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                     before the iowa industrial commissioner
 
         ____________________________________________________________
 
                                       :
 
         JAMES D. MOLITOR,             :
 
                                       :
 
              Claimant,                :
 
                                       :
 
         vs.                           :
 
                                       :         File No. 931314
 
         JET EDGE,                     :
 
                                       :      A R B I T R A T I O N
 
              Employer,                :
 
                                       :         D E C I S I O N
 
         and                           :
 
                                       :
 
         SAFECO INSURANCE CO.,         :
 
                                       :
 
              Insurance Carrier,       :
 
              Defendants.              :
 
         ___________________________________________________________
 
         
 
         
 
                              statement of the case
 
         
 
              This is a proceeding in arbitration brought by James D. 
 
         Molitor, claimant, against Jet Edge, employer, and Safeco 
 
         Insurance, insurance carrier, to recover benefits under the Iowa 
 
         Workers' Compensation Act as a result of an injury sustained on 
 
         December 2, 1988.  This matter came on for hearing before the 
 
         undersigned deputy industrial commissioner on April 16, 1991, in 
 
         Mason City, Iowa.  The matter was considered fully submitted at 
 
         the close of the hearing.  The record in this case consists of 
 
         testimony of claimant and Al Zeinemann; joint exhibits A-H; and 
 
         claimant's exhibits l, 3-6.
 
         
 
                                      issues
 
         
 
              Pursuant to the prehearing report and order submitted and 
 
         approved on April 16, 1991, the issues to be determined in this 
 
         case include:
 
         
 
              1.  Whether there is jurisdiction under the Iowa Workers' 
 
         Compensation Act;
 
         
 
              2.  Whether there is a causal connection between the injury 
 
         of December 2, 1988 and the claimant's condition after he was 
 
         released to return to work on January 23, 1989; and,
 
         
 
              3.  The nature and extent of permanent disability, if any.
 
         
 
                                 findings of fact
 
         
 
              The undersigned has carefully considered all the testimony 
 
         given at the hearing, the arguments made, and the evidence con
 
         tained in the exhibits herein, and makes the following findings:
 
         
 

 
         
 
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              Claimant sustained an injury on December 2, 1988, in the 
 
         State of Kentucky stipulated by the parties to arise out of and 
 
         in the course of employment for Jet Edge.  Benefits have been 
 
         paid to claimant under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation Act.
 
         
 
              At all times pertinent herein, claimant has been a resident 
 
         of Iowa.  He pays state taxes under Iowa law and his cars and 
 
         motorcycle are licensed in the State of Iowa.
 
         
 
              The employer was incorporated in the State of Minnesota at 
 
         the time of claimant's injury.  An affidavit from Betty 
 
         Anastasia, Personnel Manager for Possis Corporation/Jet Edge, 
 
         states neither Possis nor its subsidiary Jet Edge has a place of 
 
         business in the State of Iowa.  The employer was incorporated 
 
         under the laws of Minnesota and its business is principally 
 
         localized in Minnesota and its office is located in Minneapolis, 
 
         Minnesota (Exhibit C).  According to Irving R. Colacci, General 
 
         Manager of Jet Edge:  "No Jet Edge activity was conducted in Iowa 
 
         during the course of our dealings with Mr. Molitor and Jet Edge 
 
         has not actively engaged in doing business in Iowa, beyond pursu
 
         ing a limited number of sales opportunities."  (Ex. G).  This was 
 
         corroborated by the testimony of Mr. Al Zeinemann, claimant's 
 
         supervisor at the time of the injury.
 
         
 
              Claimant did not regularly work in Iowa.  His employment was 
 
         not localized in any state.  He was given assignments to travel 
 
         throughout the United States, including Kentucky, Michigan, New 
 
         Mexico, Washington, Idaho and outside the United States.
 
         
 
              Claimant was born on February 11, 1957 and completed the 
 
         eleventh grade of school.  He worked at various times as a 
 
         farmer, nightclub manager and construction laborer.  In the Fall 
 
         of 1986, he commenced working for Jet Edge as a field engineer.  
 
         On December 2, 1988, he hurt his back while working in the employ 
 
         of Jet Edge.  He was released to return to work in January of 
 
         1989, but at that time the company was going through massive lay
 
         offs and he offered to take a layoff the Monday following his 
 
         release to return to work.  Subsequently, he received unemploy
 
         ment compensation benefits.  Thereafter, he worked as a 
 
         self-employed Jet Edge field engineer consultant.  In July 1990, 
 
         he was hired by Mr. Beadle as consultant for his Jet Edge 
 
         operation in New Mexico.  In this capacity, he performs no manual 
 
         labor but basically manages the business.
 
         
 
              The pertinent medical evidence of record reveals that the 
 
         claimant injured his back on December 2, 1988, while replacing 
 
         heavy equipment parts.  At the time he was lifting with another 
 
         gentleman, a piece of equipment that weighed more than 125 
 
         pounds.  The following day he had increasing back difficulty and 
 
         he saw Ron Ercolani, M.D.  He was off work for about seven weeks 
 
         and had physical therapy.  Dr. Ercolani released him to return to 
 
         regular duties on January 23, 1989 (Ex. E2, pages 12-15).
 
         
 
              Claimant reported to work but employer's business was 
 
         falling off.  According to Mr. Al Zeinemann, claimant voluntarily 
 
         said he was not coming back to work.  He received unemployment 
 
         compensation benefits which required him to certify that he was 
 

 
         
 
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         ready, willing and able to work.  Claimant never returned to work 
 
         for Jet Edge.  Claimant testified that he did some consulting 
 
         work in February/March 1989 and other work throughout 1989 and 
 
         thereafter.
 
         
 
              On April 25, 1989, claimant consulted with Dr. Ercolani with 
 
         complaints of recurrent back pain.  Because of his persistent 
 
         symptoms, a CT scan was performed on May 2, 1989.  The results 
 
         showed multi-level degenerative disc disease from L2-3 through 
 
         L5-Sl with several disc herniations throughout those levels 
 
         particularly prominent at the L4-5 level, producing compression 
 
         of the thecal sac (Ex. E1, pp. 17-18).
 
         
 
              Claimant was scheduled to see Dr. Ercolani one week after 
 
         the CT scan but failed to keep his appointment.  On May 15, 1989, 
 
         Dr. Ercolani reported a conservative treatment plan to include 
 
         physical therapy, non-steroidal anti-inflammatory agents and mod
 
         ified work.  It was his opinion that the etiology of claimant's 
 
         injury goes back even prior to the December 1988 injury and that 
 
         the degenerative changes present on the CT scan have probably 
 
         been present on a long-term basis (Ex. E1, pp. 19-20).
 
         
 
              Dr. Ercolani reported that claimant had reached maximum med
 
         ical improvement on June 2, 1989, and gave him an 18 percent 
 
         impairment to the body as a whole (Ex. E2, p. 26).
 
         
 
              Claimant was referred by employer to David J. Boarini, M.D., 
 
         for a comprehensive evaluation on June 30, 1990.  On examination, 
 
         claimant had a normal gait.  He was able to flex his lower back 
 
         to 90 degrees and had normal extension and lateral bending.  He 
 
         had minimal muscle spasms in the paravertebral musculature in the 
 
         lateral back with extreme lateral bending.  There was a trace of 
 
         tenderness in the left paravertebral musculature.  Straight leg 
 
         raising was negative.  Strength and sensation were entirely 
 
         intact.  There was no evidence of atrophy or fasciculation in the 
 
         lower extremities and the thighs and the calves measured symmet
 
         rically.  Dr. Boarini commented that the CT scan previously taken 
 
         showed some mild degenerative changes but no evidence of large 
 
         disc herniation.  Lumbosacral spine x-rays taken at this time 
 
         showed no abnormalities.  Dr. Boarini stated that claimant has 
 
         some myofascial low back pain but an entirely normal neurological 
 
         examination.  It was his impression that this back pain cannot 
 
         reasonably be related to the minor incident that occurred in 
 
         1988.  He opined:  "I really don't think there is any significant 
 
         findings that would warrant a permanent partial impairment or 
 
         specific work restrictions."  (Ex. E3, pp. 1-2)
 
         
 
                                conclusions of law
 
         
 
              The first issue to be determined in this case is whether 
 
         there is jurisdiction under the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act 
 
         over claimant's injury of December 2, 1988, in Louisville, 
 
         Kentucky.  Claimant has received seven weeks of temporary total 
 
         disability benefits under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation 
 
         Act.
 
         
 
              The claimant alleges that he is entitled to Iowa workers' 
 

 
         
 
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         compensation benefits because he was hired in the State of Iowa 
 
         and has always been a resident of Iowa.
 
         
 
              Because the claimant was injured outside the territorial 
 
         limits of Iowa, determination of whether there is jurisdiction 
 
         under the Iowa workers' compensation law depends on a review of 
 
         the facts under Iowa Code section 85.71.
 
         
 
              Section 85.71 provides:
 
         
 
                If an employee, while working outside the territorial 
 
              limits of this state, suffers an injury on account of 
 
              which the employee, or in the event of death, the 
 
              employee's dependents, would have been entitled to the 
 
              benefits provided by this chapter had such injury 
 
              occurred within this state, such employee, or in the 
 
              event of death resulting from such injury, the 
 
              employee's dependents, shall be entitled to the bene
 
              fits provided by this chapter, provided that at the 
 
              time of such injury:
 
         
 
                1.  The employment is principally localized in this 
 
              state, that is, the employee's employer has a place of 
 
              business in this or some other state and the employee 
 
              regularly works in this state, or if the employee is 
 
              domiciled in this state, or
 
           2.  The employee is working under a contract of hire 
 
         made in this state in employment not principally local
 
         ized in any state, or
 
           3.  The employee is working under a contract of hire 
 
         made in this state in employment principally localized 
 
         in another state, whose workers' compensation law is 
 
         not applicable to the employee's employer, or
 
           4.  The employee is working under a contract of hire 
 
         made in this state for employment outside the United 
 
         States.
 
         
 
              In interpreting section 85.71(1), the Iowa Supreme Court in 
 
         Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Miller, 312 N.W.2d 530, 534, (Iowa 
 
         1981), stated domicile alone is not sufficient to entitle an 
 
         employee, injured outside Iowa, to benefits under our Act, but 
 
         rather, some meaningful relationship between domicile and the 
 
         employer-employee relationship must exist.  The court then held 
 
         that the employer's placement of a help wanted ad, to which 
 
         claimant responded, in an Iowa newspaper was not material to 
 
         claimant's employment and was, therefore, insufficient to supply 
 
         the necessary connection.  The court did not address the issue of 
 
         how sufficient the connection between domicile and the employment 
 
         relationship must be to entitle an employee injured in another 
 
         state to benefits under our Act.
 
         
 
              The Iowa Supreme Court next addressed the interpretation of 
 
         section 85.71 in George H. Wentz, Inc. v. Sabasta, 337 N.W.2d 495 
 
         (Iowa 1983).  In Wentz, the court expressly overruled Haverly v. 
 
         Union Construction Co., 18 N.W.2d 629 (Iowa 1945).  That case 
 
         held that making an employment contract in Iowa would support an 
 
         award of benefits under our Act.  The Wentz court at 499 said:  
 

 
         
 
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         "We think Iowa law on extraterritorial application of our 
 
         workers' compensation act has changed since the Haverly decision, 
 
         and the rule of that case no longer is valid."
 
         
 
              The court then said at page 500:
 
         
 
                The place of contract or hiring becomes significant 
 
              only when the employment is not principally localized 
 
              in any state, the law of the state where the employment 
 
              is principally localized is not applicable to the 
 
              employer, or the employment is outside the United 
 
              States....Permitting recovery of Iowa benefits based 
 
              solely on a showing the contract of hire was made in 
 
              Iowa, following Haverly, would render nugatory the 
 
              additional requirements of subsections 85.71(2), (3) 
 
              and (4) of the act.
 
         
 
              In Iowa Beef Processors and Wentz, the court referred to the 
 
         Counsel of State Governments Model Act definition of principally 
 
         localized employment which reads as follows:
 
         
 
              A person's employment is principally localized in this 
 
              or another state when (1) his employer has a place of 
 
              business in this or such other state and he regularly 
 
              works at or from such place of business, or (2) if 
 
              clause (1) foregoing is not applicable, he is domiciled 
 
              and spends a substantial part of his working time in 
 
              the service of his employer in this or such other 
 
              state;...
 
         
 
              Section 85.71(1) is clearly inapplicable to claimant.  His 
 
         employment is not principally localized in the State of Iowa and 
 
         employer has not actively engaged in doing business in Iowa, 
 
         beyond pursuing a limited number of sales opportunities.  The 
 
         employer is incorporated under the laws of the State of Minnesota 
 
         and the business of the employer is principally localized in 
 
         Minnesota with its' office located in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  
 
         Domicile alone cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction.
 
         
 
              Section 85.71(3), likewise, will not confer this agency with 
 
         jurisdiction over claimant's claim because claimant's employment 
 
         is not principally localized in another state.
 
         
 
              Section 85.71(4) on its face, is inapplicable to claimant's 
 
         situation.
 
         
 
              The place of contract or hiring becomes significant "only 
 
         when the employment is not principally localized in any state, 
 
         the law of the state where the employment is principally local
 
         ized is not applicable to the employer, or the employment is out
 
         side the United States."  Wentz, Inc., at 500.  Claimant's 
 
         employment is not principally localized in any state.  Claimant 
 
         was given assignments to travel throughout the United States as a 
 
         consultant for Jet Edge.  Claimant spent little or no time in 
 
         Minnesota and claimant was expected to work wherever he was 
 
         assigned.  However, the parties dispute whether claimant was 
 
         hired by Jet Edge in Minnesota or Iowa.  Defendants contend that 
 

 
         
 
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         claimant was hired in Minnesota at the office of the employer.  A 
 
         confirmation letter was sent from the employer representative to 
 
         claimant on September 25, 1986, confirming a telephone conversa
 
         tion on September 24, 1986.  The letter states, in pertinent 
 
         part:  "Confirming our discussion of September 24, we are hiring 
 
         you effective October 6, 1986..." (Ex. D, p. 52)  Defendants con
 
         tend that this confirmation letter simply confirms the hiring 
 
         which had already occurred in Minnesota.  It is defendants' con
 
         tention that claimant verbally accepted Mr. W. Hall, Sr., former 
 
         president of Jet Edge, offer of employment while present in Mr. 
 
         Hall's office in Minneapolis, Minnesota when he interviewed for 
 
         the job.
 
         
 
              Claimant became aware of Jet Edge through his father, who 
 
         was active in the waterjet industry and involved in a project in 
 
         Minneapolis at the time of the interview.  Claimant's version is 
 
         that he was introduced to Mr. Bill Hall, Sr., by his father who 
 
         had approached Mr. Hall for a sales job.  He accompanied his 
 
         father to Mr. Hall's office and engaged in a casual conversation 
 
         regarding employment with Jet Edge.  Three or four weeks later, 
 
         Mr. Hall called claimant and asked him to come to Minneapolis for 
 
         an interview.  Mr. Hall had already determined what he wanted to 
 
         pay claimant and what benefits he would receive.  He also had him 
 
         drive the brand new company truck because this truck was avail
 
         able to the person who would fill the job opening for which 
 
         claimant was being recruited.  At the end of the conversation, 
 
         Mr. Hall had offered claimant employment but claimant stated that 
 
         he first had to confer with his wife.  Upon his return from 
 
         Minneapolis, he discussed it with his wife and they agreed that 
 
         he would accept Mr. Hall's offer of employment.  Claimant then 
 
         called Mr. Hall and informed him of his decision.  He acknowl
 
         edged receipt of Mr. Hall's letter dated September 25, 1986, and 
 
         stated that he signed one copy and returned it to Mr. Hall.  How
 
         ever, he could not remember if he signed the copy in Charles 
 
         City, Iowa or in Minnesota.  He also remembers that he completed 
 
         the job application after he had started work.  He remembers that 
 
         he signed the contract agreement after the phone conversation 
 
         with Mr. Hall.  He acknowledged that it is possible that both 
 
         signings could have been done in Minnesota.  However, he was cer
 
         tain that he agreed to accept the offered employment when he 
 
         called Mr. Hall from Iowa after conferring with his wife.
 
         
 
              Obviously, there is a difference of opinion between claimant 
 
         and employer as to when claimant actually accepted the offer of 
 
         employment from Jet Edge.  Defendants, through Irving R. Colacci, 
 
         general manager, state that "Mr. Molitor verbally accepted Mr. 
 
         Hall's offer of employment while present in Mr. Hall's office in 
 
         Minneapolis.  The confirmation letter dated September 25, 1986, 
 
         was a courtesy letter formalizing the terms already offered and 
 
         accepted."  (Ex. G)  Claimant testified that he did not accept 
 
         employment at the time of his interview with Mr. Hall but instead 
 
         telephoned his acceptance from his home in Iowa.  Claimant's tes
 
         timony is uncontroverted and credible.  Therefore, the under
 
         signed accepts his version of the events which transpired sur
 
         rounding the offer and acceptance of employment with Jet Edge.
 
         
 
              This agency has held that a contract is deemed to have been 
 

 
         
 
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         made where the final assent is given.  When offer and acceptance 
 
         of a contract is made by telephone, the contract comes into exis
 
         tence in the place where the offeree used the telephone.  Hegge 
 
         v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Company, File No. 712121 (Appeal 
 
         Decision September 28, 1984).  Claimant gave his assent to the 
 
         offer of hire made by Mr. Hall from his home in Iowa.  Therefore, 
 
         claimant was working under a contract entered into in the State 
 
         of Iowa and the Iowa industrial commissioner has subject matter 
 
         jurisdiction in this proceeding.
 
         
 
              The next issue to be determined is whether claimant's injury 
 
         on December 2, 1988, is a cause of permanent disability.  If so, 
 
         the parties have stipulated that such disability is an industrial 
 
         disability to the body as a whole.
 
         
 
              The claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of 
 
         the evidence that the injury of December 2, 1988, is causally 
 
         related to the disability on which he now bases his claim.  
 
         Bodish v. Fischer, Inc., 257 Iowa 516, 133 N.W.2d 867 (1965).  
 
         Lindahl v. L. O. Boggs, 236 Iowa 296, 18 N.W.2d 607 (1945).  A 
 
         possibility is insufficient; a probability is necessary.  Burt v. 
 
         John Deere Waterloo Tractor Works, 247 Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732 
 
         (1955).  The question of causal connection is essentially within 
 
         the domain of expert testimony.  Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist 
 
         Hospital, 251 Iowa 375, 101 N.W.2d 167 (1960). 
 
         
 
              However, expert medical evidence must be considered with all 
 
         other evidence introduced bearing on the causal connection.  
 
         Burt, 247 Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732.  The opinion of experts need 
 
         not be couched in definite, positive or unequivocal language.  
 
         Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 903 (Iowa 1974).  However, 
 
         the expert opinion may be accepted or rejected, in whole or in 
 
         part, by the trier of fact.  Id. at 907.  Further, the weight to 
 
         be given to such an opinion is for the finder of fact, and that 
 
         may be affected by the completeness of the premise given the 
 
         expert and other surrounding circumstances.  Bodish, 257 Iowa 
 
         516, 133 N.W.2d 867.  See also Musselman v. Central Telephone 
 
         Co., 261 Iowa 352, 154 N.W.2d 128 (1967).
 
         
 
              A treating physician's testimony is not entitled to greater 
 
         weight as a matter of law than that of a physician who later 
 
         examines claimant in anticipation of litigation.  Weight to be 
 
         given testimony of a physician is a fact issue to be decided by 
 
         the industrial commissioner in light of the record the parties 
 
         develop.  In this regard, both parties may develop facts as to 
 
         the physician's employment in connection with litigation, if so; 
 
         the physician's examination at a later date and not when the 
 
         injuries were fresh; his arrangement as to compensation; the 
 
         extent and nature of the physician's examination; the physician's 
 
         education, experience, training, and practice; and all other fac
 
         tors which bear upon the weight and value of the physician's tes
 
         timony.  Both parties may bring all this information to the 
 
         attention of the factfinder as either supporting or weakening the 
 
         physician's testimony and opinion.  All factors go to the value 
 
         of the physician's testimony as a matter of fact not as a matter 
 
         of law.  Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. Prince, 366 N.W.2d 
 
         187, 192 (Iowa 1985).
 

 
         
 
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              Functional impairment is an element to be considered in 
 
         determining industrial disability which is the reduction of earn
 
         ing capacity, but consideration must also be given to the injured 
 
         employee's age, education, qualifications, experience and inabil
 
         ity to engage in employment for which he is fitted.  Olson v. 
 
         Goodyear Service Stores, 255 Iowa 1112, 125 N.W.2d 251 (1963).  
 
         Barton v. Nevada Poultry, 253 Iowa 285, 110 N.W.2d 660 (1961).
 
         
 
              A finding of impairment to the body as a whole found by a 
 
         medical evaluator does not equate to industrial disability.  This 
 
         is so as impairment and disability are not synonymous.  Degree of 
 
         industrial disability can in fact be much different than the 
 
         degree of impairment because in the first instance reference is 
 
         to loss of earning capacity and in the latter to anatomical or 
 
         functional abnormality or loss.  Although loss of function is to 
 
         be considered and disability can rarely be found without it, it 
 
         is not so that a degree of industrial disability is proportion
 
         ally related to a degree of impairment of bodily function.
 
         
 
              Factors to be considered in determining industrial dis
 
         ability include the employee's medical condition prior to the 
 
         injury, immediately after the injury, and presently; the situs of 
 
         the injury, its severity and the length of healing period; the 
 
         work experience of the employee prior to the injury, after the 
 
         injury and potential for rehabilitation; the employee's qualifi
 
         cations intellectually, emotionally and physically; earnings 
 
         prior and subsequent to the injury; age; education; motivation; 
 
         functional impairment as a result of the injury; and inability 
 
         because of the injury to engage in employment for which the 
 
         employee is fitted.  Loss of earnings caused by a job transfer 
 
         for reasons related to the injury is also relevant.  These are 
 
         matters which the finder of fact considers collectively in arriv
 
         ing at the determination of the degree of industrial disability.
 
         
 
              There are no weighting guidelines that indicate how each of 
 
         the factors are to be considered.  There are no guidelines which 
 
         give, for example, age a weighted value of ten percent of the 
 
         total value, education a value of fifteen percent of total, moti
 
         vation - five percent; work experience - thirty percent, etc.  
 
         Neither does a rating of functional impairment directly correlate 
 
         to a degree of industrial disability to the body as a whole.  In 
 
         other words, there are no formulae which can be applied and then 
 
         added up to determine the degree of industrial disability.  It 
 
         therefore becomes necessary for the deputy or commissioner to 
 
         draw upon prior experience, general and specialized knowledge to 
 
         make the finding with regard to degree of industrial disability.  
 
         See Peterson v. Truck Haven Cafe, Inc., (Appeal Decision, 
 
         February 28, 1985);  Christensen v. Hagen, Inc., (Appeal 
 
         Decision, March 26, l985).
 
         
 
              The record indicates that claimant received temporary total 
 
         disability benefits from December 5, 1989 through January 22, 
 
         1989, at the rate of $358.93 per week under the Minnesota 
 
         Workers' Compensation Act.
 
         
 
              The parties do not dispute that claimant suffered a back 
 

 
         
 
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         injury on December 2, 1988, while servicing a company machine in 
 
         Louisville, Kentucky.  On December 5, 1988, claimant saw Dr. 
 
         Ercolani with complaints of back pain without radiation into his 
 
         leg or foot (Ex. E1, p. 27).  We was taken off work and advised 
 
         to limit his activities.  Dr. Ercolani released claimant to 
 
         return to full duty on January 23, 1989 (Ex. E2, pp. 12-15).  
 
         Claimant testified that he was given a 50 pound lifting weight 
 
         restriction.  Instead of returning to work, claimant collected 
 
         unemployment compensation benefits and did some consulting work 
 
         at the same time.
 
         
 
              On April 25, 1989, claimant saw Dr. Ercolani.  His progress 
 
         notes state that he "has had recurrence of back pain /c lat. 
 
         shift 10d. ago  Saw chiropractor whom pt. thought might have made 
 
         it worse.  Nevertheless, when he quit the chiro he gradually got 
 
         better.  However because of the radiating pain into the R leg, he 
 
         was worried that something more serious than a "strain" is pre
 
         sent.  (Ex. E2, p. 7)  Dr. Ercolani ordered a CT scan which 
 
         showed multi-level degenerative disc disease from L2-3 through 
 
         L5-Sl and several disc herniations throughout those levels.  It 
 
         was Dr. Ercolani's opinion that the etiology of claimant's injury 
 
         goes way back even prior to the December 1988 injury in which he 
 
         was lifting some heavy parts.  He opined that "I think it is 
 
         quite likely that that certainly contributed to his current prob
 
         lems but I don't think it is the whole story."  (Ex. E2, p. 8)  
 
         Dr. Ercolani stated that claimant had reached maximum medical 
 
         improvement on June 2, 1989, and gave him an 18 percent impair
 
         ment to the body as a whole due to his multi-level lumbar disc 
 
         herniations.  (Ex. E2, p. 26)  Dr. Ercolani advised claimant to 
 
         be cautious about performing heavy work but imposed no other 
 
         restrictions.
 
         
 
              Claimant last saw Dr. Ercolani on June 2, 1989, however, he 
 
         continued to receive therapy (Ex. E4).  On July 30, 1990, 
 
         employer referred claimant to Dr. Boardini for examination.  He 
 
         disagreed with Dr. Ercolani's assessment that the CT scan showed 
 
         large disc herniation and stated that lumbosacral spine x-rays 
 
         taken at the time of his examination showed no abnormalities 
 
         whatsoever.  He indicated that in view of the negative findings, 
 
         neither a permanent partial impairment or specific work restric
 
         tions are warranted (Ex. E3, pp. 1-2).
 
         
 
              After carefully considering the total evidence in this case, 
 
         the undersigned concludes that claimant has a permanent back 
 
         impairment which is causally related to his December 2, 1988, 
 
         injury.  This assessment was made by Dr. Ercolani, claimant's 
 
         treating physician, after reviewing the results of a CT scan 
 
         taken on May 2, 1989.  Dr. Ercolani indicated that the degenera
 
         tive changes present on the CT scan were probably present prior 
 
         to the December 1988 injury, however, this condition was aggra
 
         vated when claimant had to lift some heavy parts during the 
 
         course of his employment.
 
         
 
              While a claimant is not entitled to compensation for the 
 
         results of a preexisting injury or disease, the mere existence at 
 
         the time of a subsequent injury is not a defense.  Rose v. John 
 

 
         
 
         Page  10
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         Deere Ottumwa Works, 247 Iowa 900, 908, 76 N.W.2d 756, 760-61 
 
         (1956).  If the claimant had a preexisting condition or disabil
 
         ity that is aggravated, accelerated, worsened or lighted up so 
 
         that it results in disability, claimant is entitled to recover.  
 
         Nicks v. Davenport Produce Co., 254 Iowa 130, 115 N.W.2d 812, 
 
         815 (1962).
 
         
 
              Dr. Ercolani indicated that claimant reached maximum medical 
 
         improvement on June 2, 1989.  A final diagnosis of multi-level 
 
         lumbar discs herniations at L2-3, L3-4, L4-5 and L5-Sl, resulting 
 
         in spinal stenosis, severe at L4-5, was made.  Dr. Ercolani 
 
         assigned an 18 percent impairment to the body as a whole and 
 
         indicated that claimant is medically unable to resume his former 
 
         employment (Ex. E2, p. 26).  He indicated claimant should avoid 
 
         work involving heavy lifting, frequent bending and activities 
 
         known to be associated with low back strains (Ex. E2, pp. 8-9).
 
         
 
              Defendants argue that if, in fact, claimant has a permanent 
 
         back impairment, it is due to an intervening injury in April 
 
         1989, unrelated to work.  Claimant testified that he twisted his 
 
         back when he stepped out of the shower.  This argument is without 
 
         merit.  It is inconceivable that such a minor incident could have 
 
         caused multi-level lumbar disc herniations.
 
         
 
              In making the above determination, the undersigned has care
 
         fully considered assessments made by physicians who have treated 
 
         and/or examined claimant.  Dr. Ercolani examined claimant at the 
 
         time of the hearing and followed him through June 2, 1989.  Dr. 
 
         Boardini saw claimant on one occasion and, according to claimant, 
 
         examined him for about 10 minutes.  Accordingly, Dr. Boardini's 
 
         assessment is not entitled to significant weight and considera
 
         tion.
 
         
 
              Claimant has clearly demonstrated that he sustained an 
 
         industrial disability as a result of the injury on December 2, 
 
         1988.  Functional impairment is an element to be considered in 
 
         determining industrial disability which is the reduction of earn
 
         ing capacity, but consideration must also be given to the injured 
 
         employee's age, education, qualifications, experience and inabil
 
         ity to engage in employment for which he is fitted.  Olson v. 
 
         Goodyear Service Stores, supra.
 
         
 
              Claimant is 34 years old and was 31 at the time of the 
 
         injury.  He completed the eleventh grade of school and does not 
 
         have a GED certificate.  He worked at various times as a carpen
 
         ter, lead man, foreman, heavy equipment operator, fabrications 
 
         foreman, construction supervisor and water jet technician and 
 
         consultant.  Claimant's entire work history revolves around heavy 
 
         equipment.  In 1988, his gross income was $26,323 and in 1989 was 
 
         $20,269 (Exs. 3-4).  Claimant's income was reduced in 1990 due to 
 
         his inability to find a job until July when he was hired as a 
 
         consultant by Mr. Beadle, owner/operator of a Jet Edge Equipment 
 
         Company.  Claimant testified that he earns $600 a week, however, 
 
         he performs no carpentry or manual labor which reduces his abil
 
         ity to earn more money.  Claimant testified that he is limited in 
 
         his ability to lift, bend, stoop, shovel, twist and turn.  He 
 

 
         
 
         Page  11
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         stated he cannot work as a carpenter, heavy equipment operator or 
 
         bartender.  He is limited in his ability to sit more than two 
 
         hours at a time and repetitively lift and carry.  Claimant has 
 
         restrictions which preclude him from obtaining employment in the 
 
         area of the job market where he has the most experience.  Never
 
         theless, claimant is a highly motivated individual and has 
 
         actively sought and obtained employment.  The evidence clearly 
 
         establishes that claimant has suffered both a loss of earnings as 
 
         a result of this injury as well as a loss of earning capacity.  
 
         Considering then all the elements of industrial disability, it is 
 
         determined that claimant has established a permanent partial dis
 
         ability of 25 percent for industrial purposes entitling him to 
 
         125 weeks of permanent partial disability benefits.
 
         
 
                                      order
 
         
 
              THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
 
         
 
              1.  That defendants pay to claimant seven point 
 
         two-eight-six (7.286) weeks of healing period benefits for the 
 
         period from December 5, 1988 through January 23, 1989, at the 
 
         stipulated rate of three hundred forty-two and 88/l00 dollars 
 
         ($342.88) per week.
 
         
 
              2.  That defendants pay to claimant one hundred twenty-five 
 
         (125) weeks of permanent partial disability benefits at the stip
 
         ulated rate of three hundred forty-two and 88/l00 dollars 
 
         ($342.88) per week commencing January 24, 1989.
 
         
 
              3.  That defendants receive full credit for all disability 
 
         benefits previously paid.
 
         
 
              4.  That accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum 
 
         together with statutory interest pursuant to Iowa Code section 
 
         85.30.
 
         
 
              5.  That defendants pay costs pursuant to rule 343 IAC 4.33.
 
         
 
              6.  That defendants file claim activity reports as requested 
 
         by the agency pursuant to rule 343 IAC 3.l.
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
              Signed and filed this ____ day of May, 1991.
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
                                       ______________________________               
 
         JEAN M. INGRASSIA
 
                                       DEPUTY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
         
 

 
         
 
         Page  12
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         Copies To:
 
         
 
         Mr. Roger L. Sutton
 
         Attorney at Law
 
         119 N Jackson St
 
         Charles City  IA  50616
 
         
 
         Mr. Harry W. Dahl
 
         Attorney at Law
 
         974 73rd St
 
         Suite 16
 
         Des Moines  IA  50312
 
         
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
                        1802; 1803; 2301
 
                        Filed May 30, 1991
 
                        JEAN M. INGRASSIA
 
         
 
                     before the iowa industrial commissioner
 
         ____________________________________________________________
 
                                       :
 
         JAMES D. MOLITOR,             :
 
                                       :
 
              Claimant,                :
 
                                       :
 
         vs.                           :
 
                                       :         File No. 931314
 
         JET EDGE,                     :
 
                                       :      A R B I T R A T I O N
 
              Employer,                :
 
                                       :         D E C I S I O N
 
         and                           :
 
                                       :
 
         SAFECO INSURANCE CO.,         :
 
                                       :
 
              Insurance Carrier,       :
 
              Defendants.              :
 
         ___________________________________________________________
 
         
 
         
 
         2301
 
         This is a claim for permanent disability benefits under Iowa 
 
         Workers' Compensation Law.  Claimant previously paid seven weeks 
 
         of temporary benefits under the Minnesota Workers' Compensation 
 
         Act.
 
         Defendants argue lack of subject matter jurisdiction stating that 
 
         claimant's only contact with Iowa is his domicile.  Claimant 
 
         found to be an employee working under a contract of hire made in 
 
         Iowa and engaged in employment not principally localized in any 
 
         state.  Iowa Code section 85.71(2).  Agency precedent that when 
 
         offer and acceptance of a contract is made by telephone, the con
 
         tract comes into existence in the place where the offeree used 
 
         the telephone.  Hegge v. Pittsburg-Des Moines Steel Company, File 
 
         No. 712121, (Appeal Decision filed September 28, 1984).
 
         
 
         
 
         1802; 1803
 
         Claimant awarded 7.286 weeks of healing period benefits and 25 
 
         percent permanent partial disability benefits due to multi-level 
 
         degenerative disc disease.  Claimant had preexisting degenerative 
 
         lumbar changes exacerbated by a work-related injury.  Claimant's 
 
         treating physician gave an 18 percent impairment to body as a 
 
         whole.  Consulting physician found no permanency after a 10 
 
         minute examination.  Greater weight given to claimant's treating 
 
         physician.  Claimant 31-year-old, completed eleventh grade of 
 
         school and manual work background.  Reduction in earning capacity 
 
         and earnings.  Claimant highly motivated and currently works 
 
         within his restrictions.
 
         
 
 
            
 
            Page   1
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                     before the iowa industrial commissioner
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                                          :
 
            RAYMOND J. FELDPAUSCH,        :
 
                                          :
 
                 Claimant,                :       File Nos. 931316
 
                                          :                 931317
 
            vs.                           :
 
                                          :          A P P E A L
 
            ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA,  :
 
                                          :        D E C I S I O N
 
                 Employer,                :
 
                 Self-Insured,            :
 
                 Defendant.               :
 
            ___________________________________________________________
 
            
 
            
 
                 The record, including the transcript of the hearing 
 
            before the deputy and all exhibits admitted into the record, 
 
            has been reviewed de novo on appeal.  The decision of the 
 
            deputy filed August 9, 1991, is affirmed and adopted as the 
 
            final agency action in this case with the following 
 
            additional analysis.
 
            
 
                 Claimant asserts that the deputy erred in holding that 
 
            claimant failed to give timely notice of his January 18, 
 
            1988 work injury.  Claimant contends that he was unaware of 
 
            the seriousness of his condition until after the 90 day 
 
            notice period had run.
 
            
 
                 The time period for notice or claim does not begin 
 
                 to run until the claimant, as a reasonable man, 
 
                 should recognize the nature, seriousness and 
 
                 probable compensable character of his injury or 
 
                 disease....The reasonableness of the claimant's 
 
                 conduct is to be judged in the light of his own 
 
                 education and intelligence.
 
            
 
            Robinson v. Department of Transp., 296 N.W.2d 809, 812 (Iowa 
 
            1980).
 
            
 
                 Claimant worked for the defendant-employer since 1953.  
 
            Claimant testified that he is aware of the procedure to 
 
            report a work injury.  In fact, claimant had reported a 
 
            number of injuries over the years.  In January 1987, 
 
            claimant reported experiencing pressure numbness in his left 
 
            thumb from using an Allen wrench.  (Claimant's exhibit 5, 
 
            page 20)  Surely a reasonable person in claimant's position 
 
            with claimant's knowledge would have reported an injury 
 
            which persisted for a number of months.
 
            
 
                 Even if claimant gave timely notice of his work injury, 
 
            he failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a 
 
            causal connection between his work injury and his permanent 
 
            condition.  Daniel B. Johnson, M.D., claimant's treating 
 
            physician, gave equivocal testimony on the issue of causal 
 
            connection.  
 

 
            
 
            Page   2
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 Furthermore, even if Dr. Johnson's opinion on casual 
 
            connection is accepted, claimant failed to prove that he 
 
            sustained a compensable work injury.  All of the objective 
 
            test results were normal indicating that claimant did not 
 
            suffer a permanent injury and Dr. Johnson's impairment 
 
            rating must be rejected.  Dr. Johnson wrote:  "In my opinion 
 
            the AMA guidelines for impairment ratings does not address 
 
            the issue of chronic pain without any other disabilities 
 
            adequately.  In my opinion, Mr. Feldpausch has about a 10% 
 
            impairment rating of the total body related to his chronic 
 
            low back pain."  (Defendant's ex. A, p. 31)  Pain that is 
 
            not substantiated by clinical findings is not a substitute 
 
            for impairment.  Waller v. Chamberlain Manufacturing, II 
 
            Iowa Industrial Commissioner Report 419, 425 (1981); Godwin 
 
            v. Hicklin G.M. Power, II Iowa Industrial Commissioner 
 
            Report 170 (1981).  The impairment rating provided by Dr. 
 
            Johnson appears to be based strictly on claimant's 
 
            subjective complaints of pain and, therefore, is rejected.
 
            
 
                 For these reasons and those in the proposed decision, 
 
            it is determined that claimant failed to give timely notice 
 
            pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.23.
 
            
 
                 Claimant shall pay the costs of the appeal, including 
 
            the preparation of the hearing transcript.
 
            
 
                 Signed and filed this ____ day of November, 1991.
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                                          
 
            ________________________________
 
                                                   BYRON K. ORTON
 
                                              INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            
 
            Copies To:
 
            
 
            Mr. Michael W. Liebbe
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            116 East 6th Street
 
            P O Box 339
 
            Davenport  IA  52805
 
            
 
            Mr. Thomas N. Kamp
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            600 Davenport Bank Building
 
            Davenport  IA  52801
 
            
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         5-2401; 5-1108
 
         Filed November 25, 1991
 
         BYRON K. ORTON
 
         BJO
 
         
 
                     before the iowa industrial commissioner
 
         ____________________________________________________________
 
                                       :
 
         RAYMOND J. FELDPAUSCH,        :
 
                                       :
 
              Claimant,                :       File Nos. 931316
 
                                       :                 931317
 
         vs.                           :
 
                                       :          A P P E A L
 
         ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA,  :
 
                                       :        D E C I S I O N
 
              Employer,                :
 
              Self-Insured,            :
 
              Defendant.               :
 
         ___________________________________________________________
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         5-2401
 
         Claimant asserts that the deputy erred in holding that claimant 
 
         failed to give timely notice of his January 18, 1988 work injury.  
 
         Claimant contends that he was unaware of the seriousness of his 
 
         condition until after the 90 day notice period had run.  Claimant 
 
         worked for the defendant-employer since 1953 and was aware of the 
 
         procedure to report a work injury.  In fact, claimant had 
 
         reported a number of injuries over the years.  A reasonable 
 
         person in claimant's position with claimant's knowledge would 
 
         have reported an injury which persisted for a number of months.
 
         
 
         
 
         5-1108
 
         Even if claimant had given timely notice of his work injury, he 
 
         failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a causal 
 
         connection between his work injury and his permanent condition.
 
         Furthermore, even if claimant proved causal connection, he failed 
 
         to prove that he sustained a compensable injury.  All of the 
 
         objective test results were normal indicating that claimant 
 
         suffered no permanent injury.  The impairment rating provided by 
 
         claimant's treating physician appears to be based strictly on 
 
         claimant's subjective complaints of pain and, therefore, is 
 
         rejected.  Pain that is not substantiated by clinical findings is 
 
         not a substitute for impairment.  Waller v. Chamberlain 
 
         Manufacturing, II Iowa Industrial Commissioner Report 419, 425 
 
         (1981); Godwin v. Hicklin G.M. Power, II Iowa Industrial 
 
         Commissioner Report 170 (181).  
 
         
 
 
            
 
            Page   1
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                     before the iowa industrial commissioner
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                                          :
 
            RAYMOND J. FELDPAUSCH,        :
 
                                          :
 
                 Claimant,                :
 
                                          :      File Nos. 931316
 
            vs.                           :                931317
 
                                          :
 
            ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA,  :
 
                                          :     A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                 Employer,                :
 
                 Self-Insured,            :       D E C I S I O N
 
                 Defendant.               :
 
                                          :
 
            ___________________________________________________________
 
            
 
                              statement of the case
 
            
 
                 This case came on for hearing on July 18, 1991, in 
 
            Davenport, Iowa.  This is a proceeding in arbitration 
 
            wherein claimant seeks compensation for permanent partial 
 
            disability benefits as a result of two alleged injuries, one 
 
            occurring on January 18, 1988 and the other on May 15, 1988.  
 
            The record in the proceeding consists of the testimony of 
 
            claimant, claimant's wife, Thomas Gillum, Joan Snyder and 
 
            Kevin O'Brien; claimant's exhibits 1 through 6; and 
 
            defendant's exhibit A, pages 1 through 53.
 
            
 
                                      issues
 
            
 
                 In both cases the issues for resolution are:
 
            
 
                 1.  Whether claimant's injuries on January 18, 1988 and 
 
            May 15, 1988 arose out of and in the course of his 
 
            employment;
 
            
 
                 2.  Whether there is any causal connection between 
 
            claimant's alleged disability and the respective injuries;
 
            
 
                 3.  The nature and extent of claimant's disability and 
 
            entitlement to disability benefits;
 
            
 
                 4.  Whether claimant gave timely notice under Iowa Code 
 
            section 85.23; and
 
            
 
                 5.  Whether claimant is entitled to Iowa Code section 
 
            85.27 medical benefits, causal connection.
 
            
 
                     
 
            
 
            
 
            Page   2
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            findings of fact
 
            
 
                 The undersigned deputy having heard the testimony and 
 
            considered all the evidence, finds that:
 
            
 
                 Claimant is 61 years old and has worked as a roll 
 
            grinder for defendant employer for the last nineteen years.  
 
            He has worked for defendant employer beginning in 1953.  
 
            Claimant described the grinder process and what he does at 
 
            this position.  He explained his hours of work, his hourly 
 
            pay and the overtime procedure for extra hours worked.  He 
 
            said he made $51,541 gross in 1987, $43,355 in 1988, $42,819 
 
            in 1989 and $45,444 in 1990.  He said his health was good as 
 
            of January 1, 1988, and he was seeing no doctor.  He 
 
            testified that on January 18, 1988, he was working on a new 
 
            cold mill having different bearing chokes.  He explained the 
 
            bolts and what he had to do to loosen the 450 pounds of 
 
            torque pressure.  He said he was using a 36 to 40 inch 
 
            wrench to untighten several bolts.  He indicated he suddenly 
 
            felt a tightness and developed a pain in his groin-right leg 
 
            that morning.  He worked the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. shift.  
 
            He did not report the injury as he thought it would go away 
 
            even though he knew he was to report all incidents.  He 
 
            wasn't sure what happened.  In February, March and April, 
 
            claimant indicated he wasn't really having problems but knew 
 
            it was there.  He still thought it would go away.  In his 
 
            job claimant can switch around at six week intervals as to 
 
            different positions.  In May 1988, claimant was back on the 
 
            cold mill and his pain went from the groin to the knee.  
 
            Claimant emphasized that this was a new pain episode and 
 
            that it occurred May 8, 1988 and not May 15, 1988, as plead 
 
            and as indicated on the prehearing report.  Claimant 
 
            indicated he just realized this different date yesterday 
 
            (July 17, 1991) when he was going over the medical bills of 
 
            Dr. Michael B. McCormick and realized the date could not be 
 
            May 15, 1988.  He had seen the doctor on May 11, 1988 
 
            because he began feeling the pain in his right groin.  
 
            Claimant said once he made the mistake he told everyone 
 
            thereafter that he was injured on May 15, 1988.  Claimant 
 
            reported this incident to the defendant employer and was 
 
            sent to Daniel B. Johnson, M.D., a neurologist who ran 
 
            tests.  Claimant testified as to his medical visits which 
 
            included three trips to Mayo Clinic.
 
            
 
                 Claimant said his pain was in his right groin area in 
 
            January 1988 and in May it went from his groin to his knee 
 
            and eventually across his back through both legs and feet.  
 
            He indicated his feet felt like he was walking on rocks.  
 
            Claimant said he continued to work seven days a week but did 
 
            not have to work every Saturday or Sunday.  He indicated 
 
            that overtime work goes toward his retirement.  Claimant 
 
            indicated he hasn't refused work but indicated he started 
 
            turning down casual hours, which type of hours he explained, 
 
            but continued to work seven days a week.  No one has told 
 
            claimant not to work extra hours.  Claimant contends he lies 
 
            on the floor when he goes home as he cannot do anything.
 
            
 
                 On cross-examination, claimant affirmed again that he 
 

 
            
 
            Page   3
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            did not tell anyone he was hurt on January 18, 1988.  He 
 
            acknowledged that when he reported an injury on May 17, 
 
            1988, he said he was injured in January or February 1988.  
 
            Claimant did not say he was injured in May 1988.  Claimant 
 
            indicated he went over all of his records and agreed there 
 
            is nothing in the records that show an injury to the 
 
            claimant on May 8 or May 15, 1988.  He also agreed that no 
 
            doctor said his feet or back problems are the result of a 
 
            May 15, 1988 work injury.  Claimant's attention was called 
 
            to the doctor's notes on May 11, 1988, where claimant 
 
            indicated he noticed some pain since a CT scan a year ago.
 
            
 
                 Claimant's attention was called to defendant's exhibit 
 
            A, page 12, dated June 6, 1988, in which he related his 
 
            problems to an angiogram a couple of years ago.  He denied 
 
            any specific incident that led to his problem.
 
            
 
                 Claimant's attention was called to defendant's exhibit 
 
            A, page 23, in which Dr. Johnson referred to Mayo Clinic's 
 
            conclusion that they could not find a cause to claimant's 
 
            conditions.  Claimant's attention was called to defendant's 
 
            Exhibit A, page 41, in which claimant obviously gave a 
 
            history involving a January 1988 onset of groin problems.  
 
            He did not deny giving this history.
 
            
 
                 Claimant was asked questions as to his other medical 
 
            reports similar to those referred to above.  It is not 
 
            necessary to go into any further detail in light of this 
 
            case and ultimate decision.
 
            
 
                 Claimant was extensively questioned on cross-
 
            examination as to his hours and the impression he has that 
 
            he is turning down hours even though he is still working 
 
            eight hours a day, seven days a week.  It actually appears 
 
            after this questioning that, in fact, less overtime was 
 
            available so this also affected his overtime income.
 
            
 
                 Martha Feldpausch, claimant's wife, testified but her 
 
            testimony was not of any material significance as to this 
 
            decision.
 
            
 
                 Joan Snyder, a registered nurse and an employee of 
 
            defendant for the last nine and one-half years, testified 
 
            that if claimant notified the employer of an injury in 
 
            January or February 1988, it would be in the records.  She 
 
            worked the same shift as the claimant, namely, 11:00 p.m. to 
 
            7:00 a.m.
 
            
 
                 Kevin O'Brien, an employee of defendant and 
 
            administrator of the workers' compensation department at the 
 
            time of claimant's alleged May 1988 injury said the first 
 
            time he was advised that claimant suffered a work injury on 
 
            May 15, 1988 was when he was served with a petition in 
 
            January 1990.  He indicated yesterday was the first time he 
 
            knew claimant was now claiming a May 8, 1988 work injury 
 
            instead of a May 15, 1988 work injury.
 
            
 
                 Defendant's Exhibit A contains several medical reports 
 
            to which defendant's attorney repeatedly referred on 
 
            cross-examination of claimant.  They show claimant was 
 

 
            
 
            Page   4
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            referring to a January or February 1988 injury.  Most 
 
            notations refer to a January 1988 injury.
 
            
 
                 On May 11, 1988, claimant's medical records show that 
 
            claimant referred to some pain since a CT scan five years 
 
            ago.  He denied any history of weakness or past weakness of 
 
            trauma (Def. Ex. A, p. 10).  The undersigned notes 
 
            claimant's petition alleged a back injury on January 18, 
 
            1988.  It is of interest to the undersigned that it would 
 
            seem that on this May 11, 1988 appointment with the doctor 
 
            he would surely have referred to his pain or trauma history 
 
            if there were such on January 18, 1988.
 
            
 
                 Claimant denied any specific incident that led to his 
 
            problem.  Claimant initially related his problem to an 
 
            angiogram in 1986 (Def. Ex. A, p. 12).  Claimant had a 
 
            normal myelogram and CT scan in August 1988 and a normal MRI 
 
            scan of the lumbar spine in September 1988.  Dr. Johnson 
 
            could not come up with the cause of his symptoms (Def. Ex. 
 
            A, pp. 19-20).  Mayo Clinic also could not find a cause 
 
            (Def. Ex. A, p. 23).
 
            
 
                 Daniel B. Johnson, M.D., a neurologist, testified 
 
            through his deposition on August 15, 1990 (Claimant's 
 
            Exhibit 6).  One will note that in the deposition the 
 
            respective pages of the deposition had been renumbered as to 
 
            the number of the deposition page as it fits in the sequence 
 
            of claimant's total exhibits.  An example, page one of the 
 
            deposition is, in fact, page 31 of claimant's exhibit 6.  
 
            Any number hereafter referred to as to exhibit 6 will refer 
 
            to the exhibit number and not the number of the deposition 
 
            page given at the original time the deposition was taken.  
 
            The undersigned finds that Dr. Johnson's deposition is 
 
            confusing in many respects when trying to determine exactly 
 
            what he is concluding on a consistent basis and then trying 
 
            to coordinate his testimony with what he put in various 
 
            reports or letters.  Dr. Johnson testified that his first 
 
            visit with claimant was on May 31, 1988, in which claimant 
 
            gave him a referral slip from a Dr. Casta indicating 
 
            claimant sustained a low back injury in January 1988.  The 
 
            doctor explained his treatment, tests and results.  He said 
 
            he did not know the cause of claimant's low back problem 
 
            then nor does he today.  He then said he felt claimant's 
 
            radiculopathy bilaterally was probably related to his injury 
 
            at work which claimant described temporarily related with 
 
            the torque wrench, but couldn't find what was actually 
 
            causing the injury to the nerve.  The doctor said within a 
 
            degree of medical certainty that probably the low back 
 
            condition that he found and treated originally was caused by 
 
            the incident claimant described at work (January 1988) (Cl. 
 
            Ex. 6, p. 47).
 
            
 
                 The doctor then said that on August 4, 1988, something 
 
            did develop which he didn't recognize originally, namely, 
 
            neuropathy (Cl. Ex. 6,  49-50).  He then ran many tests (Cl. 
 
            Ex. 6, pp. 50-52).  The doctor said he then sent claimant to 
 
            Mayo Clinic as he was unable to find the cause of claimant's 
 
            neuropathy (Cl. Ex. 6, p. 52).
 
            
 
                 The doctor then acknowledged he put a 25 pound lifting 
 

 
            
 
            Page   5
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            restriction on claimant in December 1988 because of 
 
            claimant's low back problem and not because of his 
 
            neuropathy (Cl. Ex. 6, p. 26).  The doctor then indicated 
 
            that another EMG and MRI scan in 1989 were normal.
 
            
 
                 Later in his deposition the doctor said he did not know 
 
            the anatomic cause of claimant's low back and radicular pain 
 
            that could resolve like it did before (Cl. Ex. 6, p. 61).  
 
            The doctor said claimant's neuropathy cleared up by October 
 
            9, 1989 (Cl. Ex. 6, p. 62).
 
            
 
                 The doctor then indicated claimant complained of being 
 
            impotent and claimant developed urinary incontinence.  He 
 
            then referred claimant to Mayo Clinic again, which referral 
 
            he indicated was not very fruitful.  He said the clinic felt 
 
            claimant had non-insulin dependent diabetes and psycogenic 
 
            impotence.  He did not agree with their diagnosis, 
 
            especially as to diabetes.  He said none of these problems 
 
            were involved with any work injury.  He did later indicate 
 
            that claimant's feet problems are a sign of a diabetic 
 
            situation.
 
            
 
                 The doctor felt claimant was going to have some weight 
 
            restrictions, probably 25 pounds, because of his chronic 
 
            back pain.  He believed claimant had a low back condition 
 
            since January 1988.
 
            
 
                 On cross-examination, the doctor said he did know if 
 
            claimant's back problems were permanent and he could not 
 
            find anything wrong with claimant that would be causing the 
 
            back problem insofar as objective tests are concerned (Cl. 
 
            Ex. 6, p. 69).  He said an EMG showed nerve irritation but 
 
            he couldn't find out what was causing claimant's nerve 
 
            irritation.
 
            
 
                 When asked what led him to believe the nerve irritation 
 
            was caused by an incident at work, the doctor said it is 
 
            based strictly on the history given by the claimant (Cl. Ex. 
 
            6, p. 70).  The doctor then was referred to a letter of 
 
            April 1989 in which he said the low back problems was 
 
            essentially resolved.  In April 1989, Dr. Johnson opined 
 
            claimant's disability at that time appeared to be from his 
 
            neuropathy which does not appear to be work related (Cl. Ex. 
 
            6, p. 87).
 
            
 
                 He indicated that claimant initially seemed to have a 
 
            low back problem which stemmed from a work injury but this 
 
            seems to have essentially resolved, however.  (Def. Ex. A, 
 
            p. 25)
 
            
 
                 In May 1989, claimant had a normal EMG and NCV of the 
 
            right lower extremity and right lumbar paraspinals.  In 
 
            November 1989, Dr. Johnson opined claimant's chronic low 
 
            back pain is of unclear etiology (Def. Ex. A, p. 30).  He 
 
            opined a 10 percent impairment to claimant's body as a 
 
            whole.  In December 1988, Mayo Clinic found no known 
 
            etiology of his problems.  The Mayo Clinic report of May 8, 
 
            1990 (Def. Ex. A, p. 41-41) found no objective findings 
 
            relative to an injury.  Additionally, claimant only referred 
 
            in his history to a January 1988 onset of right groin pain.
 

 
            
 
            Page   6
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 Claimant alleges a January 18, 1988 injury.  
 
            Overwhelming evidence shows that claimant believed that he 
 
            incurred an injury on that date and consistently referred to 
 
            that date in many instances as he met with doctors.  There 
 
            is no evidence that claimant gave notice of this injury to 
 
            defendant employer in compliance with section 85.23 of the 
 
            Iowa Code and the undersigned so finds.  There is no 
 
            evidence that defendant had actual notice of an injury.  
 
            Claimant was not off work because of this alleged injury.  
 
            The statute is clear.  This above finding disposes of this 
 
            January 18, 1988 alleged injury and there is no necessity to 
 
            go into detail as to any other issues.  The undersigned will 
 
            consider one other issue regarding this alleged injury as to 
 
            causal connection.  Claimant has the burden of proof to 
 
            show, if he had an injury that arose out of and in the 
 
            course of his employment and gave timely notice or that the 
 
            employer had actual notice of injury, that there is a causal 
 
            connection between his alleged impairment or disability and 
 
            the injury in question.  Claimant has not sustained his 
 
            burden as to causal connection.  Dr. Johnson's deposition is 
 
            confusing as to what would appear to be confusing 
 
            conclusions, inconsistent and back and forth statements as 
 
            far as what he really feels.  It all boils down to the 
 
            doctor relying strictly on what the claimant told him as to 
 
            any ultimate causation opinions he rendered.  Dr. Johnson 
 
            began practicing in the Quad Cities area in 1984 and has 
 
            four years experience as of 1988.  The undersigned believes 
 
            this reflects in his testimony.  The doctor referred 
 
            claimant to Mayo Clinic and claimant went there on more than 
 
            one occasion.  The doctor obviously made this referral to 
 
            get more expertise conclusions from specialists with more 
 
            experience.  Mayo Clinic did not find an etiology or cause 
 
            for claimant's complaints other than to seem to indicate 
 
            that he does have a non-insulintcw dependent diabetic 
 
            condition and a psychogenic impotence and a neurotic or 
 
            reactive depression (Def. Ex. A, pp. 41-42).  There is no 
 
            dispute that regardless of other facts, these conditions are 
 
            not work related in any respect.  Claimant's history given 
 
            to the Mayo Clinic also refers to a January 1988 alleged 
 
            injury.
 
            
 
                 The undersigned finds that claimant has failed in his 
 
            burden to show that his alleged disability is causally 
 
            connected to a January 18, 1988 injury.
 
            
 
                 The undersigned finds there is no necessity to go into 
 
            any of the other issues because of the nature of this 
 
            decision.  Claimant takes nothing from his alleged January 
 
            18, 1988 injury.
 
            
 
                 Claimant alleges a May 15, 1988 injury but acknowledges 
 
            that in his history given, he has not referred to this 
 
            alleged injury but refers to a January or February 1988 
 
            injury.  In looking at the record as a whole, it appears 
 
            that claimant may have realized his problem concerning his 
 
            lack of notice of a January 18, 1988 injury and is 
 
            stretching the factual situation so as to try to relate his 
 
            problems now to a May 15, 1988 or May 8, 1988 injury.  
 
            Claimant rationalized that it wasn't until approximately the 
 

 
            
 
            Page   7
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            day before the hearing that he determine that his injury in 
 
            May for which he brought the action was not, in fact, 
 
            incurred on May 15, 1988, but was, in fact, incurred on May 
 
            8, 1988.  His rationale being that he could not have 
 
            incurred an injury after he saw a doctor for that alleged 
 
            injury.  This makes sense to the undersigned.  There is no 
 
            medical evidence that substantiates claimant's claim that he 
 
            was injured on May 8 or 15, 1988, and if anything, what he 
 
            was suffering on those dates was a residue of some sort from 
 
            occurrences prior thereto, possibly, from a January 1988 
 
            alleged injury.  Claimant has failed in his burden to show 
 
            that he incurred an injury on May 8 or 15, 1988 that arose 
 
            out of and in the course of his employment.
 
            
 
                 Claimant has had some prior problems and in his history 
 
            had referred to events in 1986 and in 1983 as far as back 
 
            problems, one being related to what he thought was an 
 
            angiogram and another subsequent to a CT scan.  In his 
 
            history in May 1988 to the doctor, he indicated he had had 
 
            no prior injury or trauma and yet he comes into this hearing 
 
            knowing full well that he had at least an alleged injury in 
 
            January 1988.  The Mayo Clinic, which is the expert in this 
 
            case and to which claimant's treating doctor referred the 
 
            claimant to try to determine the etiology of claimant's 
 
            problems, did not find any causation between claimant's 
 
            alleged low back injury and his May 8 or 15, 1988 alleged 
 
            injury.  As mentioned earlier, they also found no etiology 
 
            or causation from or related to a January 18, 1988 alleged 
 
            injury.  
 
            
 
                 The greater weight of medical testimony and, 
 
            particularly, the most reliable expert testimony of Mayo 
 
            Clinic does not support claimant's contentions regarding 
 
            this May 1988 alleged injury.  The undersigned finds that 
 
            claimant has failed in his burden to show any causal 
 
            connection between the alleged May 8 or 15, 1988 alleged 
 
            work injury and any low back problems or impairments or 
 
            disability for which he complains.   The undersigned also 
 
            finds that claimant did not incur an injury on May 8 or May 
 
            15, 1988 which arose out of and in the course of his 
 
            employment.
 
            
 
                 The undersigned further finds that there is no reason 
 
            to resolve any other issues that may have been involved in 
 
            this case as they are moot in light of the above findings.  
 
            Claimant shall take nothing as a result of the alleged May 8 
 
            or 15, 1988 injuries.
 
            
 
                    
 
            
 
            
 
            Page   8
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            conclusions of law
 
            
 
                 Claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance 
 
            of the evidence that he received injuries on January 18, 
 
            1988, May 8, 1988 or May 15, 1988 which arose out of and in 
 
            the course of his employment. McDowell v. Town of 
 
            Clarksville, 241 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1976); Musselman v. 
 
            Central Telephone Co., 261 Iowa 352, 154 N.W.2d 128 (1967). 
 
            
 
                 The claimant has the burden of proving by a 
 
            preponderance of the evidence that the injuries of January 
 
            18, 1988 and May 8, 1988 or May 15, 1988 are causally 
 
            related to the disability on which he now bases his claim.  
 
            Bodish v. Fischer, Inc., 257 Iowa 516, 133 N.W.2d 867 
 
            (1965).  Lindahl v. L. O. Boggs, 236 Iowa 296, 18 N.W.2d 607 
 
            (1945).  A possibility is insufficient; a probability is 
 
            necessary.  Burt v. John Deere Waterloo Tractor Works, 247 
 
            Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732 (1955).  The question of causal 
 
            connection is essentially within the domain of expert 
 
            testimony.  Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist Hospital, 251 Iowa 
 
            375, 101 N.W.2d 167 (1960). 
 
            
 
                 However, expert medical evidence must be considered 
 
            with all other evidence introduced bearing on the causal 
 
            connection.  Burt, 247 Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732.  The opinion 
 
            of experts need not be couched in definite, positive or 
 
            unequivocal language.  Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 
 
            903 (Iowa 1974).  However, the expert opinion may be 
 
            accepted or rejected, in whole or in part, by the trier of 
 
            fact.  Id. at 907.  Further, the weight to be given to such 
 
            an opinion is for the finder of fact, and that may be 
 
            affected by the completeness of the premise given the expert 
 
            and other surrounding circumstances.  Bodish, 257 Iowa 516, 
 
            133 N.W.2d 867.  See also Musselman, 261 Iowa 352, 154 
 
            N.W.2d 128.
 
            
 
                 Regarding claimant's alleged injury of January 18, 
 
            1988, Iowa Code section 85.23 provides:
 
            
 
                    Unless the employer or the employer's 
 
                 representative shall have actual knowledge of the 
 
                 occurrence of an injury received within ninety 
 
                 days from the date of the occurrence of the 
 
                 injury, or unless the employee or someone on the 
 
                 employee's behalf or a dependent or someone on the 
 
                 dependent's behalf shall give notice thereof to 
 
                 the employer within ninety days from the date of 
 
                 the occurrence of the injury no compensation shall 
 
                 be allowed.
 
            
 
                 It is further concluded that:
 
            
 
                 Claimant failed to give notice, as provided by Iowa 
 
            Code section 85.23.  As to his alleged January 18, 1988 
 
            injury, the employer did not have any actual acknowledgement 
 
            of an injury to the claimant occurring on January 18, 1988.
 
            
 
                 Claimant has failed to sustain his burden as to an 
 
            alleged injury arising out of and in the course of his 
 
            employment on May 8 or May 15, 1988.
 

 
            
 
            Page   9
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 Claimant has failed in his burden to show that his 
 
            alleged injury, impairment or disability is causally 
 
            connected to either a January 18, 1988,  May 8, 1988 or May 
 
            15, 1988 alleged injury.
 
            
 
                 Any other issues set out by the parties as to the 
 
            respective injuries are moot in light of the above findings 
 
            and conclusions.
 
            
 
                                      order
 
            
 
                 THEREFORE, it is ordered:
 
            
 
                 That claimant takes nothing as to the January 18, 1988 
 
            alleged injury (File No. 931316).
 
            
 
                 That claimant takes nothing as to his alleged May 8, 
 
            1988 or May 15, 1988 injury (File No. 931317).
 
            
 
                 That claimant shall pay the costs of this action, 
 
            pursuant to rule 343 IAC 4.33.
 
            
 
                 Signed and filed this ____ day of August, 1991.
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                                          ______________________________
 
                                          BERNARD J. O'MALLEY
 
                                          DEPUTY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            
 
            Copies to:
 
            
 
            Mr Michael W Liebbe
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            116 E 6th St
 
            P O Box 339
 
            Davenport IA 52805
 
            
 
            Mr Thomas N Kamp
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            600 Davenport Bank Bldg
 
            Davenport IA 52801
 
            
 
            
 
                 
 
            
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      5-1100; 5-1108; 5-2800
 
                      Filed August 9, 1991
 
                      Bernard J. O'Malley
 
            
 
                     before the iowa industrial commissioner
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                                          :
 
            RAYMOND J. FELDPAUSCH,        :
 
                                          :
 
                 Claimant,                :
 
                                          :      File Nos. 931316
 
            vs.                           :                931317
 
                                          :
 
            ALUMINUM COMPANY OF AMERICA,  :
 
                                          :     A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                 Employer,                :
 
                 Self-Insured,            :       D E C I S I O N
 
                 Defendant.               :
 
                                          :
 
            ___________________________________________________________
 
            Claimant took nothing from either injury.
 
            
 
            5-2800
 
            Claimant failed to give notice under 85.23 as to January 18, 
 
            1988 alleged injury.
 
            
 
            5-1108
 
            No causal connection found as to January 18, 1988 alleged 
 
            injury.
 
            
 
            5-1100
 
            Claimant failed to prove an injury arose out of and in the 
 
            course of his employment.
 
            
 
            5-1108
 
            Claimant failed to show causal connection as to his alleged 
 
            May 8, 1988 or May 15, 1988 injury.
 
            
 
            
 
 
            
 
            Page   1
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                     before the iowa industrial commissioner
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                                          :
 
            LINDA CALLISON,               :
 
                                          :
 
                 Claimant,                :
 
                                          :
 
            vs.                           :
 
                                          :         File No. 931324
 
            SEARS CREDIT CENTRAL,         :
 
                                          :      A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                 Employer,                :
 
                                          :         D E C I S I O N
 
            and                           :
 
                                          :
 
            ALLSTATE INS. CO.,            :
 
                                          :
 
                 Insurance Carrier,       :
 
                 Defendants.              :
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
            
 
                              statement of the case
 
            
 
                 This is a proceeding in arbitration brought by Linda 
 
            Callison against her former employer, Sears Credit Central, 
 
            and its insurance carrier, Allstate Insurance Company.  
 
            Callison alleges that she sustained an emotional injury as a 
 
            result of stress at her work place.  The issues to be 
 
            determined are whether Callison sustained an injury on or 
 
            about February 10, 1988 which arose out of and in the course 
 
            of her employment; whether any alleged injury is a proximate 
 
            cause of any disability she has experienced; and, whether 
 
            the medical expenses which she has incurred in treating her 
 
            condition are the liability of the employer.  Claimant seeks 
 
            a running award of healing period compensation.  According 
 
            to the prehearing report, the employer is entitled to credit 
 
            for disability income, medical and hospitalization expense 
 
            payments.
 
            
 
                 The case was heard and fully submitted at Des Moines, 
 
            Iowa on January 22, 1991.  The evidence in the proceeding 
 
            consists of testimony from Linda Callison, Sandra Butler and 
 
            Keith Wise.  The record also contains jointly offered 
 
            exhibits 1 through 8.
 
            
 
                                 findings of fact
 
            
 
                 Having considered all the evidence received, together 
 
            with the appearance and demeanor of the witnesses, the 
 
            following findings of fact are made.
 
            
 
                 Linda Jean Callison is a 52-year-old married woman who 
 
            lives at Norwalk, Iowa.  Linda is a 1956 graduate of Newton 
 
            High School where she had placed emphasis in the office 
 
            practice core area.  During the time span of 1976-1979, she 
 
            took some business classes at the area community college.  
 
            She has no advanced degrees or certificates from any of her 
 
            post-high school course work.
 

 
            
 
            Page   2
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 Linda commenced employment with the Maytag Company 
 
            working as a secretary in the rubber department while she 
 
            was still in high school.  She remained in that employment 
 
            for approximately one year after completing high school.  At 
 
            that time, she got married and moved to Ames with her 
 
            husband who was then a college student.  While living in 
 
            Ames, she performed waitress work for approximately a year.  
 
            Linda did not obtain any employment while she and her 
 
            husband lived in Des Moines following his completion of 
 
            school.  The family then moved to Storm Lake, Iowa.  
 
            Initially, Linda performed seasonal work for the Dekalb 
 
            Company where she was a foreman over work crews performing 
 
            detasseling and also in the canning factory.  She also 
 
            operated machines in the canning factory.  In approximately 
 
            1969, she became a secretary for the Storm Lake Police 
 
            Department.  Her duties included bookkeeping and radio 
 
            operation.  At that time, her husband was employed as a 
 
            dispatcher for the Iowa State Patrol.  It was felt that 
 
            their jobs presented a conflict of interest and her 
 
            employment with the city police department was terminated.
 
            
 
                 In approximately November 1970, Linda obtained 
 
            part-time employment with Sears at Storm Lake.  Her job 
 
            consisted of receiving catalog orders from four stores and 
 
            then transmitting them by teletype to the Chicago catalog 
 
            center.  When Linda's husband was transferred to Des Moines 
 
            in approximately June 1972, she obtained employment at the 
 
            Wakonda Shopping Center Sears store performing teletype 
 
            operation and unit control.  Her duties included inventory 
 
            control, receiving orders and a variety of other functions.  
 
            Linda was then transferred to the Eastgate Sears store where 
 
            her primary duty was office work, but she also performed 
 
            floor sales and a variety of other duties.  When the 
 
            Eastgate store closed, she returned to the Wakonda unit and 
 
            helped with the closing of that store.  When the Wakonda 
 
            store was eventually closed, she was then transferred to the 
 
            Southridge store where she became head cashier and had 
 
            control over all receipts and cash register accounts.  She 
 
            performed that position approximately four years until the 
 
            cashier positions were eliminated.  With the elimination of 
 
            cashier positions, Linda was transferred to the Credit 
 
            Central department at the Merle Hay store.  Initially, she 
 
            performed typing connected with requests from stores to 
 
            increase the credit limit on customer charge accounts.  She 
 
            gathered data and provided it to a supervisor who made a 
 
            decision on the request for increased credit limits.  After 
 
            a time, she was then given credit approval authority of her 
 
            own and made the actual decisions regarding increase of 
 
            credit limits.  In approximately 1982, she was transferred 
 
            to performing collection activity.  Linda had been off work 
 
            for ear surgery and, when she returned, she was placed into 
 
            the collection position rather than her prior position.
 
            
 
                 According to the employer's records, claimant became a 
 
            collection correspondent on August 16, 1981 (exhibit 5, page 
 
            22).  It is noted that the position is one which had duties 
 

 
            
 
            Page   3
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            significantly different from her previous jobs with Sears.  
 
            A more detailed description of claimant's work history is 
 
            found in exhibit 6, at pages 5 and 6.
 
            
 
                 In the collection position, she contacted customers 
 
            whose accounts ranged from 30-120 days past due and 
 
            attempted to make arrangements to get the bills paid.  Linda 
 
            was in that position for approximately one year and then was 
 
            again off work for additional ear surgery.  When she 
 
            returned to work following the second ear surgery, she was 
 
            assigned to work with uncollectible accounts.  Her job was 
 
            again to locate customers and attempt to get payments.  
 
            Linda stated that she had no supervisor until 1986 or 1987 
 
            and that, during that same period of time, the record 
 
            keeping system was changed from memo cards to a computer 
 
            system.  According to Linda, she was the only person in that 
 
            department until the last few years.  She related that, in 
 
            June 1986 when the change to the computer system started, 
 
            there were three people in the department consisting of 
 
            herself, one part-time employee and one other full-time 
 
            employee who was then off work on sick leave.
 
            
 
                 When the change to the computer system was made, Linda 
 
            was required to enter data from the memo cards into the 
 
            computer system.  She stated that she was responsible for 
 
            performing most of the data entry and that at times the 
 
            computer would not accept the data which she attempted to 
 
            place in it.  According to Linda, she was also required to 
 
            perform her other usual collection work and that the 
 
            computerization process doubled her work load.  As a result, 
 
            she fell behind in performing the actual collection 
 
            activity.  According to Linda, her supervisor had told her 
 
            to give priority to entering data into the computer.  Linda 
 
            stated that, when she left employment on February 10, 1988, 
 
            all the memo cards had still not been entered into the 
 
            computer system.
 
            
 
                 Linda stated that she had told a supervisor, Terry 
 
            Stinson, that she was unable to handle all the work and that 
 
            Stinson told her he would obtain help for her, but the help 
 
            was never received.  Commencing in May 1987, Linda was off 
 
            work approximately four weeks for depression.  She stated 
 
            that, when she returned, her accounts were further behind 
 
            because no one had processed them.  According to Linda, from 
 
            that point on she fell further and further behind.  Linda 
 
            complained that procedures were changed and by the time 
 
            things began working smoothly under one procedure, those 
 
            procedures were changed again.
 
            
 
                 Linda stated that, commencing in October 1987, she was 
 
            prohibited from speaking with other employees because her 
 
            supervisor, Mr. Wise, had told her to "shut up."  Linda 
 
            stated that other employees were likewise not allowed to 
 
            speak with her because she was so far behind in her work, 
 
            but that they continued to come to her for guidance with 
 
            problems.  Linda stated that being prohibited from speaking 
 
            with coemployees was a tremendous pressure during those last 
 
            three months of her employment.  Linda related that, during 
 

 
            
 
            Page   4
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            the last few years, she had gone through eight different 
 
            supervisors, all of whom had different ideas and procedures.
 
            
 
                 According to Linda, Mr. Wise called her into the office 
 
            frequently and criticized her for not getting caught up with 
 
            her work.  She stated that she received no help, only 
 
            criticism.  She also complained that the meetings, some of 
 
            which ran as long as 3-4 hours, detracted from her ability 
 
            to get her work completed.
 
            
 
                 According to Linda, she had managed the litigated 
 
            accounts including small claims court and bankruptcy, but in 
 
            1987 a new small claims desk was opened and that activity 
 
            was performed by a different person.  However, when the 
 
            person did not know what action to take, she came to Linda 
 
            rather than a supervisor for guidance.
 
            
 
                 When initially moved into the credit department, 
 
            Linda's performance was considered to be quite acceptable 
 
            (exhibit 4, pages 200, 201, 206 and 207).  Her performance 
 
            was apparently not considered to be unsatisfactory until she 
 
            was assigned actual collection work commencing in 1982.
 
            
 
                 The employer's records show that claimant was 
 
            considered to be deficient in early 1982 and again in 1983 
 
            due to medical absences, but that no adverse action was 
 
            taken against her because the absences were for good reason 
 
            (exhibit 4, pages 157, 210, 211, 212 213, 214, 216 and 217).  
 
            The records also show a lack of productivity during that 
 
            same period of time.  It is not possible to determine how 
 
            much of the lack of productivity was due to medical absences 
 
            as opposed to inefficiency.  In approximately October 1983, 
 
            it was requested that her employment be terminated (exhibit 
 
            4, page 158).
 
            
 
                 Linda continued to perform at a substandard level and 
 
            it was again requested that her employment be terminated 
 
            (exhibit 4, pages 161, 162, 165, 166, 208, 209 and 215).  
 
            The names of claimant's supervisors during the preceding 
 
            problems seemed to be C. D. Whitmer and also A. Bergo.
 
            
 
                 A number of performance appraisal or review documents 
 
            are found in exhibit 4 from pages 172 through 207.  Some are 
 
            undated and the period of time to which they refer cannot be 
 
            determined.  There appear to be no reports for the period of 
 
            time running from late 1984 through 1987.  The report at 
 
            exhibit 4, page 80 appears to be signed by J. McCarty, Jr.  
 
            The report dated February 5, 1988 is signed by W. K. Wise.  
 
            Apparently the 1984 through 1987 time span is the period of 
 
            which Linda described as having no supervisor.  It cannot be 
 
            determined if the lack of deficiency reports and unfavorable 
 
            evaluations during the 1984-1987 span is a result of a lack 
 
            of such reports being prepared due to a lack of having a 
 
            supervisor or whether it indicates that she was performing 
 
            adequately.  It appears more likely, however, that reports 
 
            were simply not made because the record contains no 
 
            evaluations, favorable or unfavorable.  Generally speaking, 
 
            most of the reviews and evaluations which appear subsequent 
 
            to claimant being placed in the collection correspondent 
 
            position were unfavorable.  The record does not show Linda 
 

 
            
 
            Page   5
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            to have ever become fully proficient in the position of 
 
            collection correspondent.
 
            
 
                 The record shows that Linda Callison operated under a 
 
            threat of termination of her employment due to her level of 
 
            productivity for a number of years.  Working under such 
 
            conditions would be quite stressful.  The record does not 
 
            contain any clear explanation regarding why the termination 
 
            process extended over a period of approximately six years.
 
            
 
                 According to Keith Wise and Sandra Butler, Linda's work 
 
            was substandard and remained substandard throughout the 
 
            amount of time they had contact with her.  It was planned to 
 
            give Linda notice of termination of her employment on 
 
            February 10, 1988 due to her lack of productivity.  The plan 
 
            was disrupted by her failing to come to work and seeking 
 
            medical care.
 
            
 
                 Instead of going to work on February 10, 1988, Linda, 
 
            at her husband's insistence, sought medical treatment.  Her 
 
            physician, Robert J. Foley, M.D., found her to be depressed 
 
            and restricted her from working.  Linda has not since 
 
            returned to employment at Sears.  She has been treated by 
 
            Dr. Foley, a general practitioner, and Rick D. Turner, M.D., 
 
            a psychiatrist.  She has been evaluated by psychiatrist 
 
            Hector Cavallin, M.D.  Claimant has also received treatment 
 
            from Robert A. Straight, Ph.D., and Craig Butterfield, a 
 
            psychotherapist.
 
            
 
                 The first mention of depression in claimant's medical 
 
            records is found in a note dated August 9, 1982 where it is 
 
            indicated that claimant was unable to tolerate Ativan, a 
 
            medication which had been prescribed for muscle contraction 
 
            headaches, and that she had probable early depression 
 
            (exhibit 1, pages 69 and 70).  The next reference to 
 
            depression appears at an entry dated May 19, 1987 when Dr. 
 
            Foley took claimant off work for a month due to depression 
 
            (exhibit 1, pages 50-54).  Dr. Foley indicated that claimant 
 
            had been disabled due to depression from May 19, 1987 
 
            through June 17, 1987 and released her to return to work 
 
            effective June 18, 1987 (exhibit 1, page 26).  According to 
 
            the insurance claim form, it was indicated that Linda's 
 
            symptoms had started in April 1987 (exhibit 1, page 22).
 
            
 
                 Dr. Foley then resumed treating claimant's depression 
 
            on February 10, 1988 when his notes indicated that she had 
 
            depression which was recurrent, she was not improving and 
 
            that she was disabled from working (exhibit 1, page 23).  In 
 
            another note, it is indicated that her symptoms appeared in 
 
            January 1988 (exhibit 1, page 20).  In a note dated October 
 
            27, 1988, Dr. Foley reported that Linda's depression is 
 
            under good control and that she should have no problem with 
 
            a five-year-old living in her home (exhibit 1, page 18).
 
            
 
                 All of Dr. Foley's notes prior to November 21, 1988 
 
            refer to claimant's employment where the source or cause of 
 
            her stress is mentioned.  The note of November 21, 1988 is 
 
            the first reference to the child custody suit in which she 
 
            became involved.  It is the first note which makes reference 
 
            to any source of stress other than her employment.
 

 
            
 
            Page   6
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 Linda's granddaughter resided with her prior and 
 
            subsequent to February 10, 1988.  There were apparently no 
 
            problems in that situation until October 1988 when the 
 
            child's biological father came to visit and took action to 
 
            obtain custody.  Linda and her husband became involved in 
 
            custody litigation.  Part of the process included a home 
 
            study which was performed by Craig Butterfield.  According 
 
            to Butterfield, he observed no signs of depression when he 
 
            met with Linda in late 1988.  It is noted that this was at 
 
            about the same time that Dr. Foley indicated in a report 
 
            that Linda's depression was under good control.  In his 
 
            report dated December 5, 1988, Butterfield indicated that 
 
            Linda was having difficulty at work during 1987 and became 
 
            unable to function on the job in February 1988 (exhibit 1, 
 
            pages 116, 130, 138 and 139; exhibit 7, pages 5 and 6).
 
            
 
                 Claimant initially lost the custody litigation and the 
 
            granddaughter was placed with the biological father.  After 
 
            several months, however, the granddaughter returned to 
 
            reside with claimant.  The situation with the granddaughter 
 
            is not presently a matter of concern for the claimant.  
 
            Claimant had experienced grief and anxiety and reactive 
 
            depression due to the loss of custody rights.  She treated 
 
            with Craig Butterfield for that situation (exhibit 7, pages 
 
            6-9, 12 and 22).
 
            
 
                 Claimant was examined by psychiatrist Hector W. 
 
            Cavallin, M.D., on August 2, 1988.  In his report, he states 
 
            that stress and difficulty at work resulted in Linda 
 
            developing a major depressive disorder which has been 
 
            treated appropriately, but that she remains depressed and 
 
            limited.  He felt that she was incapable of returning to her 
 
            previous occupation due to the conflict which exists between 
 
            Linda and her supervisor (exhibit 1, pages 142 and 143).
 
            
 
                 Commencing in 1990, Linda began receiving treatment 
 
            from psychiatrist Rick D. Turner, M.D.  His notes indicate 
 
            that claimant developed depression in the setting of work 
 
            stresses involving computerization and change of 
 
            supervisors.  He felt that her condition had stabilized, but 
 
            that she had residual symptoms related to a preexisting 
 
            generalized anxiety disorder and aftereffects of the 
 
            depressive illness consisting of loss of self-esteem due to 
 
            being unable to work.  He encouraged her to return to work 
 
            at some place other than Sears (exhibit 1, pages 4-6).
 
            
 
                 Linda has recently obtained part-time employment as a 
 
            bookkeeper at a service station near her place of residence.  
 
            She works approximately 20 hours per week.  She seems to be 
 
            getting along well in that position.
 
            
 
                                conclusions of law
 
            
 
                 Claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance 
 
            of the evidence that she received an injury on February 10, 
 
            1988 which arose out of and in the course of her employment. 
 
            McDowell v. Town of Clarksville, 241 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 
 
            1976); Musselman v. Cent. Tel. Co., 261 Iowa 352, 154 N.W.2d 
 
            128 (1967). 
 

 
            
 
            Page   7
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 The words "arising out of" refer to the cause or source 
 
            of the injury.  McClure v. Union County, 188 N.W.2d 283, 287 
 
            (Iowa 1971); Crowe v. DeSoto Consol. Sch. Dist., 246 Iowa 
 
            402, 68 N.W.2d 63 (1955).  The "arising out of" requirement 
 
            is satisfied by showing a causal relationship between the 
 
            employment and the injury.  Sheerin v. Holin Co., 380 N.W.2d 
 
            415, 417 (Iowa 1986).
 
            
 
                 Aggravation of a preexisting condition is one form of 
 
            compensable injury.  While a claimant is not entitled to 
 
            compensation for the results of a preexisting injury or 
 
            disease, the mere existence at the time of a subsequent 
 
            injury is not a defense.  Rose v. John Deere Ottumwa Works, 
 
            247 Iowa 900, 908, 76 N.W.2d 756, 760-61 (1956).  If the 
 
            claimant had a preexisting condition or disability that is 
 
            aggravated, accelerated, worsened or lighted up so that it 
 
            results in disability, claimant is entitled to recover.  
 
            Nicks v. Davenport Produce Co., 254 Iowa 130, 115 N.W.2d 
 
            812, 815 (1962).
 
            
 
                 Linda Callison's claim is that emotional stress caused 
 
            her to develop depression.  Non-tramatically induced mental 
 
            injury is compensable only when the injury resulted from a 
 
            situation of greater dimensions than the day-to-day mental 
 
            stresses and tensions which all employees must experience.  
 
            Swiss Colony v. Dep't of Indus., L. & H. R., 72 Wis. 2d 46, 
 
            240 N.W.2d 128 (1976); School Dist. #1 v. Dep't of Indus., 
 
            L. & H. R., 62 Wis. 2d 370, 215 N.W.2d 373 (1974); 
 
            Desgranges v. Dep't of Human Services, file number 760747 
 
            (App. Decn. 1988).  The work place must provide something 
 
            more than merely the setting in which the symptoms of the 
 
            emotional disorder arise.  Newman v. John Deere Ottumwa 
 
            Works of Deere & Co., 372 N.W.2d 199 (Iowa 1985).
 
            
 
                 In this case, it is quite clear, as established by Drs. 
 
            Cavallin and Turner, that stress at claimant's employment 
 
            precipitated her depressive disorder.  While Linda may have 
 
            had a preexisting anxiety disorder, the record clearly 
 
            establishes that she had several sources of stress in her 
 
            work place after she was placed in the collection 
 
            correspondent position in 1981.  Linda was in a job which 
 
            she seemed incapable of performing properly.  Her statements 
 
            that she had no problems prior to the installation of the 
 
            computer in 1986 are simply inaccurate.  Working as a debt 
 
            collector was apparently a position for which Linda was not 
 
            well suited.  Since she was not well suited for the 
 
            position, she did not perform well in the position.  Her 
 
            performance was understandably criticized by her 
 
            supervisors.  She was unable to make sustained significant 
 
            improvement in her performance.  When the depression became 
 
            manifest, that situation further detracted from her ability 
 
            to perform her job.
 
            
 
                 The pivotal question in this case is whether the 
 
            stresses to which Linda was subjected at her place of 
 
            employment were out of the ordinary in comparison to the 
 
            day-to-day emotional strain and tension which all employees 
 
            must experience and which employees customarily encounter on 
 
            a daily basis without suffering serious mental injury.
 

 
            
 
            Page   8
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 The evidence in this case does not establish, by a 
 
            preponderance of the evidence, that Linda Callison was 
 
            assigned an unreasonable amount of work.  There is no 
 
            evidence that she was humiliated, berated or otherwise 
 
            publicly embarrassed.  To the contrary, the evidence shows 
 
            that she did not perform adequately.  She was counseled in 
 
            an attempt to improve her performance, but she did not 
 
            improve.  The stress of being unable to perform the amount 
 
            of work required for one's position is certainly a 
 
            substantial level of stress.  It is not, however, a stress 
 
            which, by itself, is unusual.  The unusual part in this case 
 
            is that the employer did not sooner take action to transfer 
 
            Linda Callison to a different position or to terminate her 
 
            employment.  It extended over approximately six years.
 
            
 
                 It is recognized that the work of being a debt 
 
            collector is generally a highly stressful occupation in and 
 
            of itself.  There are many individuals who do not have the 
 
            personality or aptitudes to work effectively as a debt 
 
            collector.  Linda Callison is apparently one of those 
 
            individuals.  Many individuals have the good judgment to 
 
            extricate themselves from a position which they are unable 
 
            to perform.  In some situations, the change or transfer is 
 
            accomplished through action taken by the employer.  Neither 
 
            of those things happened in this case.  It is understandable 
 
            that Linda Callison, after nearly two decades of employment 
 
            with Sears, would not lightly choose to leave that 
 
            employment.  Once the depression began, she would have 
 
            likely been impaired.  Her performance likely would have 
 
            deteriorated and she would have been impaired in making 
 
            intelligent decisions regarding her job.
 
            
 
                 The change to a computer caused added work and stress, 
 
            though, by itself, it is not an unusual stress.
 
            
 
                 When all the various stresses of Linda Callison's work 
 
            at Sears are considered in combination, in particular the 
 
            fact that she was not capable of performing the job and 
 
            stayed in that job for six years, the fact that there was a 
 
            change to computerization to which she did not readily 
 
            adapt, and the fact that work as a debt collector is 
 
            generally a high stress occupation, it is determined that 
 
            the stresses experienced by Linda Callison were out of the 
 
            ordinary in comparison to the stresses normally experienced 
 
            on a day-to-day basis by all employees without experiencing 
 
            emotional difficulties.  It is therefore concluded that 
 
            Linda Callison's depressive disorder is an injury which 
 
            arose out of and in the course of her employment.
 
            
 
                 Linda is entitled to recover healing period 
 
            compensation commencing from the date the disability began, 
 
            namely February 10, 1988, until the earlier of the three 
 
            terminating events defined in Iowa Code section 85.34(1).
 
            
 
                 On October 27, 1988, Dr. Foley reported that claimant's 
 
            depression was under good control.  His treatment notes 
 
            dated October 10, 1988 show the depression to be fairly 
 
            stable.  It was at about this same period of time that Craig 
 
            Butterfield, a psychotherapist, conducted an investigation 
 

 
            
 
            Page   9
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            concerning the advisability of placing custody of the 
 
            granddaughter with claimant and her husband.  Through the 
 
            course of that investigation Butterfield found no signs of 
 
            depression.
 
            
 
                 Claimant has not fully recovered from the depression 
 
            and it is unlikely that she will ever fully recover.  Her 
 
            condition has been essentially stable, other than for the 
 
            reactive depression associated with the custody litigation 
 
            concerning her granddaughter.  Linda has had difficulty in 
 
            finding replacement employment.  It can be expected that she 
 
            will be somewhat fragile emotionally and any replacement 
 
            employment will need to accommodate that emotional 
 
            fragility.  Her current employment seems to be appropriate 
 
            in view of her education and background.  She will probably 
 
            do reasonably well in positions which do not involve high 
 
            stress levels.  Her hourly rate of earnings has diminished 
 
            considerably when her employment with Sears is compared to 
 
            her current employment.  The weekly earnings are even 
 
            further diminished in view of the fact that she is working 
 
            only 20 hours per week.  There is no good, reliable medical 
 
            evidence in the record regarding whether or not claimant has 
 
            the capacity to work more than 20 hours per week.
 
            
 
                 In his report dated April 26, 1990, Dr. Turner stated 
 
            that claimant has continued to be mildly anxious, 
 
            particularly in regard to a number of stressors which were 
 
            not related to the work stress.  As indicated in the report, 
 
            Dr. Turner encouraged her to return to work, but felt she 
 
            could not work at Sears.  He concludes that she was 
 
            predominantly depressed for almost two and one-half years, 
 
            but that, at the time of the report, her depression was in 
 
            remission and he was encouraging her to return to work.  He 
 
            also summarized that she had some residual problems as a 
 
            result of the depressive episode.  It is noted that Dr. 
 
            Turner apparently considers the 1987 absence from work to be 
 
            part of the same depressive episode since he states that her 
 
            symptoms began approximately two and one-half years prior to 
 
            her referral, which referral was made in September 1989.  
 
            His report further makes reference to her attempt to return 
 
            to work and also that she had then been off work 
 
            continuously for about a year when he initially saw her.  
 
            Dr. Turner attributed some of claimant's residual symptoms 
 
            to her preexisting generalized anxiety disorder, though 
 
            coupled with psychological aftereffects of her depressive 
 
            illness.
 
            
 
                 It is determined that the assessment of this case as 
 
            made by Dr. Turner is correct.  Though claimant remained in 
 
            treatment subsequent to February 26, 1990, it is determined 
 
            that the treatment was maintenance in nature.  She had a 
 
            relapse when her Nortriptyline medication was discontinued.  
 
            Upon resumption of the medication, her condition again 
 
            stabilized.  The bulk of the continued treatment subsequent 
 
            to February 26, 1990 was treatment with Dr. Straight for the 
 
            anxiety complaints.  Dr. Turner generally found no pervasive 
 
            symptoms of depression whenever he examined her, other than 
 

 
            
 
            Page  10
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            the June 20, 1990 examination when she had been taken off 
 
            medication.
 
            
 
                 It is therefore concluded that claimant's entitlement 
 
            to healing period compensation ended February 26, 1990 
 
            consistent with the April 26, 1990 report from Dr. Turner.
 
            
 
                 Dr. Turner finds residual symptoms from the depressive 
 
            episode which are combined with the preexisting anxiety 
 
            disorder.  Since emotional injury is not a scheduled injury, 
 
            any permanent disability which results is to be compensated 
 
            industrially.
 
            
 
                 If claimant has an impairment to the body as a whole, 
 
            an industrial disability has been sustained.  Industrial 
 
            disability was defined in Diederich v. Tri-City Railway Co., 
 
            219 Iowa 587, 593, 258 N.W.2d 899, 902 (1935) as follows: 
 
            "It is therefore plain that the legislature intended the 
 
            term `disability' to mean `industrial disability' or loss of 
 
            earning capacity and not a mere `functional disability' to 
 
            be computed in the terms of percentages of the total 
 
            physical and mental ability of a normal man."
 
            
 
                 Functional impairment is an element to be considered in 
 
            determining industrial disability which is the reduction of 
 
            earning capacity, but consideration must also be given to 
 
            the injured employee's age, education, qualifications, 
 
            experience and inability to engage in employment for which 
 
            he is fitted.  Olson v. Goodyear Service Stores, 255 Iowa 
 
            1112, 1121, 125 N.W.2d 251, 257 (1963).
 
            
 
                 Industrial disability or loss of earning capacity is a 
 
            concept that is quite similar to impairment of earning 
 
            capacity, an element of damage in a tort case.  Impairment 
 
            of physical capacity creates an inference of lessened 
 
            earning capacity.  The basic element to be determined, 
 
            however, is the reduction in value of the general earning 
 
            capacity of the person, rather than the loss of wages or 
 
            earnings in a specific occupation.  Post-injury earnings 
 
            create a presumption of earning capacity.  The earnings are 
 
            not synonymous with earning capacity and the presumption may 
 
            be rebutted by evidence showing the earnings to be an 
 
            unreliable indicator.  DeWall v. Prentice, 224 N.W.2d 428, 
 
            435 (Iowa 1974); Carradus v. Lange, 203 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 
 
            1973); Holmquist v. Volkswagon of America, Inc., 261 N.W.2d 
 
            516 (Iowa App. 1977) A.L.R.3d 143; Michael v. Harrison 
 
            County, Thirty-fourth Biennial Report of the Industrial 
 
            Commissioner 218 (1979); 2 Larson Workmen's Compensation 
 
            Law, sections 57.21 and 57.31.
 
            
 
                 As indicated by Dr. Turner, Dr. Cavallin and Craig 
 
            Butterfield, returning to work at Sears is not a viable 
 
            option for Linda Callison.  Claimant appears to be getting 
 
            along reasonably well in her current employment as a 
 
            bookkeeper.  There is little in the way of medical guidance 
 
            in the record with regard to activity restrictions, but it 
 
            can reasonably be inferred that she should avoid high stress 
 
            occupations.  Linda Callison could probably work as a 
 
            teletype operator, secretary or in a number of other 
 
            positions which do not involve confrontations with the 
 

 
            
 
            Page  11
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            general public or confrontations with supervisors and which 
 
            provide well-defined, achievable work requirements and 
 
            standards.  She has experienced a considerable loss of 
 
            income as the result of the loss of her employment with 
 
            Sears.  When all the material factors of industrial 
 
            disability are considered, it is determined that Linda 
 
            Callison experienced a 50 percent permanent reduction in her 
 
            earning capacity as a result of the February 10, 1988 
 
            injury.
 
            
 
                 Since the employer has been determined to be liable for 
 
            the injury, the employer is likewise responsible for the 
 
            expenses covered by section 85.27.  Those expenses are found 
 
            in exhibit 2 and total $2,477.61.  The only issue identified 
 
            for those expenses was the issue of liability.
 
            
 
                 In view of the stipulations in the prehearing report, 
 
            the employer is entitled to credit for the medical expenses 
 
            paid by the group plan.  The employer is also entitled to 
 
            credit in the amount of $14,866.42 for payments made under 
 
            the group disability income plan.
 
            
 
                                      order
 
            
 
                 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants pay Linda 
 
            Callison one hundred six and six-sevenths (106 6/7) weeks of 
 
            compensation for healing period payable commencing February 
 
            10, 1988 at the stipulated rate of two hundred thirty-three 
 
            and 92/100 dollars ($233.92) per week.
 
            
 
                 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants pay Linda 
 
            Callison two hundred fifty (250) weeks of compensation for 
 
            permanent partial disability payable commencing February 27, 
 
            1990 at the stipulated rate of two hundred thirty-three and 
 
            92/100 dollars ($233.92) per week.
 
            
 
                 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all past due amounts, less 
 
            credit in the amount of fourteen thousand eight hundred 
 
            sixty-six and 42/100 dollars ($14,866.42) in group 
 
            disability income benefits, be paid in a lump sum together 
 
            with interest pursuant to section 85.30 of The Code.
 
            
 
                 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants, subject to group 
 
            plan payments, pay the following medical expenses pursuant 
 
            to section 85.27:
 
            
 
                 Taylor, Smith, Turner & Associates     $1,575.00
 
                 Robert J. Foley, M.D.                     137.00
 
                 Iowa Lutheran Hospital                     49.00
 
                 Linda Jean Callison, mileage              251.16
 
                 Linda Jean Callison, prescriptions        465.45
 
                 Total                                  $2,477.61
 
            
 
                 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs of this proceeding 
 
            are assessed against the defendants pursuant to rule 343 IAC 
 
            4.33.
 
            
 
                 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants shall file claim 
 
            activity reports as requested by this agency pursuant to 
 
            rule 343 IAC 3.1.
 

 
            
 
            Page  12
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 Signed and filed this ______ day of ____________, 1991.
 
            
 
                 
 
            
 
                 
 
                 
 
                                          ______________________________
 
                                          MICHAEL G. TRIER
 
                                          DEPUTY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 

 
            
 
            Page  13
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            Copies To:
 
            
 
            Mr. David D. Drake
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            West Towers Office Complex
 
            1200 35th Street, Suite 500
 
            W. Des Moines, Iowa  50265
 
            
 
            Mr. Marvin E. Duckworth
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            Suite 111, Terrace Center
 
            2700 Grand Avenue
 
            Des Moines, Iowa  50312
 
            
 
            
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                           1108.20; 1402.30; 2204
 
                           Filed April 22, 1991
 
                           MICHAEL G. TRIER
 
            before the iowa industrial commissioner
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                      :
 
            LINDA CALLISON,     :
 
                      :
 
                 Claimant, :
 
                      :
 
            vs.       :
 
                      :         File No. 931324
 
            SEARS CREDIT CENTRAL,    :
 
                      :      A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                 Employer, :
 
                      :         D E C I S I O N
 
            and       :
 
                      :
 
            ALLSTATE INS. CO.,  :
 
                      :
 
                 Insurance Carrier,  :
 
                 Defendants.    :
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
            
 
            1108.20; 1402.30; 2204
 
            Fifty-two-year-old woman, with a long history of employment 
 
            with the employer in clerical positions, was moved into a 
 
            position as a debt collector.  Thereafter, she did not 
 
            perform well.  She worked for approximately six years under 
 
            a nearly constant threat of termination of employment due to 
 
            lack of productivity.  When presented with added work and 
 
            changes in the work place which resulted from converting 
 
            from manual records to a computer records system, she 
 
            decompensated and experienced a major depressive episode.  
 
            It was held that the Wisconsin test was met in view of the 
 
            highly stressful nature of debt collection employment, the 
 
            stress from being unable to perform the job and under the 
 
            continued threat of termination of employment for nearly six 
 
            years and finally the change from manual to computer record 
 
            keeping.  Benefits were awarded.  Claimant awarded 106 6/7 
 
            weeks of healing period and 50 percent permanent partial 
 
            disability.