Page 1
before the iowa industrial commissioner
____________________________________________________________
:
STELLA ODOM, :
:
Claimant, :
:
vs. :
: File No. 960752
FIELDSTONE CABINETRY, INC., :
: A R B I T R A T I O N
Employer, :
: D E C I S I O N
and :
:
CRANBROOK AGENCY, :
:
Insurance Carrier, :
Defendants. :
___________________________________________________________
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a proceeding in arbitration brought by Stella
Odom, claimant, against Fieldstone Cabinetry, Inc.,
employer, and Cranbrook Agency, insurance carrier, as
defendants. Claimant seeks to recover benefits under the
Iowa Workers' Compensation Act as a result of an alleged
work injury occurring on April 26, 1990.
The record in this case consists of the testimony of
the claimant, Leona Martin, and Michael Odom; joint exhibits
1 through 44; and, defendants' exhibits 1 through 7. This
matter came on for hearing before the undersigned deputy
industrial commissioner on March 23, 1992, at Mason City,
Iowa.
issues
The parties submit the following issues for resolution:
1. Whether claimant sustained an injury on April 26,
1990, which arose out of and in the course of her
employment;
2. Whether there is a causal connection between
claimant's alleged injury and her permanent disability;
3. Whether claimant is entitled to temporary total or
healing period benefits;
4. Whether claimant is entitled to permanent partial
disability benefits; and,
5. Claimant's workers' compensation rate.
findings of fact
The undersigned deputy, having reviewed all of the
Page 2
evidence received, finds the following facts:
Claimant, Stella Odom, was born on April 12, 1956. In
1974, she graduated from high school in Mason City, Iowa.
Claimant described herself as an average student.
Additional education consists of two years at the Northern
Iowa Community College and a twelve month course in
practical nursing for which claimant received a degree.
Claimant secured a license as a practical nurse.
Claimant's work history includes two years in positions
as a supervising LPN at several nursing homes in Mason City
and Rockwell, Iowa. In these positions, claimant not only
supervised the activities of LPN's and nurses aides, but
also monitored patient medications and charted patient
activities. Claimant earned $3.65 per hour to $4.05 per
hour.
Claimant became dissatisfied with the nursing
profession and elected to attend Hamilton Business College
in Mason City. In April of 1976, she completed a one year
program and received a degree in the medical/secretarial
field.
For the next several months, claimant secured a
position with the Northern Iowa Medical Center where her job
duties included transcribing and filing medical reports and
records. She earned $4.00 per hour.
After several other jobs, including positions as a
photograph developer, production worker at Land O Lakes
plant and as a business monitor for the North Central School
District, claimant began working for defendant employer,
Fieldstone Cabinetry, Inc.
From August of 1987 through February of 1989, claimant
worked as a panel and door sander.
Taken off of work for injuries unrelated to this claim,
Ms. Odom was eventually placed in a temporary assignment
duty position from February of 1989 through August of 1989.
This position was a part-time office job, and involved
collating books, preparing mailings and performing some
computer-data entry operations. Claimant was able to use
the skills she learned at Hamilton Business College in this
position.
In August of 1989, claimant became the benefits
specialist, and the assistant to Mark Evers, the personnel
manager and Lynn Kirchgatter. As benefits specialist,
claimant was involved with health insurance and workers'
compensation claims. Mr. Evers indicated in his deposition
that claimant also acted as the office secretary/clerk.
Claimant's main responsibilities included filing, typing and
computer work (Evers Deposition, page 5).
In late April of 1990, claimant returned to the
production area on the night shift. Patricia Holmgaard
replaced claimant as benefits specialist. Mr. Evers
indicated that claimant was replaced because the benefits
Page 3
specialist position required someone with more experience
and more advanced skills in computers (Evers Dep., pp. 8-9).
On May 2, 1990, while working at a job claimant
described as "catching door," she developed cramping in her
neck and shoulder area. She told her supervisor, and
reported to Diane Frakes, a physician's assistant to the
company doctor, Kenneth Washburn, M.D. Claimant underwent
nerve conduction studies, which revealed right carpal tunnel
syndrome, right medial epicondylitis, right bicepital
tendinitis and right neck pain (Joint Exhibit 3, pages 3-4).
Claimant was restricted to one arm duty and was
instructed to undergo physical therapy with iontophoresis to
the right elbow and shoulder. She was also given wrist
splints (Jt. Ex. 3, pp. 3-4).
Claimant returned to Dr. Washburn and Ms. Frakes on May
9, 1990. She underwent additional physical therapy,
cervical traction and continued to be off of work (Jt. Ex.
3, p. 4).
During the next month, claimant continued with physical
therapy and was off of work (Jt. Exs. 4 and 9). On June 4,
1990, Dr. Washburn ordered an EMG for the right upper
extremity. He suspected AC joint arthritis in the right
shoulder, and recommended an orthopedic and rheumatic
consultation for the same (Jt. Ex. 10). A Dr. Trimble, a
rheumatologist, saw her for a possible arthritic condition,
found none, and felt her problem was a "localized
musculoskeletal problem" and did not "find evidence of true
connective tissue disease." (Jt. Ex. 12, p. 13). She was
then referred to a Dr. Wolbrink, an orthopedic specialist.
After an examination noting near normal range of motion of
the neck and a positive impingement test of the right
shoulder, Dr. Wolbrink diagnosed mild to moderate rotator
cuff tendinitis and possible cervical osteoarthropathy. He
offered an injection to the right shoulder which claimant
declined. She returned to Dr. Washburn who prescribed
physical therapy for the range of motion problems and
theraband exercises for strengthening (Jt. Ex. 12).
Throughout July and August of 1990, claimant continued
to undergo physical therapy and strengthening programs. On
August 31, claimant was released to return to work in a
light duty capacity with a five pound lifting restriction.
She was not allowed to, or was unable to return to work at
Fieldstone Cabinetry with these restrictions (Jt. Ex. 27).
Claimant was sent to Scott B. Neff, D.O., an orthopedic
specialist in Des Moines, for an evaluation. He performed a
series of orthopedic tests, and recommended an EMG and an
MRI of the right shoulder. Dr. Neff recommended that
claimant performed no repetitive lifting, reaching, pulling
or pushing activities with her right shoulder (Jt. Ex. 34,
pp. 35-39).
The test results of the MRI dated October 15, 1990,
showed a small area of tendinitis, but no rotator cuff tear
in the right shoulder area (Jt. Ex. 35).
Page 4
Carpal tunnel release surgery was recommended for
claimant's right wrist problems, and surgery was performed
in November of 1990. Dr. Neff released claimant to return
to work in November of 1990, and recommended she perform
clerical duties, but no heavy lifting or machinery work (Jt.
Ex. 37).
In January of 1991, claimant received her final
permanent medical restrictions which restricted work duties
to at or below shoulder height. She was to undergo an
evaluation regarding her impairment on March 25, 1991. Dr.
Neff found no impairment (Jt. Ex. 40). Claimant was unable
to return to work at Fieldstone Cabinetry.
Martin S. Rosenfeld, D.O., an orthopedic surgeon,
performed an independent medical evaluation on January 20,
1992. He was of the opinion that claimant had sustained an
8 percent permanent partial disability, and attributed 5
percent impairment due to right shoulder pain and motion
complaints, and 3 percent due to carpal tunnel residuals
(Jt. Ex. 41).
analysis and conclusions of law
The first issue to be addressed is whether claimant
received an injury to her neck and/or shoulder on April 26,
1990, which arose out of and in the course of her employment
with Fieldstone Cabinetry.
An employee is entitled to compensation for any and all
personal injuries which arise out of and in the course of
the employment. Section 85.3(1).
Claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that she received an injury on April 26,
1990, which arose out of and in the course of her
employment. McDowell v. Town of Clarksville, 241 N.W.2d 904
(Iowa 1976); Musselman v. Central Telephone Co., 261 Iowa
352, 154 N.W.2d 128 (1967).
An employee is entitled to compensation for any and all
personal injuries which arise out of and in the course of
the employment. Section 85.3(1).
The injury must both arise out of and be in the course
of the employment. Crowe v. DeSoto Consol. Sch. Dist., 246
Iowa 402, 68 N.W.2d 63 (1955) and cases cited at pp. 405-406
of the Iowa Report. See also Sister Mary Benedict v. St.
Mary's Corp., 255 Iowa 847, 124 N.W.2d 548 (l963) and Hansen
v. State of Iowa, 249 Iowa 1147, 91 N.W.2d 555 (1958).
The words "out of" refer to the cause or source of the
injury. Crowe, 246 Iowa 402, 68 N.W.2d 63 (1955).
The words "in the course of" refer to the time and
place and circumstances of the injury. McClure v. Union
et al. Counties, 188 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1971); Crowe v. DeSoto
Consol. Sch. Dist., 246 Iowa 402, 68 N.W.2d 63 (1955).
Page 5
"An injury occurs in the course of the employment when
it is within the period of employment at a place the
employee may reasonably be, and while he is doing his work
or something incidental to it." Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch.
Dist. v. Cady, 278 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1979), McClure, 188
N.W.2d 283; Musselman, 261 Iowa 352, 154 N.W.2d 128.
Claimant's position as a "door catcher" required that
she catch or grab the doors as they were coming off of an
overhead conveyor belt. She estimated that she caught or
grabbed approximately thirty doors per minute. Weights of
the doors varied. Claimant has been consistent in her
description of she reported the injury to her supervisor,
and was sent to the company physician. As she described her
job duties, it seems highly probable that claimant could
have sustained an injury while performing her duties.
Claimant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
she was performing her duties as required, and she was
performing them in the appropriate time, place and manner.
The next issue to be addressed is whether there is a
causal connection to claimant's disability and the work
injury.
The claimant has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the injury of April 26,
1990, is causally related to the disability on which she now
bases her claim. Bodish v. Fischer, Inc., 257 Iowa 516, 133
N.W.2d 867 (1965). Lindahl v. L. O. Boggs, 236 Iowa 296, 18
N.W.2d 607 (1945). A possibility is insufficient; a
probability is necessary. Burt v. John Deere Waterloo
Tractor Works, 247 Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732 (1955). The
question of causal connection is essentially within the
domain of expert testimony. Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist
Hospital, 251 Iowa 375, 101 N.W.2d 167 (1960).
However, expert medical evidence must be considered
with all other evidence introduced bearing on the causal
connection. Burt, 247 Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732. The opinion
of experts need not be couched in definite, positive or
unequivocal language. Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d
903 (Iowa 1974). However, the expert opinion may be
accepted or rejected, in whole or in part, by the trier of
fact. Id. at 907. Further, the weight to be given to such
an opinion is for the finder of fact, and that may be
affected by the completeness of the premise given the expert
and other surrounding circumstances. Bodish, 257 Iowa 516,
133 N.W.2d 867. See also Musselman, 261 Iowa 352, 154
N.W.2d 128.
Furthermore, if the available expert testimony is
insufficient alone to support a finding of causal
connection, such testimony may be coupled with nonexpert
testimony to show causation and be sufficient to sustain an
award. Giere v. Aase Haugen Homes, Inc., 259 Iowa 1065, 146
N.W.2d 911, 915 (1966). Such evidence does not, however,
compel an award as a matter of law. Anderson v. Oscar Mayer
& Co., 217 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Iowa 1974). To establish
compensability, the injury need only be a significant
factor, not be the only factor causing the claimed
Page 6
disability. Blacksmith v. All-Amnerican, Inc., 290 N.W.2d
348, 354 (Iowa 1980).
Several physicians have made the requisite causal
connection between claimant's condition and her work-related
injury. Specifically, Dr. Neff, who was deposed for the
case, states at page 11 of his deposition that claimant's
diagnosis of mild tendinitis was related to her work injury
of April 28 [sic], 1990. Claimant was treated by a number
of physicians, and Dr. Neff guided her care between October
1990 and January 1991. He is an orthopedic specialist and
was able to review all of claimant's medical records and
test results regarding the right shoulder. He is found to
be claimant's treating physician, and his opinion is relied
upon in finding that claimant's condition, that of
tendinitis in the right shoulder, was caused by her work
activities on April 26, 1990.
The next issue to be determined is whether claimant is
entitled to temporary total or permanent partial disability
benefits. As a general rule, claimants are to be awarded
temporary total disability benefits for time off of work
when they have not sustained a permanent injury.
Conversely, healing period benefits are awarded for time off
of work in the event claimant has sustained a permanent
injury. The question then becomes, has claimant sustained a
permanent injury?
Claimant has been evaluated by two physicians, her
treating physician, Dr. Neff, and Dr. Rosenfeld. Dr.
Rosenfeld's final diagnosis was that of mild AC arthritis,
and he thought that claimant had an overuse syndrome of the
right upper extremity. He assessed a 5 percent impairment
rating based on shoulder pain and motion complaints
(Rosenfeld Deposition). Dr. Neff, while not assigning any
impairment rating to claimant's right upper extremity, did
impose medical restrictions of no work requiring the use of
her upper extremity above shoulder level (Neff Deposition,
page 12).
There is no evidence in the record which suggests that
claimant had any work restrictions prior to the injury she
sustained on April 26, 1990. Therefore, it is found that
claimant has sustained a permanent impairment, and she is to
be awarded healing period benefits for the time she was off
work.
As claimant has sustained an injury to the body as a
whole, an evaluation of her industrial disability is
warranted.
Functional impairment is an element to be considered in
determining industrial disability which is the reduction of
earning capacity, but consideration must also be given to
the injured employee's age, education, qualifications, expe
rience and inability to engage in employment for which he is
fitted. Olson v. Goodyear Service Stores, 255 Iowa 1112,
125 N.W.2d 251 (1963). Barton v. Nevada Poultry, 253 Iowa
285, 110 N.W.2d 660 (1961).
Page 7
A finding of impairment to the body as a whole found by
a medical evaluator does not equate to industrial disabil
ity. This is so as impairment and disability are not syn
onymous. Degree of industrial disability can in fact be
much different than the degree of impairment because in the
first instance reference is to loss of earning capacity and
in the latter to anatomical or functional abnormality or
loss. Although loss of function is to be considered and
disability can rarely be found without it, it is not so that
a degree of industrial disability is proportionally related
to a degree of impairment of bodily function.
Factors to be considered in determining industrial dis
ability include the employee's medical condition prior to
the injury, immediately after the injury, and presently; the
situs of the injury, its severity and the length of healing
period; the work experience of the employee prior to the
injury, after the injury and potential for rehabilitation;
the employee's qualifications intellectually, emotionally
and physically; earnings prior and subsequent to the injury;
age; education; motivation; functional impairment as a
result of the injury; and inability because of the injury to
engage in employment for which the employee is fitted. Loss
of earnings caused by a job transfer for reasons related to
the injury is also relevant. These are matters which the
finder of fact considers collectively in arriving at the
determination of the degree of industrial disability.
There are no weighting guidelines that indicate how
each of the factors are to be considered. There are no
guidelines which give, for example, age a weighted value of
ten percent of the total value, education a value of fifteen
percent of total, motivation - five percent; work experience
- thirty percent, etc. Neither does a rating of functional
impairment directly correlate to a degree of industrial
disability to the body as a whole. In other words, there
are no formulae which can be applied and then added up to
determine the degree of industrial disability. It therefore
becomes necessary for the deputy or commissioner to draw
upon prior experience, general and specialized knowledge to
make the finding with regard to degree of industrial dis
ability. See Peterson v. Truck Haven Cafe, Inc., (Appeal
Decision, February 28, 1985); Christensen v. Hagen, Inc.,
(Appeal Decision, March 26, l985).
For example, a defendant employer's refusal to give any
sort of work to a claimant after he suffers his affliction
may justify an award of disability. McSpadden v. Big Ben
Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1980).
At the time of the hearing, claimant was almost 36
years of age. She is a high school graduate, and has
obtained two advanced degrees, one in practical nursing and
the other in the medical/secretarial field. Although she
has not continued to keep her license as a practical nurse,
she is still eligible for the same. However, claimant
expressed that she has no desire to continue any type of
work in the nursing field.
Claimant's employment has focused on jobs that have
Page 8
paid a little more than minimum wage. Her best paying job
has been with the defendant. At the time she had left
employment with Fieldstone Cabinetry, claimant was earning
$6.52 per hour. She worked an average of 40 hours per week.
Although claimant has had carpal tunnel release surgery
performed on both her left and right wrists, her physical
condition appears to be stable and solid, including the
continuing soreness she has with her right shoulder. She
has a good work record, and enjoyed the benefits specialist
position she held for a limited time while recovering from
the left carpal tunnel release surgery. In fact, claimant
appeared to be somewhat resentful that she no longer held
the position.
Claimant is certainly employable and she made clear at
the hearing that she wanted the benefits specialist position
at Fieldstone. Although defendants are not obligated to
offer her that particular position, it is unfortunate that a
company with approximately 400 positions is unable to
re-employ claimant in a job which accommodates her
restrictions.
Claimant has a substantial number of years of
experience in the nursing field, and that she chooses not to
re-enter the field is her choice does not increase her
industrial disability for workers' compensation purposes.
Likewise, claimant's office and secretarial skills are
transferable to many other types of businesses, and although
claimant has engaged in a limited job search, the
undersigned finds that she needs to increase her efforts in
trying to find suitable employment. Additionally, claimant
stated that she tried not to lift more than 20 pounds on a
repetitive basis, although this restriction was phrased as a
"probable" lifting restriction imposed by Dr. Rosenfeld.
Likewise, she stated that repetitive work hurts her neck and
shoulder area, but again repetitive work is not a restricted
activity.
Defendants argue that Dr. Rosenfeld's evaluation should
be discounted, as he saw claimant only once. This writer
rejects the argument as to accept it would circumvent the
purpose of an independent medical evaluation. As a result,
Dr. Rosenfeld's evaluation was considered in arriving at
claimant's entitlement to permanent partial disability
benefits.
After considering all of the factors that comprise an
industrial disability, it is found that claimant has
sustained a 10 percent industrial disability.
Finally, the parties were unable to agree upon the
number of exemptions to which claimant is entitled for
purposes of calculating her workers' compensation rate.
During her testimony, claimant explained that she was
married, her two stepsons and her biological son wee
dependants, living in her household on April 26, 1990.
Therefore, claimant is entitled to five exemptions, and her
workers' compensation rate, based on $260.80 gross weekly
Page 9
earnings, is $186.78. See Guide to Iowa Workers'
Compensation Claim Handling, July 1, 1989.
order
THEREFORE, it is ordered:
That claimant is awarded healing period benefits from
April 26, 1990 through January 20, 1991, at the rate of one
hundred eighty-six and 78/100 dollars ($186.78) per week.
That claimant is awarded fifty (50) weeks of permanent
partial disability benefits at the rate of one hundred
eighty-six and 78/100 dollars ($186.78) per week, commencing
on January 21, 1991.
That defendants shall pay accrued weekly benefits in a
lump sum and shall receive credit against the award for
weekly benefits previously paid.
That defendants shall pay interest on benefits awarded
herein as set forth in Iowa Code section 85.30.
That defendants shall pay the costs of this action,
pursuant to rule 343 IAC 4.33.
That defendants shall file an activity report upon
payment of this award as required by this agency, pursuant
to rule 343 IAC 3.1.
Page 10
Signed and filed this ____ day of April, 1992.
________________________________
PATRICIA J. LANTZ
DEPUTY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
Copies To:
Mr Robert W Pratt
Attorney at Law
6959 University Ave
Des Moines IA 50311
Mr Brendan T Quann
Attorney at Law
200 Cyrcare Bldg
Dubuque IA 52001
5-1803
Filed April 23, 1992
Patricia J. Lantz
before the iowa industrial commissioner
____________________________________________________________
:
STELLA ODOM, :
:
Claimant, :
:
vs. :
: File No. 960752
FIELDSTONE CABINETRY, INC., :
: A R B I T R A T I O N
Employer, :
: D E C I S I O N
and :
:
CRANBROOK AGENCY, :
:
Insurance Carrier, :
Defendants. :
___________________________________________________________
5-1803
Claimant worked for several years at Fieldstone Cabinetry on
the assembly/production line.
She sustained various injuries to both wrists and to her
shoulder.
This claim pertained to claimant's shoulder problem. She
was given impairment ratings of 0% and 5% with restrictions
of no repetitive work at or above shoulder level.
Claimant's primary past employment was in the secretarial
field and nursing field.
Claimant awarded 10% industrial disability.
BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
_________________________________________________________________
WILLIAM E. ADAMS, JR.
Claimant,
vs.
File No. 960977
MICRO-SPECIALTIES CO., INC.,
A P P E A L
Employer,
D E C I S I O N
and
HAWKEYE SECURITY INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Insurance Carrier,
Defendants.
_________________________________________________________________
The record, including the transcript of the hearing before the
deputy and all exhibits admitted into the record, has been
reviewed de novo on appeal. The decision of the deputy filed
April 30, 1991 is affirmed and is adopted as the final agency
action in this case.
Claimant shall pay the costs of the appeal, including the
preparation of the hearing transcript.
Signed and filed this ____ day of October, 1992.
________________________________
BYRON K. ORTON
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
Copies To:
Mr. Ned A. Stockdale
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 496
Estherville, Iowa 51334
Mr. Willis J. Hamilton
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 188
Storm Lake, Iowa 50588
9998
Filed October 28, 1992
Byron K. Orton
BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
____________________________________________________________
WILLIAM E. ADAMS, JR.
Claimant,
vs.
File No. 960977
MICRO-SPECIALTIES CO., INC.,
A P P E A L
Employer,
D E C I S I O N
and
HAWKEYE SECURITY INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Insurance Carrier,
Defendants.
____________________________________________________________
9998
Summary affirmance of deputy's decision filed April 30,
1991.
Page 1
before the iowa industrial commissioner
____________________________________________________________
:
WILLIAM E. ADAMS, JR., :
:
Claimant, :
:
vs. :
: File No. 960977
MICRO-SPECIALTIES CO., INC., :
: A R B I T R A T I O N
Employer, :
: D E C I S I O N
and :
:
HAWKEYE SECURITY INSURANCE :
COMPANY, :
:
Insurance Carrier, :
Defendants. :
___________________________________________________________
statement of the case
This is a proceeding in arbitration brought by William
Adams, Jr., claimant, against his former employer,
Micro-Specialties Co., Inc., and its insurance carrier,
Hawkeye Security Insurance Company, defendants. The matter
came on for hearing before the undersigned deputy industrial
commissioner on April 14, 1992, at Storm Lake, Iowa.
The record in this case consists of the live testimony
of the claimant; Jayline Adams, claimant's wife; Justina
Cejka; Jerry Howland; James Sandig; and Stephen Mefferd;
and, claimant's exhibits 2 through 19. Claimant's exhibit
20, to which defendants objected, is admitted.
issues
According to the prehearing report, the parties submit
the following issues:
1. Whether claimant sustained an injury on September
10, 1990, which arose out of and in the course of his
employment;
2. Whether there is a causal connection to claimant's
disability;
3. Whether claimant is entitled to temporary total or
healing period benefits, or permanent partial disability
benefits;
4. Whether claimant is entitled to medical benefits
under Iowa Code section 85.27; and,
5. Whether claimant is entitled to penalty benefits,
as provided for under Iowa Code section 86.13(4).
Page 2
findings of fact
The undersigned deputy, having reviewed all the
evidence received, finds the following facts:
Claimant, William Adams, Jr., was born on July 20,
1964, and was 27 years old at the time of the hearing. He
is married and has one child.
Mr. Adams has a severe loss of hearing. He attended
the Iowa School For The Deaf, and graduated with a high
school in 1984. His course work consisted of general
subjects, and claimant stated that he maintained a B
average.
After graduation, claimant worked as a carpet layer for
one year, and then attended Iowa Western Community College
in Council Bluffs, Iowa, for one quarter of a semester.
Claimant dropped out of school due to poor grades he
received in his drafting/engineering and computer aided
design courses.
Claimant then went to live with his parents and helped
them raise hogs after several months, claimant went to work
for Northwood Meats, where he worked as a machine operator.
One year later, claimant decided to return to Iowa
Western Community College, and enrolled in graphic art
courses. Claimant stayed in school for approximately one
year, and then withdrew because he did not want to undertake
additional student loans.
During the next five years, claimant held eight
different jobs including positions as a production worker
for a plastics manufacturer; assembly line work for a meat
packing company; a machine operator for a company which
manufactured hydraulic cylinders; and, as a welder for
C.E.I. Trucking Company. Claimant's employment was somewhat
sporadic, as he held these positions for two weeks up to
five months.
The only physical problem claimant encountered in any
of these positions was a hernia he developed after he lifted
some equipment. Claimant's hourly earnings ranged from
$4.25 per hour to $7.50 per hour.
In May 1990, claimant began working for defendant
employer, Micro-Specialties Co., Inc., a company that
produces various sizes of liners for different machine
parts. Claimant obtained his position as a machine operator
through the Job Training Partnership Act. He began as a
machinist, which included operating lathes; assembly drill
presses; glue machines; and, burnishers. These duties
required claimant to lift frequently steel cylinders
weighing between 25 to 30 pounds up to more than 100 pounds.
In August 1990, claimant developed low back pain. He
sought treatment from his family physician, John Rhodes,
M.D., whose notes indicate that the low back pain "has been
going on for some time." (Claimant's Exhibit 8, page 3).
Page 3
On September 10, 1990, claimant was assigned to a job
which required him to lift from the ground to waist or chest
level liners, weighing in excess of 100 pounds, and
approximately 36 inches in length. Claimant testified that
he was bending over an oil pan, started to lift the liner,
and felt pain when his back "went out." Claimant reported
to his coworker that his back was sore, but he continued to
work. He lifted three to four more linings, and could not
continue due to the pain. He reported the incident to Dale
Mefferd, and was escorted to A.W. Samuelson, a chiropractor
in Laurens, Iowa. Dr. Samuelson diagnosed a severe muscle
spasm. He was unable to fully examine claimant and sent him
home to rest and gave claimant ice packs (Cl. Ex. 7, p. 3).
Later that day, claimant went back to the employer with
continued complaints of pain in the low back, and was
admitted to the Pocahontas County Memorial Hospital for 24
hour observation. Dr, Rhodes attended to claimant, ordered
an x-ray of the lumbar spine (which was normal) and
diagnosed an acute muscle strain of the low back. Claimant
was released from the hospital on September 11, 1990, with
instructions to seek physical therapy (Cl. Ex. 9, pp. 1-4).
After one week of physical therapy, claimant returned
to work on light duty assignment, and continued physical
therapy through September 21, 1990 (Cl. Ex. 9, pp. 4-5).
Claimant continued to treat with Dr. Rhodes, who
referred him to Samir R. Wahby, M.D., an orthopedic
specialist in Fort Dodge, Iowa. An examination performed by
Dr. Wahby revealed pain and tenderness over the lower lumbar
region, but claimant displayed normal range of motion of the
back. Straight leg raising tests were negative, and Dr.
Wahby recommended against heavy lifting (Cl. Ex. 10, pp.
2-3). Dr. Rhodes eventually released claimant to return to
work without restrictions on October 22, 1990 (Cl. Ex. 8, p.
6).
When claimant returned to his job, he was assigned
light duty for two weeks. According to Stephen Mefferd,
this assignment was to allow claimant to ease back into the
work environment. Then, claimant was placed on regular job
duties. On October 31, 1990, claimant aggravated his back
condition, left work at noon and called Dr. Rhodes, who
advised claimant to take medication, not return to work for
the rest of the day, and bed rest. This telephone
conversation with Dr. Rhodes is not found in Dr. Rhodes'
notes. Claimant's wife called Stephen Mefferd, who stated
that claimant would be terminated due to absenteeism.
After the termination, claimant declined to continue
his insurance company through the COBRA program and applied
for Title XIX.
In January 1991, claimant returned to Dr. Rhodes
seeking treatment for pain he felt while picking up
something from the floor. Again, Dr. Rhodes diagnosed a
marked muscle spasm in the left lower paraspinal muscle. He
stated that claimant "will not be able to do any work that
Page 4
requires heavy lifting or bending over repeatedly. He also
has difficulty doing a job that requires long-term
standing." Dr. Rhodes also recommended physical therapy
(Cl. Ex. 8, pp. 3-5).
Claimant returned to Micro-Specialties requesting a
job. Stephen Mefferd indicated that the company would have
been willing to re-employ claimant but that the company did
not have enough work to justify hiring another worker.
By this time, claimant felt very frustrated, and sought
help from a vocational rehabilitationist from the State of
Iowa.
In July 1991, claimant sought treatment from William
Follows, M.D., an orthopedic surgeon in Spencer, Iowa. Dr.
Follows' notes indicate that claimant had been experiencing
"a great deal of pain" for four days, after he tried to lift
a bucket of bait while fishing (Cl. Ex. 11, p. 5). Claimant
was to rest and was to return in four days. An MRI was
ordered, and the results showed a juvenile discogenic
disease called Scheuermann's Disease. This condition is an
inflammatory disease of bone and cartilage in the spine.
The MRI test results revealed disc degeneration and
circumferential bulging at the low back area, L4-5 and L5-
S1. Some nerve root impingement was shown at the right S1
level, but claimant did not display "right sided signs."
(Cl. Ex. 11, p. 5) Dr. Follows recommended vocational
rehabilitation, with particular concentration in the areas
that do not require heavy use of claimant's back, and
specifically recommended the drafting field (Cl. Ex. 11, p.
5).
In July 1991, Dr. Follows expressed the opinion:
It is difficult for me to say with any degree
of assurance that Mr. Adams' back problem is job
related. According to his history, it began at
the same time as he was working for this company
and doing heavy lifting but the only time I have
seen him is July 19 and the symptoms started a
year ago. It is, therefore, very difficult for me
to implicate a causal relationship
Page 5
with any degree of certainty. However, it is
certainly possible that his problems could have
stemmed from his lifting.
(Cl. Ex. 11, p. 4)
In November 1991, Dr. Follows was of the opinion that
claimant had a 5 percent functional impairment (Cl. Ex. 11,
p. 2).
In November 1991, claimant sought help from the
University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics Spine Diagnostic
and Treatment Center. After a thorough evaluation and
examination, it was determined that claimant's physical
condition was "absolutely solid, stable and healed from
previously injuries...." It was recommended that claimant
undertake a two week low back pain rehabilitation program;
cardiovascular/exercise program; and, resolve certain
financial and personal problems that were contributing to
his stress (Cl. Ex. 12, pp. 1-4). The rehabilitation notes
indicate that claimant's spine was non-tender; he
demonstrated full range of motion and full motor strength in
the lower extremities; he had symmetric, bilateral deep
tendon reflexes in the lower extremities; and, negative
straight leg raising tests. The overall assessment was that
claimant had chronic low back pain with no surgery
indicated.
Work restrictions included a 50 pound one time lift,
not to be performed more than four times per hour, with no
repetitive lifting of more than 25 pounds. It was also
determined that "with a positive, aggressive rehabilitation
approach, these lifting strengths can be significantly
improved." (Cl. Ex. 12, p. 2)
Presently, claimant is working at a full-time temporary
position for General Foods in Mason City, Iowa. He earns $5
per hour and works on the assembly line. The job does not
require any heavy lifting or prolonged standing.
Claimant stated that he enjoys fishing, and that he
desires to return to school to further his education.
It should be noted that claimant has never earned more
than $5,000 per year in any year since graduating from high
school.
analysis and conclusions of law
The first issue to be addressed is whether claimant
received an injury on September 10, 1990, which arose out of
and in the course of his employment with Micro-Specialties
Co., Inc.
An employee is entitled to compensation for any and all
personal injuries which arise out of and in the course of
the employment. Section 85.3(1).
Claimant has the burden of proving by a preponderance
of the evidence that he received an injury on September 10,
Page 6
1990, which arose out of and in the course of his
employment. McDowell v. Town of Clarksville, 241 N.W.2d 904
(Iowa 1976); Musselman v. Central Telephone Co., 261 Iowa
352, 154 N.W.2d 128 (1967).
The injury must both arise out of and be in the course
of the employment. Crowe v. DeSoto Consol. Sch. Dist., 246
Iowa 402, 68 N.W.2d 63 (1955) and cases cited at pp. 405-406
of the Iowa Report. See also Sister Mary Benedict v. St.
Mary's Corp., 255 Iowa 847, 124 N.W.2d 548 (l963) and Hansen
v. State of Iowa, 249 Iowa 1147, 91 N.W.2d 555 (1958).
The words "out of" refer to the cause or source of the
injury. Crowe, 246 Iowa 402, 68 N.W.2d 63.
The words "in the course of" refer to the time and
place and circumstances of the injury. McClure v. Union
et al. Counties, 188 N.W.2d 283 (Iowa 1971); Crowe, 246 Iowa
402, 68 N.W.2d 63.
"An injury occurs in the course of the employment when
it is within the period of employment at a place the
employee may reasonably be, and while he is doing his work
or something incidental to it." Cedar Rapids Comm. Sch.
Dist. v. Cady, 278 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1979), McClure, 188
N.W.2d 283; Musselman, 261 Iowa 352, 154 N.W.2d 128.
The medical records substantiate claimant's position
that he was lifting a heavy piece of equipment while at work
on September 10, 1990. There is no dispute that claimant
was performing his job duties as required, in a time, place
and manner suitable to his employment. Therefore, it is
found that claimant received an injury which arose out of
and in the course of his employment with the employer.
The next issue to be addressed is whether there is a
causal relationship between claimant's injury and his
disability.
The claimant has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the injury of September
10, 1990, is causally related to the disability on which he
now bases his claim. Bodish v. Fischer, Inc., 257 Iowa 516,
133 N.W.2d 867 (1965). Lindahl v. L. O. Boggs, 236 Iowa
296, 18 N.W.2d 607 (1945). A possibility is insufficient; a
probability is necessary. Burt v. John Deere Waterloo
Tractor Works, 247 Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732 (1955). The
question of causal connection is essentially within the
domain of expert testimony. Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist
Hospital, 251 Iowa 375, 101 N.W.2d 167 (1960).
However, expert medical evidence must be considered
with all other evidence introduced bearing on the causal
connection. Burt, 247 Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732. The opinion
of experts need not be couched in definite, positive or
unequivocal language. Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d
903 (Iowa 1974). However, the expert opinion may be
accepted or rejected, in whole or in part, by the trier of
fact. Id. at 907. Further, the weight to be given to such
an opinion is for the finder of fact, and that may be
Page 7
affected by the completeness of the premise given the expert
and other surrounding circumstances. Bodish, 257 Iowa 516,
133 N.W.2d 867. See also Musselman, 261 Iowa 352, 154
N.W.2d 128.
Furthermore, if the available expert testimony is
insufficient alone to support a finding of causal
connection, such testimony may be coupled with nonexpert
testimony to show causation and be sufficient to sustain an
award. Giere v. Aase Haugen Homes, Inc., 259 Iowa 1065, 146
N.W.2d 911, 915 (1966). Such evidence does not, however,
compel an award as a matter of law. Anderson v. Oscar Mayer
& Co., 217 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Iowa 1974). To establish
compensability, the injury need only be a significant
factor, not be the only factor causing the claimed
disability. Blacksmith v. All-Amnerican, Inc., 290 N.W.2d
348, 354 (Iowa 1980).
While a claimant is not entitled to compensation for
the results of a preexisting injury or disease, the mere
existence at the time of a subsequent injury is not a
defense. Rose v. John Deere Ottumwa Works, 247 Iowa 900,
908, 76 N.W.2d 756, 760-61 (1956). If the claimant had a
preexisting condition or disability that is aggravated,
accelerated, worsened or lighted up so that it results in
disability, claimant is entitled to recover. Nicks v.
Davenport Produce Co., 254 Iowa 130, 115 N.W.2d 812, 815
(1962).
Although claimant sought medical treatment immediately
following the accident and several months thereafter, there
is a six month time frame in which claimant was not under
any medical care. Although claimant testified that he did
not seek medical treatment because he was unable to afford
the same, claimant also admitted that he had applied for and
obtained Title XIX insurance. Claimant's failure to secure
medical treatment indicates that his physical condition did
not warrant a visit to the doctor.
Additionally, claimant's physical condition was most
closely followed by Dr. Rhodes. His notes indicate that
claimant had sustained muscle strain while lifting at work
in September 1990. Dr. Rhodes saw claimant throughout
September and October of 1990, and then in January of 1991.
Dr. Rhodes released claimant to return to work without
restrictions in October of 1990.
Although claimant testified that due to an exacerbation
of pain in his low back, he or his wife called Dr. Rhodes on
or about October 31, 1990, this phone call is not documented
in Dr. Rhodes' medical records. It has been this writer's
experience that when a patient calls a doctor's office and
is given instructions to curtail work activities, the doctor
or the doctor's office personnel makes a notation in the
medical records.
Dr. Rhodes has rendered no opinion regarding whether
claimant's condition was related to his work injury.
Furthermore, Dr. Rhodes did not assess any impairment
rating.
Page 8
Even if the undersigned was convinced that Dr. Follows
was claimant's treatment physician, his opinion regarding
the causal relationship between claimant's injury in
September of 1990 and his permanent disability of 5 percent
is insufficient to prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that claimant sustained a permanent disability due to the
work injury.
As a result, it is found that claimant has failed to
carry his burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the
evidence that there is a causal connection between
claimant's injury and his disability.
The next issue to be addressed is whether claimant is
entitled to medical benefits as provided for under Iowa Code
section 85.27.
Iowa Code section 85.27 states, in relevant part:
Iowa Code section 85.27 provides, in relevant part:
The employer, for all injuries compensable
under this chapter or chapter 85A, shall furnish
reasonable surgical, medical, dental, osteopathic,
chiropractic, podiatric, physical rehabilitation,
nursing, ambulance and hospital services and
supplies therefor and shall allow reasonably
necessary transportation expense incurred for such
services.
As it has been determined that claimant did sustain a
compensable injury, it is found that defendants are
obligated to pay for claimant's care up until October 22,
1990, when claimant was released without restrictions to
return to work.
Although defendants raise the defense of authorization,
the undersigned finds this an invalid defense, particularly
with respect to the charges made prior to October 22, 1990.
ORDER
THEREFORE, it is ordered:
That claimant sustained an injury on September 10,
1990, which arose out of and in the course of his
employment.
That defendants shall pay claimant temporary total
disability benefits from September 13, 1990 through October
22, 1990, at the rate of one hundred thirty-seven and 64/100
dollars ($137.64) per week.
That defendants shall pay medical expenses incurred
from September 10, 1990 through October 22, 1990.
That defendants shall pay accrued weekly benefits in a
lump sum.
Page 9
That defendants shall pay interest on benefits awarded
herein as set forth in Iowa Code section 85.30.
That defendants shall pay the costs of this action,
pursuant to rule 343 IAC 4.33.
That defendants shall file an activity report upon
payment of this award as required by this agency, pursuant
to rule 343 IAC 3.1.
Signed and filed this ____ day of April, 1992.
________________________________
PATRICIA J. LANTZ
DEPUTY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
Copies To:
Mr Ned A Stockdale
Attorney at Law
108 N 7th St
Estherville IA 51334
Mr Willis J Hamilton
Attorney at Law
606 Ontario St
P O Box 188
Storm Lake IA 50588
5-1801
Filed April 30, 1992
Patricia J. Lantz
before the iowa industrial commissioner
____________________________________________________________
:
WILLIAM E. ADAMS, JR., :
:
Claimant, :
:
vs. :
: File No. 960977
MICRO-SPECIALTIES CO., INC., :
: A R B I T R A T I O N
Employer, :
: D E C I S I O N
and :
:
HAWKEYE SECURITY INSURANCE :
COMPANY, :
:
Insurance Carrier, :
Defendants. :
___________________________________________________________
5-1801
Claimant sustained a work-related injury, but failed to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he had a
permanent disability.
Claimant awarded temporary total disability and medical
benefits.
BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
------------------------------------------------------------
MOE ALYASSIN, :
:
Claimant, :
:
vs. :
: File No. 961315
UNITED TECHNOLOGY :
CORPORATION, :
: A R B I T R A T I O N
Employer, :
: D E C I S I O N
and :
:
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE :
CO., :
:
Insurance Carrier, :
Defendants. :
------------------------------------------------------------
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a proceeding in arbitration brought by Moe
Alyassin, claimant, against his former employer, United
Technology Corporation, and its insurance carrier, Pacific
Employers Insurance Company.
The case was heard before the undersigned deputy
industrial commissioner on March 22, 1994. The evidence
consists of testimony from claimant, Susan Alyassin
(claimant's wife), Rick Innis (human resources manager for
United Technology), Byron Robison (private investigator),
Candice Kaelber (vocational rehabilitation specialist), and
Frederick Shimon (health and safety coordinator for United
Technology); claimant's exhibits 1-7; and, defendants'
exhibits 1a-b, 2b, and 6-10. Defendants' exhibit 4 was
excluded from the evidence, and an offer of proof was made.
ISSUE
The parties have submitted the following issue for
resolution:
1. The extent of claimant's industrial disability.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The undersigned deputy, having reviewed all of the
evidence received, finds the following facts:
Claimant, at the time of the hearing, was 42 years of
age. He graduated from high school in Iran. After
graduation, he spent 13 months in the Iranian air force,
basic terrain duty. He was forced to leave the air force
Page 2
because he could not pass a requisite test, and then went
into the army for two years. He was stationed at the top of
a mountain to perform guard duty.
In late 1976 or early 1977, he obtained a student visa
to pursue education in the United States. For one month, he
studied English in Chicago, and eventually pursued a degree
in art from Iowa Community College in Fort Dodge, Iowa.
Claimant did not have a work permit, but worked in
restaurants while attending school.
In 1980, claimant began working for Sheller Globe, now
known as United Technologies Automotive.
Claimant has held a variety of positions with the
company, including jobs as a finish operator, injection
operator and receiving clerk. All jobs can be considered
manual labor, and have required claimant to lift, twist,
bend, pull and work on production lines. Heavy lifting was
aided by hoists provided by the employer.
Claimant was injured while he was working as a fork
truck driver in the receiving area of the plant. In this
job, he was required to load and unload boxes with a fork
truck or forklift. Sometimes, claimant was required to
manually lift the boxes. The packages housed a variety of
items, weighed a variety of pounds, and came in all sizes.
Claimant became a crew leader in 1986 or 1987. He
received a $.40/hour pay increase, and his responsibilities
included assigning work and dividing job duties among
workers. He continued to do the same work as the other
workers. After approximately one year, claimant was
relieved of his duties as crew leader.
On September 12, 1990, claimant was working in the
receiving area. He lifted a box, and felt pain in his low
back and legs. He went to the nurses' station, but no nurse
was available. He spoke to his supervisor, and was sent to
Mercy Hospital in Iowa City, Iowa. (Claimant's Exhibit 1)
After visiting the company doctor, claimant was referred to
Richard Berge, M.D., who diagnosed a herniated disc. (Cl.
Ex. 4) Evidently, Dr. Berge referred claimant to Edward
Law, who performed the surgery and followed claimant's
treatment after the surgery. (Cl. Ex. 5). The records
indicate that claimant received several releases to return
to work in light duty capacities, apparently these returns
never panned out. The final note from Dr. Law (although it
is difficult to tell as claimant's exhibits are not in
chronological order) indicates that claimant could return to
work 4 hours per day on August 5, 1991. He was able to lift
20 pounds, and in two weeks, was to work 6 hours per day.
He was to take a 10 minute break every two hours. (Cl. Ex.
4) Later, Dr. Law's restriction were no lifting of greater
than 25 pounds, no repetitive bending, twisting or stooping,
and no sitting beyond one hour without taking a break.
Claimant was able to work eight hours per day. He believed
claimant had a 10 percent impairment to the body as a whole.
(Cl. Ex. 6)
Page 3
Records from W. John Robb, M.D., are dated July 19,
1991. His examination revealed some symptoms on straight
leg raising tests, but the final diagnoses was "status
postoperative L4-5 discectomy left [and] moderate pain
behavior with functional overlay." (Cl. Ex. 2). Dr. Robb
believed claimant could return to various job assignments
within the plant. He suggested claimant undergo an MMPI to
assess the functional component within claimant's symptoms.
(Cl. Ex. 2)
In March of 1992, claimant underwent an independent
medical evaluation, performed by Marc Hines, M.D., a
neurologist. He offered that claimant had sustained a 25
percent permanent impairment to the body as a whole due to
loss of function, nerve root involvement, and loss of range
of motion. (Cl. Ex. 3)
Defendants employed the services of a vocational
rehabilitation specialist, Candice Kaelber. In addition to
testifying at the hearing, her notes are included in the
evidence as defendants' exhibits 2b and 3. They reiterate
that claimant underwent numerous programs of physical
therapy and work hardening programs, but was still
unsuccessful at a return to work at the employer's plant.
Claimant stated that he tried to find suitable
employment while still in Iowa, but to no avail.
Eventually, claimant moved to Gainesville, Florida and
secured employment with a company that manufactures fire
engines. He works in the detail department, and polishes
the completed trucks. His job is within his restrictions,
and claimant currently earns $10.00 per hour. From his
wages, he pays $1.50 per hour for health care insurance. At
United Technology Corporation, he was making $10.45 per
hour, and did not pay for health insurance.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The sole issue to address is claimant's industrial
disability.
The party who would suffer loss if an issue were not
established has the burden of proving that issue by a
preponderance of the evidence. Iowa R. App. P. 14(f).
Functional impairment is an element to be considered in
determining industrial disability which is the reduction of
earning capacity, but consideration must also be given to
the injured employee's age, education, qualifications, expe
rience and inability to engage in employment for which he is
fitted. Olson v. Goodyear Service Stores, 255 Iowa 1112,
125 N.W.2d 251 (1963). Barton v. Nevada Poultry, 253 Iowa
285, 110 N.W.2d 660 (1961).
A finding of impairment to the body as a whole found by
a medical evaluator does not equate to industrial disabil
ity. This is so as impairment and disability are not syn
onymous. Degree of industrial disability can in fact be
much different than the degree of impairment because in the
first instance reference is to loss of earning capacity and
Page 4
in the latter to anatomical or functional abnormality or
loss. Although loss of function is to be considered and
disability can rarely be found without it, it is not so that
a degree of industrial disability is proportionally related
to a degree of impairment of bodily function.
Factors to be considered in determining industrial dis
ability include the employee's medical condition prior to
the injury, immediately after the injury, and presently; the
situs of the injury, its severity and the length of healing
period; the work experience of the employee prior to the
injury, after the injury and potential for rehabilitation;
the employee's qualifications intellectually, emotionally
and physically; earnings prior and subsequent to the injury;
age; education; motivation; functional impairment as a
result of the injury; and inability because of the injury to
engage in employment for which the employee is fitted. Loss
of earnings caused by a job transfer for reasons related to
the injury is also relevant. These are matters which the
finder of fact considers collectively in arriving at the
determination of the degree of industrial disability.
There are no weighting guidelines that indicate how
each of the factors are to be considered. There are no
guidelines which give, for example, age a weighted value of
ten percent of the total value, education a value of fifteen
percent of total, motivation - five percent; work experience
- thirty percent, etc. Neither does a rating of functional
impairment directly correlate to a degree of industrial
disability to the body as a whole. In other words, there
are no formulae which can be applied and then added up to
determine the degree of industrial disability. It therefore
becomes necessary for the deputy or commissioner to draw
upon prior experience, general and specialized knowledge to
make the finding with regard to degree of industrial dis
ability. See Peterson v. Truck Haven Cafe, Inc., (Appeal
Decision, February 28, 1985); Christensen v. Hagen, Inc.,
(Appeal Decision, March 26, l985).
At the time of the hearing, claimant was 42 years old.
He has a degree in art, but has never pursued a career in
this area.
Claimant worked for approximately ten years for the
defendant. He worked as a laborer in a variety of unskilled
or semi-skilled positions.
While claimant's motivation to return to suitable
employment with the employer is questionable, so is
defendant's actions to provide claimant with appropriate
work options.
Claimant has undergone a discectomy and still feels
pain. It has been suggested that he is magnifying his pain.
Claimant has found suitable employment, and earns $10
per hour. His fringe benefits are not as attractive as
those he enjoyed while working for the defendant.
After considering all of the factors enumerated above,
Page 5
it is determined that claimant has sustained a 20 percent
industrial disability .
ORDER
THEREFORE, it is ordered:
That defendants shall pay claimant one hundred (100)
weeks of permanent partial disability benefits at the rate
of two hundred eighty-six and 16/100 dollars ($286.16) per
week commencing August 28, 1991.
That accrued weekly benefits shall be paid in a lump,
with credit awarded for benefits previously paid.
That defendants shall pay interest on the award,
pursuant to Iowa Code section 85.30.
That defendants shall pay the costs associated with
this action.
That defendants shall file a claims activity report
upon payment of this award.
Signed and filed this ____ day of April, 1994.
________________________________
PATRICIA J. LANTZ
DEPUTY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
Copies To:
Mr Robert F Wilson
Attorney at Law
210 Second St
810 Dows Bldg
Cedar Rapids IA 52401
Mr Harry W Dahl
Attorney at Law
974 73rd St
Des Moines IA 50312
5-1803
Filed April 12, 1994
Patricia J. Lantz
BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
------------------------------------------------------------
MOE ALYASSIN, :
:
Claimant, :
:
vs. :
: File No. 961315
UNITED TECHNOLOGY :
CORPORATION, :
: A R B I T R A T I O N
Employer, :
: D E C I S I O N
and :
:
PACIFIC EMPLOYERS INSURANCE :
CO., :
:
Insurance Carrier, :
Defendants. :
------------------------------------------------------------
5-1803
Claimant awarded 20% industrial disability.