injury is 
 
         found to be a cause of permanent disability, is industrial 
 
         disability to the body as a whole.
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
         
 
              That the commencement date for permanent partial disability 
 
         benefits, in the event such benefits are awarded, is November 1, 
 
         1984.
 
         
 
              That the rate of compensation, in the event of an award, is 
 
         $172.35 per week.
 
         
 
              That the providers of medical services would testify that 
 
         the fees charged were reasonable and defendants are not offering 
 
         contrary evidence.
 
         
 
              That the providers of medical services would testify that 
 
         the treatment was reasonable and necessary for the alleged injury 
 
         and defendants are not offering contrary evidence.
 
         
 
              That the medical expenses are causally related to the injury 
 
         but the causal connection to a work injury remains an issue to be 
 
         decided in this case.
 
         
 
              That no credits are claimed by defendants under Iowa Code 
 
         Section 85.38(2) for the previous payment of benefits under an 
 
         employee nonoccupational group plan or for workers' compensation 
 
         benefits paid prior to the hearing.
 
         
 
              That the claim for Iowa Code Section 86.13 penalty benefits 
 
         has been bifurcated from these proceedings.
 
         
 
                                   ISSUES
 
         
 
              The parties presented the following issues for determination 
 
         at the time of the hearing.
 
         
 
              Whether claimant sustained an injury on May 16, 1984 which 
 
         arose out of and in the course of employment with employer.
 
         
 
              Whether the alleged injury is the cause of permanent 
 
         disability.
 
         
 
              Whether claimant is entitled to weekly compensation for 
 
         permanent disability benefits, and if so, the nature and extent 
 
         of benefits.
 
         
 
              Whether claimant is entitled to medical benefits under Iowa 
 
         Code Section 85.27.
 
         
 
              Whether claimant's injury was caused by his own willful 
 
         intent to injure himself.
 
         
 
              Whether claimant's injury was caused by his intoxication 
 
         which did not arise out of and in the course of his employment, 
 
         but was due to the effects of alcohol or another narcotic, 
 
         depressant, stimulant, hallucinogenic, or hypnotic drug not 
 
         prescribed by an authorized medical practitioner which was a 
 
         substantial factor in causing the injury.
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
         
 
              That in the event it is determined that claimant sustained 
 
         an injury arising out of and in the course of employment, and in 
 
         the event it is determined that the claim is not barred by 
 
         willful intent to injure or his intoxication, then whether the 
 
         claim of Harriet Den Hartog, as executor of the estate of Larry 
 
         Den Hartog, is barred by Iowa Code Section 85.31(4) because Larry 
 
         Den Hartog died on September 8, 1985 from unrelated causes while 
 
         this claim was yet unliquidated.
 
         
 
              The issue of penalty benefits under Iowa Code Section 86.13 
 
         is bifurcated.
 
         
 
                          SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE
 
         
 
              All of the evidence was examined and considered.  The 
 
         following is a summary of the pertinent evidence.
 
         
 
              Counsel for the defendants made a very comprehensive, yet 
 
         succinct summary of much of the pertinent evidence in this case 
 
         in his post-hearing brief.  Therefore, a large portion of his 
 
         summary will be used as an overview of the facts of this case.  
 
         His summary will then be supplemented by additional evidence and 
 
         other evidence which is also pertinent to the determination of 
 
         this case.
 
         
 
                   Larry Den Hartog began working for Farmers Coop Oil 
 
              Association on January 4, 1984.  Mr. Den Hartog had a 
 
              history of alcohol abuse and during the previous six months 
 
              had twice been a patient at alcohol treatment centers.  When 
 
              Mr. Den Hartog was hired, William J. Muilenburg, the manager 
 
              of Farmers Coop Oil Association, informed Mr. Den Hartog 
 
              that any evidence of drinking on the job would be grounds 
 
              for immediate termination.
 
         
 
                   In late April or early May, Mr. Muilenburg was informed 
 
              by a citizen that Larry Den Hartog had been seen purchasing 
 
              alcohol at a local establishment.  When confronted by Mr. 
 
              Muilenburg with this allegation, Larry Den Hartog denied 
 
              that he had returned to drinking.
 
         
 
                   In March or April, Farmland Industries announced a 
 
              seminar in Kansas City dealing with LP gas safety.  After a 
 
              discussion with Mr. Muilenburg, Larry Den Hartog agreed to 
 
              go to the school in Kansas City. Larry Den Hartog understood 
 
              the schedule was for three days of classes beginning Tuesday 
 
              morning May 15 and continuing through Thursday afternoon, 
 
              May 17.  Mr. Den Hartog agreed to drive his own vehicle from 
 
              Orange City to Kansas City on Monday, May 14 and return from 
 
              Kansas City either late Thursday, May 17 or early Friday, 
 
              May 18.
 
         
 
                   In Kansas City, Farmland Industries has a 
 
              self-contained schooling facility with dormitory rooms, 
 
              dining facilities and auditoriums and meeting rooms where 
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
                   seminars are conducted.  Larry Den Hartog's food and lodging 
 
              had been prepaid with the registration for the seminar.
 
         
 
                   Farmers Coop Oil Association's business practice is to 
 
              reimburse an employee's actual out-of-pocket expenses for 
 
              gas and meals en route to and from work seminars.
 
         
 
                   At approximately 6:00 a.m. on May 14, Larry Den Hartog 
 
              went to the offices of Farmers Coop Oil Association and told 
 
              Bill Muilenburg's secretary that Mr. Muilenburg had 
 
              authorized an advance of $100.00 for travel expenses to 
 
              Kansas City.  The secretary complied with the request.  Mr. 
 
              Den Hartog then promptly left for Kansas City.
 
         
 
                   When Mr. Muilenburg learned of the request, he was 
 
              angry because, 1) employees normally got no advance monies 
 
              and simply received reimbursement for amounts actually sent; 
 
              2) Larry Den Hartog lied when he said the advance had been 
 
              authorized by Mr. Muilenburg; and 3) $100.00 was more than 
 
              twice the amount which was generally needed for gas and food 
 
              on the road during the round trip to and from Kansas City.
 
         
 
                   Larry Den Hartog arrived in Kansas City late in the 
 
              afternoon of Monday, May 14.  Mr. Den Hartog was assigned to 
 
              a double room which he shared with another seminar 
 
     
 
                          
 
                                                         
 
              participant.  The following morning Larry Den Hartog's 
 
              roommate left for breakfast and attendance of the seminar 
 
              meetings before Larry Den Hartog was out of bed.
 
         
 
                   Larry Den Hartog did not attend any of the seminar 
 
              sessions which began early Tuesday morning May 15.  When a 
 
              representative of the school went looking for Larry Den 
 
              Hartog on Tuesday morning May 15, Mr. Den Hartog was not in 
 
              the room and he had taken his belongings with him.
 
         
 
                   Larry Den Hartog never attended any of the seminar 
 
              sessions on May 15, 16 or 17.
 
         
 
                   There is no evidence of the whereabouts of Larry Den 
 
              Hartog from 7:00 a.m. May 15 through 9:00 a.m.
 
              May 16.
 
         
 
                   There is no evidence in this record that Mr. Den Hartog 
 
              was engaged in any activity in furtherance of his employer's 
 
              business from 7:00 a.m. Tuesday, May 15 through 9:00 a.m. 
 
              Wednesday, May 16.  When Larry Den Hartog was specifically 
 
              asked if he had been doing anything within the scope of his 
 
              employment, he failed to answer (Def.'s Ex. 2, p. 23, 
 
              Interrogatory No. 29).
 
         
 
                   At approximately 8:50 a.m. on Wednesday, May 16 Larry 
 
              Den Hartog was involved in a single-vehicle accident at a 
 
              location approximately 100 miles north of Kansas City when 
 
              Mr. Den Hartog's vehicle abruptly left the road and ran into 
 
              a concrete bridge pillar.
 
         
 
                   At the time of the accident, his employer and his wife 
 
              both expected that Mr. Den Hartog would have been attending 
 
              classes in Kansas City.
 
         
 
                   Mr. Muilenburg testified that if Larry Den Hartog had 
 
              appeared at the offices of Farmers Coop Oil Association on 
 
              Wednesday, May 16 with no explanation of where he had been 
 
              or why he was not attending the seminar, Mr. Den Hartog 
 
              would have been terminated from his employment.
 
         
 
                   Farmers Coop Oil Association never paid Larry Den 
 
              Hartog any wages for May 15 and 16, 1984 since there was no 
 
              evidence Mr. Den Hartog was acting on behalf of his employer 
 
              on those dates.
 
         
 
                   As a result of injuries sustained in the motor vehicle 
 
              accident, Larry Den Hartog was hospitalized for extensive 
 
              treatment in Omaha, Sioux City, and Orange City.  Following 
 
              his release from the hospital and his release to return to 
 
              work, Mr. Den Hartog never contacted Bill Muilenburg seeking 
 
              re-employment at Farmers Coop Oil Association.  Rather, 
 
              Larry Den Hartog took a job with the Sioux County Sheriff's 
 
              Department for wages which exceeded the wages he had 
 
              previously been paid at Farmers Oil Association.  Larry Den 
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
                   Hartog began work November 1, 1984 and worked until June 23, 
 
              1985, when he was terminated for drinking on the job.  In 
 
              July or August 1984 Mr. Den Hartog was treated for 
 
              alcoholism at the Calvary Rehabilitation Center in Phoenix, 
 
              Arizona.  On or about September 7 or September 8, 1985, Mr. 
 
              Den Hartog died in Phoenix, Arizona from causes not related 
 
              to the injury on May 6, 1984.
 
         
 
              This excellent summary is now supplemented by the following 
 
         additional and other evidence.
 
         
 
              Harriet Den Hartog, testified that the decedent, Larry Den 
 
         Hartog, hung himself while on work release from the 
 
         rehabilitation center in Phoenix, Arizona at 6:00 a.m. on Sunday, 
 
         September 8, 1985.  She stated that she had talked to him a week 
 
         before, and that claimant saw her brother in Mesa, Arizona the 
 
         week before his death, and claimant sounded good, he liked his 
 
         job and seemed to be doing well (Exhibit 1, pages 5-8).
 
         
 
              Claimant, while he was living, summarized his own 
 
         institutional treatment for alcoholism at interrogatory number 
 
         12.
 
         
 
               a.  Alcoholism
 
               b.  Unknown
 
               c.  State Hospital                  d.  30 days - May, 
 
                    1966
 
                   Cherokee, IA
 
         
 
                   Keystone Treament [sic] Center      30 days - Oct. 
 
                   1972
 
                   Canton, SD
 
         
 
                   State Hospital                      10 days - Jan. 
 
                   1973
 
                   Cherokee
 
         
 
                   Keystone Treament [sic] Center      30 days - July - 
 
                   1983
 
                   Canton, SD
 
         
 
                   Calvary Rehab. Center               42 days - Oct. 
 
                   1983
 
                   Phoenix, Ariz.
 
         
 
                   Calvary Rehab. Center               June 18, 1985 - 
 
                   Phoenix, Ariz.
 
         
 
         (Ex. 2, p. 8)
 
         
 
              An examination of claimant's treatment records do not 
 
         indicate he was suicidal.  On the contrary, the only time suicide 
 
         was specifically mentioned, Dr. Robert A. Komer, D.O., at 
 
         Cherokee stated on January 5, 1973 "There is no evident suicidal 
 
         rumination."  (Ex. 6, p. 14).  On another occasion when claimant 
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
         was admitted on August 4, 1966, his wife indicated on the 
 
         Commitment Notes that claimant was not suicidal (Ex. 5, p. 11). 
 
         Other than these two recorded references which indicate that 
 
         claimant was not suicidal, there is no evidence in the record on 
 
         the subject of suicide until claimant did in fact hang himself on 
 
         September 8, 1985.
 
         
 
              The hospital treatment records do record a fainting episode 
 
         (Ex. 5, pp. 5 & 15).  This had never happened before and claimant 
 
         was real confused afterwards (Ex. 5, p. 23).  This happened while 
 
         claimant was hospitalized at Cherokee on August 4, 1966.
 
         
 
              When claimant was hospitalized at Keystone on July 21, 1983, 
 
         he indicated on a Medical History that he had had blackouts years 
 
         ago (Ex. 7, p. 5).  Claimant suffered another episode of loss of 
 
         consciousness at this institution which was described briefly as 
 
         follows.
 
         
 
                   On his fifth day of treatment, the patient again 
 
              admitted to drinking beer which, he stated, "another patient 
 
              bought for me".  When confronted and threatened with 
 
              dismissal, the patient suffered a Gran Mall seizure in the 
 
              counselor's office.  A staff doctor was in attendance at the 
 
              time.  The patient suffered some temporary loss of memory, 
 
              but appeared improved within 72 hours.  He was allowed to 
 
              remain at Keystone.  The patient frequently spoke of 
 
              "leaving treatment early".
 
         
 
         (Ex. 7, p. 14)
 
         
 
              Claimant stated a number of times at the treatment 
 
         facilities that his drinking began to be a serious problem after 
 
         his first daughter, Kelly, was born a paraplegic on December 13, 
 
         1962 (Ex. 5, p. 3; Ex. 7. p. 12).
 
         
 
              Claimant's wife testified that he did not have any money to 
 
         take to school at Kansas City and she had none to give him, so he 
 
         got $100.00 from his employer before he left.  When she met him 
 
         at the hospital in Omaha after the accident he still had $86.00 
 
         and some odd change left, which in her opinion was just about 
 
         what he needed for gas for his car (Ex. 1, pp. 11-16; Ex. 13, p. 
 
         37).  She testified that Muilenburg told her to keep the $86.00 
 
         (Ex. 1, p. 38).
 
         
 
              Claimant's wife testified that she tried to talk to her 
 
         husband and find out how the accident happened.  He did not 
 
         remember anything after the accident.  He did not remember 
 
         whether he attended classes or when he left his room (Ex. 1, pp. 
 
         17-21). She testified that claimant took a lie detector test to 
 
         prove that he was telling the truth when he said he did not 
 
         remember what happened (Ex. 1, p. 23).
 
         
 
              In response to interrogatory number 29, claimant gave this 
 
         account of his memory while he was still living.
 
         
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
                   Left Orange City and drove to Kansas City and checked 
 
              in at Seminar site and was given a room.
 
         
 
              b.   In route from Orange City to Kansas City and at the 
 
              seminar site.
 
         
 
              c.  Left Orange City early in the morning of May 14th and 
 
              drove throughout the day and reached the seminar site late 
 
              in the afternoon.  Went to bed about Suppertime.  Woke up 
 
              during the night sometime on the night of May 14th and the 
 
              morning of May 15th and went to the bathroom.  Sometime 
 
              early in the morning of May 14th, a roommate invited me to 
 
              go to breakfast but I felt too sick to get up at that time.  
 
              Was involved in a one car accident on the 16th of May but 
 
              have no recollection of same.
 
         
 
         (Ex. 2, p. 23)
 
         
 
              Claimant's wife testified that their daughter told her that 
 
         claimant had a bad headache the morning he left town on Monday, 
 
         May 14, 1984.  She further testified that claimant was sick and 
 
         did not feel good on Sunday night before he left town (Ex. 1, pp. 
 
         18 & 19).  Claimant's wife denied that her husband had returned 
 
         to drinking before leaving for Kansas City (Ex. 1, pp. 50 & 51).  
 
         She said that she had no idea where her husband was during the 
 
         approximate 24 hour period prior to the accident (Ex. 1, p. 23). 
 
         She further testified that she visited that accident scene 
 
         approximately one and one-half weeks later.  It appeared to her 
 
         that his car had left the road gradually (Ex. 1, pp. 21 & 22).
 
         
 
              Claimant's wife was asked if her husband had been drinking 
 
         at the time of the accident and she responded as follows.
 
         
 
                          
 
                                                         
 
                   Q.  And what did you learn from the highway patrolman?
 
         
 
                   A.  He said that -- The first thing I asked, I said, 
 
              "Was there drinking involved?"  He said, "I've been a 
 
              patrolman for 25 years."  And he said, "I had to get right 
 
              down next to Larry's mouth in order to even understand what 
 
              he was saying."  And he said, "No, there was no alcohol 
 
              involved."  He said, "There's nothing been found in the car, 
 
              there's been no smell on his breath."  And he says, "I know 
 
              what they smell like," he says, "no matter what they've 
 
              had." And he told that to me, and he also told it to one of 
 
              my friends that had taken us down there.
 
         
 
         (Ex. 1, pp. 25-28)
 
         
 
              The patrol report did not show any drinking, arrest or 
 
         improper conduct by the driver.  The patrolman did say that the 
 
         car left the road abruptly on the right side and struck two 
 
         concrete bridge pillars.  Otherwise, the patrolman gave no 
 
         indication how or why the accident happened (Ex. 4; Ex. AAAA).
 
         
 
              Claimant was transferred from the accident scene to Fairfax, 
 
         Missouri Community Hospital and then to Clarkson Hospital in 
 
         Omaha.  Later he was transferred to Marion Health Center in Sioux 
 
         City and eventually Orange City Municipal Hospital.  Claimant 
 
         suffered multiple serious injuries.  Probably the most complete 
 
         but yet succinct listing of his injury situation is found at the 
 
         final impressions made by the Marion Health Center on June 2, 
 
         1984.
 
         
 
              FINAL IMPRESSION:
 
              1. Status post thoracic trauma with multiple fractured ribs 
 
                 bilaterally, history of flail chest, prolonged mechanical 
 
                 ventilation from 5-16 to 5-30, bilateral pneumothorax, 
 
                 and status post chest tube placement.
 
              2. Status post pulmonary contusion.
 
              3. Status post lacerated liver, exploratory laparotomy times 
 
                 two.
 
              4. Status post multiple lacerations with disconnected ear 
 
                 that has been re-attached.
 
              5. Fracture of lumbar vertebra.
 
              6. Right displaced femur fracture.
 
              7. Elevated white count with history of Enterobacter cloacae 
 
                 and 12 days of Gentamycin.
 
              8. Urinary tract infection with resistant pseudomonas, now 
 
                 resolved.
 
              9. Status post hypoxemia, now non-hypoxemic.
 
              10. Confusion, resolved.
 
              11. History of alcohol abuse in the past.
 
              12. Tobacco abuse.
 
         
 
         (Ex. VV)
 
         
 
              The emergency room physician in Missouri, E. L. Niedermeyer, 
 
         M.D., stated that he did not take a blood alcohol test but he 
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
         added that he did not have any indication or reason for drawing 
 
         an alcohol blood level, and he did not necessarily suspect 
 
         alcohol was involved in this situation at that time (Ex. F).  
 
         None of the hospital records at Clarkson Hospital in Omaha, 
 
         mention or give any indication or suspicion that alcohol was 
 
         involved in this accident or that claimant was intoxicated at the 
 
         time of the injury (Exs., Y, Z, AA-RR).
 
         
 
              Claimant answered interrogatory number 22 as follows while 
 
         he was living.
 
         
 
                   Interrogatory No. 22:  State with specificity the basis 
 
              for your contention that the injury arose out of and in the 
 
              course of your employment with this employer.
 
         
 
                   Answer:
 
              As part of my job, I was sent to Kansas City at Employer 
 
              expense to attend a seminar.  I was told to provide my own 
 
              transportation, for which I would be reimbursed and I was 
 
              paid my full salary for the trip to Kansas City attending at 
 
              the seminar and return.  I was returning to my home from 
 
              Kansas City at the time of the automobile accident.
 
         
 
         (Ex. 2, p. 16)
 
         
 
              Claimant's wife testified that he did not return to work at 
 
         the Coop because after the accident he could not handle the 
 
         physical aspects of the job like handling the large tanks (Ex. 1, 
 
         p. 36).
 
         
 
              William J. Muilenburg, employer's manager, testified that he 
 
         hired claimant as a driver salesman delivering LP gas on a bulk 
 
         truck which was a job that required exertion and physical effort 
 
         (Ex. 13, pp. 5-15).  He testified that claimant agreed to go to 
 
         school in Kansas City.  Claimant was to be paid on the basis of 
 
         the average hours he would have worked if he had not gone to 
 
         school.  His tuition, lodging and food for the school were all 
 
         paid by employer.  The employee was to drive his own vehicle and 
 
         be reimbursed his automobile expenses when he returned (Ex. 13, 
 
         pp. 15-24).  Muilenburg said that claimant was not physically 
 
         able to perform this job after the accident (Ex. 13, pp. 35 & 
 
         36). Muilenburg testified that claimant was paid for May 14, 1984 
 
         but he was not paid for May 15 and May 16, 1984.  Claimant was 
 
         allowed to keep the $100.00 that he got as expense money from the 
 
         bookkeeper (Ex. 13, p. 36).  Muilenburg verified that the 
 
         original agreement was that claimant was to be paid while 
 
         attending this school, all of his expenses for attending the 
 
         school were to be paid, and claimant was to be reimbursed for his 
 
         transportation expenses to and from the school (Ex. 13, p. 39).
 
         
 
              The following colloquy transpired between claimant's counsel 
 
         and Muilenburg.
 
         
 
                   Q.  In other words, you didn't expect him to go down to 
 
              Kansas City and be stranded down there?
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
         
 
                   A.  No.
 
         
 
                   Q.  And he would be just as much on the trip coming 
 
              home as he would going down, would he not?
 
         
 
                   A.  Pardon me? I don't understand.
 
         
 
                   Q.  It's as much an essential part of the trip that he 
 
              come home as that he go down?
 
         
 
                   A.  Yes.
 
         
 
                   Q.  And you would certainly expect that the trip down 
 
              would be followed up by a trip home?
 
         
 
                   A.  Yes.
 
         
 
                   Q.  The place where this accident happened, was it on a 
 
              highway for travel that is customarily used to travel 
 
              between Kansas City and Orange City?
 
         
 
                   A.  Yes.
 
         
 
                   Q.  Do you know whether or not this accident happened 
 
              on the portion of the highway for travel that was headed 
 
              toward Orange City or away from Orange City?
 
         
 
                   A.  Well, not having been at the scene of the accident, 
 
              I would -- my answer would be on the way towards Orange 
 
              City.
 
         
 
                   Q.  In other words, it would be northbound, northbound 
 
              portion?
 
         
 
                   A.  Yes.
 
         
 
         (Ex. 13, pp. 39 & 40)
 
         
 
              Muilenburg testified that he did not know of any facts that 
 
         would support a claim that the accident was a willful attempt by 
 
         claimant to injure himself.  Likewise, he testified that he had 
 
         no knowledge of any facts that alcohol or any other drug 
 
         substance was a substantial factor in decedent's automobile 
 
         accident (Ex. 13, pp. 40-48).
 
         
 
              In a response to a request for admissions, Muilenburg 
 
         answered questions five and six as follows.
 
         
 
                   5.  Admit that the accident occurred on the most 
 
              acceptable and appropriate automobile route between Orange 
 
              City, Iowa and Kansas City.
 
         
 
                   Admit.
 
         
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
                   6.  Admit that the claimant's vehicle was travelling 
 
              said route in a direction away from Kansas City and toward 
 
              Orange City, Iowa.
 
         
 
                   Admit.
 
         
 
         (Ex. CCCC)
 
         
 
              Alan Pechacek, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon, who treated 
 
         claimant for his fractured hip and spinal injury, stated that 
 
         claimant suffered multiple injuries and was fortunate to have 
 
         survived the accident.  He began to treat claimant in Sioux City 
 
         on June 2, 1984.  He declared that claimant was temporarily 
 
         totally disabled from the date of the accident May 16, 1984 to 
 
         November 1, 1984 when he was able to perform the light sedentary 
 
         office job for the sheriff as a dispatcher.  He stated that 
 
         claimant could not perform moderate or heavy physical labor 
 
         again, as he had done in the past.  Dr. Pechacek described 
 
         claimant's limitations as follows.
 
         
 
                   At the time that he did return to work in November, 
 
              1984, his recovery was such that he was really only suited 
 
              to a sedentary or light job activity.  He was certainly not 
 
              fit for work activities that would include lifting, 
 
              carrying, bending, turning, or twisting, and prolonged 
 
              standing and/or walking, climbing up and/or down stairs, 
 
              ladders, or on equipment on a continuous or repetitive basis 
 
              throughout a work day.  I feel that he could have performed 
 
              job activities involving a mixture of standing, walking, and 
 
              sitting.  He could probably handle light materials (less 
 
              than 15 lbs.) so far as lifting or carrying are concerned, 
 
              but only on an occasional or intermittent basis.  He was 
 
              probably not suited for prolonged periods of riding or 
 
     
 
                          
 
                                                         
 
              driving vehicles or heavy equipment.
 
         
 
         (Ex. ZZZ)
 
         
 
              Dr. Pechacek applied the Guides to the Evaluation of 
 
         Permanent Impairment, second edition, published by the American 
 
         Medical Association and awarded a five percent permanent 
 
         impairment of the body as a whole for decedent's spinal injury. 
 
         He awarded a seven percent permanent impairment of the right hip 
 
         and converted this to three percent of the body as a whole.  He 
 
         combined these two ratings to eight percent of the body as a 
 
         whole.  He added that he felt that claimant's disability would be 
 
         greater than ten percent because of functional limitations that 
 
         reduced his ability to perform work (Ex. ZZZ).
 
         
 
                         APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS
 
         
 
              An employee is entitled to compensation for any and all 
 
         personal injuries which arise out of and in the course of the 
 
         employment.  Section 85.3(1).
 
         
 
              Claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
 
         evidence that he received an injury on May 16, 1984 which arose 
 
         out of and in the course of his employment.  McDowell v. Town of 
 
         Clarksville, 241 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1976); Musselman v. Central 
 
         Telephone Co., 261 Iowa 352, 154 N.W.2d 128 (1967).
 
         
 
              The injury must both arise out of and be in the course of 
 
         the employment.  Crowe v. DeSoto Consol. Sch. Dist., 246 Iowa 
 
         402, 68 N.W.2d 63 (1955) and cases cited at pp. 405-406 of the 
 
         Iowa Report.  See also Sister Mary Benedict v. St. Mary's Corp., 
 
         255 Iowa 847, 124 N.W.2d 548 (1963) and Hansen v. State of Iowa, 
 
         249 Iowa 1147, 91 N.W.2d 555 (1958).
 
         
 
              The words "out of" refer to the cause or source of the 
 
         injury.  Crowe, 246 Iowa 402, 68 N.W.2d 63.
 
         
 
              The words "in the course of" refer to the time and place and 
 
         circumstances of the injury.  McClure v. Union et al. Counties, 
 
         188 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1971); Crowe, 246 Iowa 402, 68 N.W.2d 63.
 
         
 
              "An injury occurs in the course of the employment when it is 
 
         within the period of employment at a place the employee may 
 
         reasonably be, and while he is doing his work or something 
 
         incidental to it."  Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch. Dist. v. Cady, 278 
 
         N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1979).  McClure, 188 N.W.2d 283, Musselman, 261 
 
         Iowa 352, 154 N.W.2d (1967).
 
         
 
              The claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
 
         the evidence that the injury of May 16, 1984 is causally related 
 
         to the disability on which he now bases his claim.  Bodish v. 
 
         Fischer, Inc., 257 Iowa 516, 133 N.W.2d 867 (1965).  Lindahl v. 
 
         L. O. Boggs, 236 Iowa 296, 18 N.W.2d 607 (1945).  A possibility 
 
         is insufficient; a probability is necessary.  Burt v. John Deere 
 
         Waterloo Tractor Works, 247 Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732 (1955).  The 
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
         question of causal connection is essentially within the domain of 
 
         expert testimony.  Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 251 Iowa 
 
         375, 101 N.W.2d 167 (1960).
 
         
 
              However, expert medical evidence must be considered with all 
 
         other evidence introduced bearing on the causal connection.  
 
         Burt, 247 Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732.  The opinion of experts need 
 
         not be couched in definite, positive or unequivocal language.  
 
         Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1974).  However, 
 
         the expert opinion may be accepted or rejected, in whole or in 
 
         part, by the trier of fact.  Id. at 907.  Further, the weight to 
 
         be given to such an opinion is for the finder of fact, and that 
 
         may be affected by the completeness of the premise given the 
 
         expert and other surrounding circumstances.  Bodish, 257 Iowa 
 
         516, 133 N.W.2d 867.  See also Musselman, 261 Iowa 352, 154 
 
         N.W.2d 128 (1967).
 
         
 
              If claimant has an impairment to the body as a whole, an 
 
         industrial disability has been sustained.  Industrial disability 
 
         was defined in Diederich v. Tri-City Railway Co., 219 Iowa 587, 
 
         593, 258 N.W. 899, 902 (1935) as follows:  "It is therefore plain 
 
         that the legislature intended the term 'disability' to mean 
 
         'industrial disability' or loss of earning capacity and not a 
 
         mere 'functional disability' to be computed in the terms of 
 
         percentages of the total physical and mental ability of a normal 
 
         man."
 
         
 
              Functional impairment is an element to be considered in 
 
         determining industrial disability which is the reduction of 
 
         earning capacity, but consideration must also be given to the 
 
         injured employee's age, education, qualifications, experience and 
 
         inability to engage in employment for which he is fitted.  Olson 
 
         v. Goodyear Service Stores, 255 Iowa 1112, 1121, 125 N.W.2d 251, 
 
         257 (1963).
 
         
 
              Claimant did sustain the burden of proof by a preponderance 
 
         of the evidence that he sustained an injury which arose out of 
 
         and in the course of employment with employer.  The testimony of 
 
         Muilenburg established that there was an agreement that claimant 
 
         was to be paid for attending the school and that all of his 
 
         expenses were to be paid by employer as well as his 
 
         transportation expenses to and from the school for the use of his 
 
         personal vehicle.  Muilenburg's decision to only pay claimant 
 
         through May 14, 1984 was an after the fact unilateral decision 
 
         that was not part of the original agreement.  In effect, 
 
         Muilenburg granted that he had paid claimant for May 15 and May 
 
         16 by permitting the Den Hartogs to keep the $86.00 in expense 
 
         money that was not used during decedents absence.
 
         
 
              Iowa Code Section 85.61(6) provides:
 
                   The words "personal injury arising out of and in the 
 
              course of the employment" shall include injuries to 
 
              employees whose services are being performed on, in, or 
 
              about the premises which are occupied, used, or controlled 
 
              by the employer, and also injuries to those who are engaged 
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
                   elsewhere in places where their employer's business requires 
 
              their presence and subjects them to dangers incident to the 
 
              business.
 
         
 
              Employer, in this case, agreed to pay the employee his 
 
         average hourly wages during the period that he traveled to the 
 
         school and also during the period that he traveled from the 
 
         school to home again.  Employer agreed to pay the employee his 
 
         travel and transportation expenses to the school and to return 
 
         home again. Claimant testified by interrogatory number 22 "I was 
 
         returning home from Kansas City at the time of the automobile 
 
         accident." (Ex. 2, p. 16).  Claimant was 100 miles north of 
 
         Kansas City on the most direct and immediate route to return home 
 
         at the time of the accident.  He was driving in the direction of 
 
         home.  His suitcase was in the car.  Therefore, it is determined 
 
         that the accident occurred while claimant was returning home from 
 
         the school.
 
         
 
              Defendants argue that claimant deviated from his employment 
 
         from the morning of May 15, 1984 until the time of the accident 
 
         on May 16, 1984 because claimant was supposed to be in the 
 
         classrooms at the school.  Actually, defendants are correct when 
 
         they state in their brief "There is no evidence of the 
 
         where-abouts of Larry Den Hartog from 7:00 a.m. May 15 through 
 
         9:00 a.m. May 16."
 
         
 
              If there is absolutely no evidence of where claimant was or 
 
         what he did during this period, it is difficult to state with 
 
         certainty whether he did in fact or did not in fact deviate.  It 
 
         would appear likely that a deviation occurred because claimant 
 
         was expected to be in the classroom but did not attend any of the 
 
         classes.  Assuming that the claimant did deviate, he had 
 
         terminated the deviation when he started home.  In Farmers 
 
         Elevator Co., Kingsley, v. Manning, 286 N.W.2d 174 (Iowa 1979), 
 
         the employee was held to be in the course of employment when 
 
         returning home from a company sponsored dinner when he fell 
 
         asleep at the wheel and was involved in an accident.
 
         
 
              Bulman v. Sanitary Farm Dairies, 247 Iowa 488, 494, 73 
 
         N.W.2nd 27, 30 (1955) held as follows.
 
         
 
                   If the employer assumes the burden of the workman's 
 
              coming and going expense, that is held to imply that the 
 
              time of coming and going is a part of the time of 
 
              employment.  Or when the employer sends him on a special 
 
              mission apart from his usual employment, the coming and 
 
              going time of such mission is implied to be within the 
 
              course of employment.
 
         
 
              Likewise, the claimant in Crees v. Sheldahl Telephone Co., 
 
         258 Iowa 292, 139 N.W.2d 190 (1965) was also found to be in the 
 
         course of employment when involved in an automobile accident 
 
         while returning to his place of employment after an evening meal 
 
         out of town and the employer was in the practice of paying for 
 
         claimant's travel and transportation expenses.
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
         
 
              In addition, the court held in the Crees case "If, after 
 
         deviating from the employment or a temporary abandonment, the 
 
         employee returns to the employment, in this case starts the 
 
         return trip home, and is injured, the injury is compensable."
 
         
 
              In Pohler v. T. W. Snow Constr. Co., 239 Iowa 1018, 33 
 
         N.W.2d 416 (1948) an employee returning to his bunk car from a 
 
         special errand for his employer was held to be in the course of 
 
         employment.  The court said in Pohler that even if it is assumed 
 
         that the employee deviated from his employment, nevertheless, 
 
         when he reached the place where he had turned aside from his 
 
         employment, then the deviation had ended and he had resumed his 
 
         employment.
 
         
 
              The return trip is as much a part of the employment as the 
 
         outbound trip.  Heisler v. Strange Bros. Hide Co., 212 Iowa 848, 
 
         850, 237 N.W.343 (1931).
 
         
 
              In Lamb v. Standard Oil Co., 250 Iowa 911, 916 96 N.W.2d 730 
 
         (1959), the return trip was held to be in the course of 
 
         employment.  It was also held that claimant's temporary 
 
         abandonment (deviation) ended when he started the return trip 
 
         home.  See also 1 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, 19.29.
 
         
 
              Defendants' argument that these cases can be distinguished 
 
         by the fact that the employee completed the business that he was 
 
         sent to do and that Den Hartog did not because he did not attend 
 
         the classes is without merit.  Claimant's employment had not been 
 
         terminated at the time of the accident, even though grounds for 
 
         termination probably existed.  Therefore, it is determined that 
 
         under the facts of this case, that even if it is assumed that a 
 
         deviation occurred, that once claimant started home, the 
 
 
 
                         
 
                                                         
 
         deviation ended and he resumed his employment.  In conclusion, it 
 
         is determined that claimant did receive an injury which arose out 
 
         of and in the course of employment with employer when he was 
 
         involved in an automobile accident on his return trip from Kansas 
 
         City to home on May 16, 1984.
 
         
 
              The parties have agreed by stipulation that the injury was 
 
         the cause of temporary disability and that claimant is entitled 
 
         to temporary disability benefits from March 16, 1984 to November 
 
         1, 1984.
 
         
 
              It is now determined that the injury was the cause of 
 
         permanent disability.  Dr. Pechacek established that there is 
 
         permanent impairment and that it was caused by this injury.  
 
         There is no evidence to suggest otherwise.
 
         
 
              Dr. Pechacek awarded an eight percent permanent functional 
 
         impairment of the body as a whole.  Worse however, are 
 
         claimant's working limitations as described by Dr. Pechacek.  
 
         Moderate to heavy physical labor which claimant had done in the 
 
         past was foreclosed in the future.  Claimant was limited to 
 
         light, sedentary office type of work in which he could stand, 
 
         walk and sit alternately.  He cannot lift or carry over 15 
 
         pounds. Claimant should not lift, carry, bend, turn or twist or 
 
         do any prolonged standing, walking, or climbing.  Claimant is 
 
         entitled to a 40 percent industrial disability to the body as a 
 
         whole. However, due to his death, he is only entitled to receive 
 
         benefits from November 1, 1984 to the date of his death on 
 
         Sunday, September 8, 1985.  Iowa Code Section 85.31(4).  
 
         Claimant is entitled to medical expenses in the amount of 
 
         $79,485.02 as shown in claimant's exhibits CCC through XXX.  The 
 
         report fee of Dr. Pechacek in the amount of $75.00 for a medical 
 
         report is not a medical expense but rather a trial preparation 
 
         expense, however, it may be treated as a cost of this action 
 
         under Division of Industrial Services Rule 343-4.33.  None of 
 
         these medical expenses were disputed by defendants.  On the 
 
         contrary, it was stipulated that they were fair and reasonable 
 
         charges, that the services were reasonable and necessary and 
 
         were causally connected to this injury.
 
         
 
              Iowa Code section 85.16 provides as follows.
 
         
 
                   No compensation under this chapter shall be allowed for 
 
              an injury caused:
 
                   1.  By the employee's willful intent to injure himself 
 
              or to willfully injure another.
 
                   2.  By the employee's intoxication, which did not arise 
 
              out of and in the course of employment but which was due to 
 
              the effects of alcohol or another narcotic, depressant, 
 
              stimulant, hallucinogenic, or hypnotic drug not prescribed 
 
              by an authorized medical practitioner, if the intoxication 
 
              was a substantial factor in causing the injury.
 
                   3.  By the willful act of a third party directed 
 
              against the employee for reasons personal to such employee.
 
         
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
              Defendants have the burden of proving the affirmative 
 
         defense of willful intent to injure himself.  Reddick v. Grand 
 
         Union Tea Co., 230 Iowa 108, 296 N.W. 800 (1941).  There is 
 
         absolutely no evidence to indicate that claimant willfully 
 
         intended to injure himself at the time of the automobile accident 
 
         and injury on March 16, 1984 or at any other time.  On the 
 
         contrary, there only two times that suicide is specifically 
 
         mentioned in the record and the evidence supports the proposition 
 
         that claimant was not suicidal. When claimant's wife committed 
 
         him to Cherokee, on August 4, 1966, she made a recorded statement 
 
         that he was not suicidal (Ex. 5, p. 11).  Dr. Komer, on January 
 
         5, 1973, stated that there was no evidence of suicidal rumination 
 
         (Ex. 6, p. 14).  The only evidence in the record that claimant 
 
         was suicidal is the incident when claimant actually took his own 
 
         life on Sunday, September 8, 1985, which was more than a year 
 
         after the automobile accident on May 16, 1984.
 
         
 
              Defendants have the burden of proving the affirmative defense 
 
         that alcohol or some other drug substance was a substantial factor 
 
         in causing the injury.  Reddick, 230 Iowa 108, 296 N.W. 800.  
 
         There is absolutely no evidence of any substance other than 
 
         alcohol in the entire record.  It is true, that claimant was 
 
         severely afflicted with the disease of alcoholism and received a 
 
         great deal of treatment for it.  Ironically, however, there is 
 
         absolutely no evidence that claimant had been drinking alcohol at 
 
         or immediately before the time of this accident or during his 
 
         absence from the school.  On the contrary, the patrol report shows 
 
         no evidence of alcohol.  No arrests were made and no charges were 
 
         filed against claimant as a result of the accident for any reason.  
 
         Claimant's wife testified that the patrolman told her that he had 
 
         been a patrolman for 25 years and that he put his face next to 
 
         claimant's mouth and did not detect any alcohol substance (Ex. 1, 
 
         pp. 25-28). The emergency room doctor in Fairfax, Missouri, Dr. 
 
         Niedermeyer, reported in writing that he did not have any reason 
 
         to take a blood alcohol test and that he did not suspect that 
 
         alcohol was involved in this situation (Ex. F).
 
         
 
              Furthermore, if claimant left home with $100.00 in cash and 
 
         still had $86.00 after the accident, there is some inference, at 
 
         least, that claimant did not spend a lot of money on alcohol or 
 
         anything else, especially considering that claimant probably 
 
         would have purchased some food and some gasoline sometime during 
 
         the period after he left home on Monday, May 14, 1984 at 6:00 
 
         a.m. until the time of the accident on Wednesday, May 16 at 9:00 
 
         a.m.
 
         
 
              Even though there is no evidence of alcohol at or before the 
 
         time of the automobile accident, there is evidence that claimant 
 
         was sick.  Claimant's wife testified that he was sick the night 
 
         before he left home.  She also testified that her daughter 
 
         reported that claimant had a headache on the morning that he left 
 
         home (Ex. 1, pp. 18 & 19).  Claimant himself testified at 
 
         interrogatory number 29 that he felt too sick to get up and eat 
 
         breakfast on the morning of May 15, 1984 (Ex. 2, p. 23).  It 
 
         should also be noted that claimant had a history of blacking out, 
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
         fainting episodes and at least one gran mal seizure.  He fainted 
 
         at Cherokee in 1966 and was real confused after that (Ex. 5, pp. 
 
         5, 15 & 23).  When he entered Keystone in 1983 he reported that 
 
         he had had blackouts some years ago (Ex. 7, p. 5).  He suffered a 
 
         gran mal seizure at Keystone in 1983 with a temporary loss of 
 
         memory, but appeared improved within 72 hours (Ex. 7, p. 14).
 
         
 
              From the foregoing evidence it is determined that defendant 
 
         did not sustain the burden of proof by a preponderance of the 
 
         evidence that claimant's injury was due in any respect to a 
 
         willful intent to injure himself, or that alcohol or any other 
 
         drug was a substantial factor in causing the injury.  On the 
 
         contrary, there is evidence of fainting spells, blackouts and a 
 
         gran mal seizure.  These were typically followed by confusion or 
 
         lack of ability to function for up to 72 hours.  Hence, there is 
 
         evidence that claimant was sick immediately prior to his period 
 
         of absence.  This sickness combined with previous periods of lack 
 
         of consciousness, raises an inference that illness or blackouts 
 
         may be the explanation for his absence from the school and the 
 
         accident itself.  Due to this evidence, it is difficult to say 
 
         with absolute certainty that claimant did in fact deviate from 
 
         his employment, if in fact he became sick, blacked out or 
 
         encountered a period on confusion.
 
         
 
              Defendants contend that Harriet Den Hartog, executor of the 
 
         estate of Larry Den Hartog, cannot recover because all potential 
 
         liability of the employer and insurance carrier was extinguished 
 
         pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.31(4) when Larry Den Hartog died 
 
         from unrelated causes while his claim was yet unliquidated. 
 
         Defendants cite Vanni v. Ringland-Johnson-Crowley Co., Vol. 1 
 
         Iowa Industrial Commissioner Report 353 (Appeal Decision 1980).
 
         
 
              Iowa Code section 85.31(4) provides "Where an employee is 
 
         entitled to compensation under this chapter for an injury 
 
         received, and death ensues from any cause not resulting from the 
 
         injury for which he was entitled to the compensation, payments of 
 
         the unpaid balance for such injury shall cease and all liability 
 
         therefor shall terminate."  Compensation for permanent partial 
 
         disability becomes due at the end of the healing period.  Iowa 
 
         Code section 85.34(2).  Teel v. McCord, 394 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa 
 
         1986).  The deputy, writing an appeal decision on behalf of the 
 
         commissioner, decided as follows.
 
         
 
                   Claimant's argument, in essence, is that Mrs. Vanni 
 
              should be able to collect disability benefits for the period 
 
              of time between the last payment of said disability to 
 
              claimant and the time of his death.  Obviously, such 
 
              benefits are accrued.  However, claimant fails to point out 
 
              that said benefits are unliquidated.  That is, where the 
 
              injured worker dies for reasons not associated with the 
 
              injury, the workman's compensation law has no provision in 
 
              it for the surviving spouse or estate to bring an action for 
 
              an unliquidated number of weeks or weekly benefits 
 
              payments.
 
         
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
              The Vanni decision is incorrect for several reasons.  First, 
 
         nothing in Iowa Code section 85.31(4) requires the benefits to be 
 
         liquidated.  Second, the deputy does not explain why he did not 
 
         follow the decision of the industrial commissioner himself made 
 
         just a few months prior to the Vanni decision.  Vanni is dated 
 
         October 27, 1980.  The commissioner, himself, decided on June 4, 
 
         1980 in the case of Lundeen v. Quad City Construction, 
 
         Thirty-fourth Biennial Report of the Industrial Commissioner 193 
 
         (Appeal decision 1980) that the proper construction of Iowa Code 
 
         section 85.31(4) was as follows.
 
         
 
                   In light of the purpose and principles served by the 
 
              Iowa Workers' Compensation Act, it cannot be said that an 
 
              employer is released from all liability incurred and owing 
 
              prior to a claimant's untimely death.  A fair interpretation 
 
              of Iowa Code section 85.31(4) indicates that any portion of 
 
              an award which has not accrued as of the date of a 
 
              claimant's non-related death will abate along with any 
 
              further liability on the part of the employer.  However, any 
 
              award which was due prior to a claimant's demise that is 
 
              still owing upon the date of claimant's death does not 
 
              abate.
 
         
 
              A surviving spouse was awarded benefits on the basis of 
 
         Lundeen in the case of Valerie Handel, surviving spouse of Ted 
 
         Handel, claimant v. Determann Industries, Inc., Vol III Iowa 
 
         Industrial Commissioner Report 120 (September 15, 1982).  The 
 
         deputy was reversed by the commissioner on appeal for the reason 
 
         that the surviving spouse in her own right was not a party to 
 
         bring the action.  However, the commissioner cited Lundeen again 
 
         as good law and a proper interpretation of Iowa Code section 
 
         85.31(4).  It was apparent from the decision that the estate 
 
         would have been a proper party in interest.  Valerie Handel, 
 
 
 
                         
 
                                                         
 
         surviving spouse of Ted Handel, v. Dettermann Industries Inc., 
 
         file number 670157, decided January 28, 1983.  In this case the 
 
         action is not brought by the surviving spouse, but rather by the 
 
         decedent's estate.  The commissioner indicated in Handel that the 
 
         injured employee's legal representative would be a proper party 
 
         in interest under Iowa Code section 85.26(4).  In this case, 
 
         Harriett Den Hartog is the executor of the estate of Larry Den 
 
         Hartog and is a proper party to bring this action.
 
         
 
              The issue of whether Iowa Code section 85.31(4) extinguishes 
 
         the right of the estate to bring an action was the subject of a 
 
         ruling on a motion to dismiss in the case of Lou Ann Risinger, 
 
         executrix of the estate of Harry W. Risinger, deceased v. Allied 
 
         Structural Steel, file number 745320 filed July 6, 1984.  The 
 
         deputy in that ruling agreed with the deputy in Handel that 
 
         Professor Larson shows a wide variance of how the various states 
 
         handle the situation when an employee dies from unrelated causes. 
 
         2 Larson Workmen's Compensation Law section 58.44 (1981).
 
         
 
              The instant case is specifically a situation where claimant 
 
         brought the action himself before he died but died before 
 
         liability was established.  The Iowa Supreme Court has not 
 
         addressed this specific situation.  In a case where liability had 
 
         been established prior to death by a memorandum of agreement, the 
 
         Supreme Court held as follows, quoting from the Risinger ruling.
 
         
 
                   In the case Tibbs v. Denmark Light and Telephone Corp., 
 
              230 Iowa 1173, 300 N.W. 328 (1941), the court ruled that 
 
              unpaid installments of weekly compensation which had not 
 
              become payable become barred at the time of death but that 
 
              any unpaid installments which had become due were an asset 
 
              of the estate, the same as any other debt.  In Tibbs there 
 
              was a memorandum of agreement for payment of 400 weeks of 
 
              compensation which had been entered into before the worker's 
 
              unrelated death.  This ruling was recently followed in 
 
              Lundeen v. Quad City Construction Co., 23 Biennial Report, 
 
              Iowa Industrial Commissioner 193 (Appeal Decision 1980).
 
         
 
              The balance of the Risinger ruling is pertinent to this case 
 
         and is quoted below.
 
         
 
                   This action was commenced by the worker during his 
 
              lifetime and is now being prosecuted by the executor of his 
 
              estate, the proper party to pursue such an action.  Handel 
 
              v. Determann Industries, Inc., Appeal Decision, File No. 
 
              670156, (January 28, 1983).
 
         
 
                   The purpose of workers' compensation is to replace lost 
 
              earnings.  Prompt payment of justly due benefits is to be 
 
              encouraged.  Wilson Food Corporation v. Cherry, 315 N.W.2d 
 
              756 (Iowa 1982).
 
         
 
                   As shown previously, no recovery can be had for any 
 
              amounts which become payable subsequent to the death of 
 
              Harry W. Risinger.  If some amount were justly due to Harry 
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
                   W. Risinger and had been timely paid he would have received 
 
              those payments prior to his death.  His estate would 
 
              presumably be larger as a result of the timely payment of 
 
              compensation.
 
         
 
                   The first alternative is to sustain the motion which 
 
              would reward defendants for a failure to make timely 
 
              payments of justly due compensation and deny decedent's 
 
              heirs what they would have received if timely payment of 
 
              justly due benefits had been made.
 
         
 
                   The second alternative is to overrule the motion which 
 
              should result in defendants paying the same amount they 
 
              would have paid if timely payment had been commenced and 
 
              which would give decedent's heirs the same amount they would 
 
              have received if timely payment had been paid.
 
         
 
              Permitting the estate to maintain this action is clearly 
 
         consistent with Iowa Code section 611.20 which provides as 
 
         follows "All causes of action shall survive and may be brought 
 
         notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the 
 
         same".
 
         
 
              It is also consistent with Iowa Code section 611.22.
 
         
 
                   Any action contemplated in sections 611.20 and 611.21 
 
              may be brought, or the court, on motion, may allow the 
 
              action to be continued, by or against the legal 
 
              representatives or successors in interest of the deceased.  
 
              Such action shall be deemed a continuing one, and to have 
 
              accrued to such representative or successor at the time it 
 
              would have accrued to the deceased if the deceased had 
 
              survived.  If such is continued against the legal 
 
              representative of the defendant, a notice shall be served on 
 
              the legal representative as in case of original notices.
 
         
 
              The Supreme Court has not ruled on this exact situation, 
 
         because in Tibbs liability had already been established by a 
 
         memorandum of agreement, nevertheless, this decision is 
 
         consistent with a steady stream of Supreme Court decisions over 
 
         the years that have held that the workers' compensation laws are 
 
         for the benefit of the injured worker and are to be construed 
 
         liberally to that end.  Rish v. Iowa Portland Cement Co., 186 
 
         Iowa 443, 451, 170 N.W. 532, 535 (1919); Barton v. Nevada Poultry 
 
         Co., 253 Iowa 285, 289, 110 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1961); Irish v. 
 
         McCreary Saw Mill, 175 N.W.2d 364, 368 (Iowa 1970); John Deere 
 
         Dubuque Works v. Meyers, 410 N.W.2d 255, 157 (Iowa 1987).
 
         
 
                             FINDINGS OF FACT
 
         
 
              WHEREFORE, based upon the evidence presented the following 
 
         findings of fact are made.
 
         
 
              That employer had sent claimant to the school in Kansas City 
 
         and had agreed to pay claimant his average hourly wage while 
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
         attending the school, pay the expenses of the school, and pay 
 
         claimant's transportation and travel expenses to and from the 
 
         school.
 
         
 
              That claimant was returning home from the school at the time 
 
         of his accident on May 16, 1984.
 
         
 
              That claimant sustained an injury on May 16, 1984 which 
 
         arose out of and in the course of his employment at the time of 
 
         the automobile accident while returning home from the school.
 
         
 
              That claimant was unable to work due to the injury from May 
 
         16, 1984 to November 1, 1984.
 
         
 
              That Dr. Pechacek determined that claimant sustained a 
 
         permanent functional impairment of eight percent to the body as a 
 
         whole.
 
         
 
              That claimant was no longer able to perform employment which 
 
         requires moderate to heavy physical labor as he had done in the 
 
         past and that claimant was limited to light, sedentary office 
 
         type of work with a lot of freedom of movement after the injury.
 
         
 
              That claimant sustained an industrial disability in the 
 
         amount of 40 percent of the body as a whole.
 
         
 
              That claimant died from causes unrelated to this injury on 
 
         September 8, 1985.
 
         
 
              That claimant incurred $79,485.02 in medical expenses.
 
         
 
              That claimant commenced this action in person while still 
 
         living.
 
         
 
              That the estate was substituted as the party claimant after 
 
         his death.
 
         
 
              That employer's liability had not been established by 
 
         settlement, award or otherwise at the time of claimant's death on 
 
         September 8, 1985.
 
         
 
              That defendants had paid no benefits to claimant or to his 
 
         estate up to the time of his death.
 
         
 
              That claimant's death was not due to this injury but was a 
 
         result of causes unrelated to this injury.
 
         
 
              That there was no evidence to indicate that claimant's 
 
         injury was a result of his own willful intent to injure himself.
 
         
 
              That there is no evidence that alcohol or any other drug 
 
         substance was a substantial factor in causing the injury.
 
         
 
              That there was evidence that in the past claimant had 
 
         suffered blackouts, fainting episodes and at least one gran mal 
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
         seizure.
 
         
 
              That claimant did not feel well the night before he left 
 
         home, that claimant's daughter reported that he had a headache 
 
         the morning that he left home, and that claimant testified that 
 
         he was sick on the morning of May 16, 1984 and did not go to 
 
         breakfast at that time.
 
         
 
                               CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
 
         
 
              WHEREFORE, based upon the evidence presented and the 
 
         principles of law previously discussed the following conclusions 
 
         of law are made.
 
         
 
              That claimant did sustain an injury on May 16, 1984 which 
 
         arose out of and in the course of employment with employer.
 
         
 
              That the injury was the cause of temporary disability from 
 
         May 16, 1984 to November 1, 1984.
 
         
 
              That claimant in entitled to healing period benefits for the 
 
         period of temporary disability shown above.
 
         
 
              That the injury was the cause of permanent disability.
 
         
 
              That claimant is entitled to permanent partial disability 
 
         benefits from November 1, 1984 until the date of his death on 
 
         September 8, 1985.
 
         
 
              That claimant is entitled to medical expenses for this 
 
         injury.
 
         
 
              That claimant did not willfully intend to injure himself.
 
 
 
                               
 
                                                         
 
         
 
              That alcohol or other drug substances were not a substantial 
 
         factor in causing claimant's injury.
 
         
 
              That the estate was a proper party to this action after 
 
         claimant's death and is entitled to recover both medical expenses 
 
         and workers' compensation benefits from the date of injury until 
 
         the date of death.
 
         
 
              That Iowa Code section 85.31(4) did not extinguish 
 
         claimant's rights to recovery but that this cause of action 
 
         survived pursuant to Iowa Code section 611.20 and 611.22.
 
         
 
                                  ORDER
 
         
 
              WHEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
 
         
 
              That defendants pay to claimant twenty-four point two eight 
 
         six (24.286) weeks of healing period benefits at the rate of one 
 
         hundred seventy-two and 35/100 dollars ($172.35) per week for the 
 
         period from May 16, 1984 to November 1, 1984 in the total amount 
 
         of four thousand one hundred eighty-five and 69/100 dollars 
 
         ($4,185.69).
 
         
 
              That defendants pay to claimant forty-four point five seven 
 
         one (44.571) weeks of permanent partial disability at the rate of 
 
         one hundred seventy-two 35/100 dollars ($172.35) per week for the 
 
         period from November 1, 1984 to September 8, 1985 in the total 
 
         amount of seven thousand six hundred eighty-one and 81/100 
 
         dollars ($7,681.81).
 
         
 
              That these benefits are to be paid in a lump sum.
 
         
 
              That interest will accrue pursuant to Iowa Code section 
 
         85.30.
 
         
 
              That defendants pay to claimant seventy-nine thousand four 
 
         hundred eighty-five and 02/100 dollars ($79,485.02) in medical 
 
         expenses.
 
         
 
              That defendants pay the costs of this action pursuant to 
 
         Division of Industrial Services Rule 343-4.33.
 
         
 
              That defendants file claim activity reports as requested by 
 
         this agency pursuant to Division of Industrial Services Rule 
 
         343-3.1.
 
         
 
              That this case is to be returned to the prehearing calendar 
 
         for assignment on the issue of penalty benefits pursuant to Iowa 
 
         Code section 86.13.
 
         
 
         
 
              Signed and filed this 4th day of March, 1988.
 
         
 
         
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
                                            WALTER R. McMANUS, JR.
 
                                            DEPUTY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
         
 
         Copies To:
 
         
 
         Mr. Joe Cosgrove
 
         Attorney at Law
 
         400 Frances Bldg
 
         Sioux City, Iowa  51101
 
         
 
         Mr. Cecil Goettsch
 
         Attorney at Law
 
         1100 Des Moines Bldg
 
         Des Moines, Iowa  50307
 
 
 
         
 
         
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            1107; 1110; 1402.20;
 
                                            1402.30; 1402.60; 1403.30;
 
                                            1601; 1602; 1802; 1803;
 
                                            2501
 
                                            Filed March 4, 1988
 
                                            WALTER R. McMANUS, JR.
 
         
 
                    BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
         
 
         
 
         HARRIET DEN HARTOG,
 
         Executor of the Estate of
 
         LARRY DEN HARTOG, Deceased,
 
         
 
              Claimant,
 
                                                    File No. 777409
 
         vs.
 
                                                 A R B I T R A T I 0 N
 
         FARMERS COOP OIL ASSOC.,
 
                                                    D E C I S I 0 N 
 
              Employer,
 
         
 
         and
 
         
 
         FARMLAND MUTUAL,
 
         
 
              Insurance Carrier,
 
              Defendants.
 
         
 
         
 
         1107; 1110; 1402.20; 1402.30; 1402.40; 1402.60; 1403.30
 
         
 
              Employee, a chronic alcoholic, checked in at training school. 
 
         Then he disappeared and his whereabouts were unknown for 24 hours 
 
         until he was involved in a terrible one car automobile accident 
 
         when his car left the interstate and hit the bridge pillars. 
 
         Accident occurred on the route toward home and his car was headed 
 
         toward home and he was 100 miles away from training site.  
 
         Employer agreed to pay his average hourly wages while at school, 
 
         all expenses of school, and travel and transportation expense to 
 
         and from the school.  Employee was found to be returning home and 
 
         did sustain an injury arising out of and in the course of 
 
         employment.
 
         
 
         1601
 
         
 
              There was absolutely no evidence of the use of alcohol or 
 
         other drug substance based on patrol and emergency room evidence. 
 
         There was a history of fainting, blackouts and one gran mal 
 
         seizure in the past followed by periods of confusion for up to 72 
 
         hours.  There was evidence from claimant, his wife and daughter 
 
         that he was ill the day before and the day of the disappearance.
 
         
 
         1602
 
         
 
                                                
 
                                                         
 
              There was no evidence of suicidal inclinations until 
 
         claimant actually hung himself over a year after the accident.  
 
         The only evidence on suicide was that he was not suicidal.
 
         
 
         1802; 1803; 2501
 
         
 
              Claimant was allowed healing period and permanent partial 
 
         disability until the date of his nonrelated death and $79,405.02 
 
         in medical expenses.
 
         
 
         Proper party in interest and section 85.31(4)
 
         
 
              Claimant brought the action but died before liability was 
 
         determined.  Held his estate was the proper party to continue the 
 
         action.  It was held that damages did not have to be liquidated 
 
         prior to death in order to be recoverable by his estate in 
 
         construing section 85.31(4).
 
 
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
         
 
                                            1110,1402.30,1403.30,1601,
 
                                            1602,1802,1803,1901
 
                                            Filed August 25, 1989
 
                                            DAVID E. LINQUIST
 
         
 
                     BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
         
 
         
 
         HARRIET DEN HARTOG,
 
         Executor of the Estate of
 
         LARRY DEN HARTOG, Deceased,
 
                                                   File No. 777409
 
              Claimant,
 
              
 
         vs.                                        A P P E A L
 
         
 
         FARMERS COOP OIL ASSOC.,
 
                                                   D E C I S I O N
 
              Employer,
 
              
 
         and
 
         
 
         FARMLAND MUTUAL,
 
         
 
              Insurance Carrier,
 
              Defendants.
 
              
 
              
 
              
 
         1110 - 1402.30
 
         
 
              Employee, a chronic alcoholic, checked in at training 
 
         school. Then he disappeared and his whereabouts were unknown for 
 
         24 hours until he was involved in a one car automobile accident.  
 
         Accident occurred on the route toward home and his car was headed 
 
         toward home and he was 100 miles away from training site.  
 
         Employer agreed to pay his average hourly wages while at school, 
 
         all expenses of school, and travel and transportation expense to 
 
         and from the school.  Employee was found to be returning home and 
 
         did sustain an injury arising out of and in the course of 
 
         employment.
 
         
 
         1403.30 - 1601
 
         
 
              There was absolutely no evidence of the use of alcohol or 
 
         other drug substance based on patrol and emergency room evidence. 
 
         There was a history of fainting, blackouts and one gran mal 
 
         seizure in the past followed by periods of confusion for up to 72 
 
         hours.  There was evidence from claimant, his wife and daughter 
 
         that he was ill the day before and the day of the disappearance.
 
         
 
         1602
 
         
 

 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              There was no evidence of suicidal inclinations until 
 
         claimant actually hung himself over a year after the accident.  
 
         The only evidence on suicide was that he was not suicidal.
 
         
 
         1802 - 1803
 
         
 
              Claimant was allowed healing period and permanent partial 
 
         disability until the date of his nonrelated death and $79,405.02 
 
         in medical expenses.
 
         
 
         1901
 
         
 
              Proper party in interest and section 85.31(4)
 
         
 
              Claimant brought the action but died before liability was 
 
         determined.  Held his estate was the proper party to continue the 
 
         action.  It was held that damages did not have to be liquidated 
 
         prior to death in order to be recoverable by his estate in 
 
         construing section 85.31(4).