BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                                          :
 
            LEONA AMES,                   :
 
                                          :
 
                 Claimant,                :
 
                                          :
 
            vs.                           :
 
                                          :      File No. 963896
 
            LIBBEY-OWENS FORD COMPANY,    :
 
                                          :     A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                 Employer,                :
 
                                          :       D E C I S I O N
 
            and                           :
 
                                          :
 
            KEMPER INSURANCE,             :
 
                                          :
 
                 Insurance Carrier,       :
 
                 Defendants.              :
 
            ___________________________________________________________
 
            
 
                              STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
            
 
                 This is a proceeding in arbitration brought by Leona 
 
            Ames, claimant, against Libby-Owens Ford Company, employer, 
 
            and Kemper Insurance, insurance carrier, both as defendants.  
 
            Mrs. Ames bases her claim upon an injury she sustained on 
 
            October 2, 1990.  The record in this case consists of the 
 
            testimony from the claimant; Arlin Pals, a union 
 
            representative; Leona Martin, a rehabilitation consultant; 
 
            Edwin Meyer, a former production foreman for the defendant 
 
            employer; John Babyar, a private investigator; Claimant's 
 
            exhibits 1 through 69; and, defendants' exhibits B through 
 
            I.  This matter came on for hearing before the undersigned 
 
            deputy industrial commissioner on October 27, 1992, at Mason 
 
            City, Iowa.
 
            
 
                                      ISSUES
 
            
 
                 The parties submit the following issues for resolution:
 
            
 
                 1.  Whether there is a causal relationship between 
 
            claimant's injury and her disability;
 
            
 
                 2.  Whether claimant is entitled to temporary 
 
            disability or healing period benefits or permanent partial 
 
            or permanent total disability benefits;
 
            
 
                 3.  Whether claimant is entitled to medical benefits 
 
            under Iowa Code section 85.27;
 
            
 
                 4.  Whether defendants are entitled to credit for 
 
            benefits previously paid under Iowa Code section 85.38(2);
 
            
 
                 5.  Whether claimant is an odd-lot employee; and,
 
            
 
                 6.  Claimant's correct workers' compensation rate.
 
            
 
                                 FINDINGS OF FACT
 

 
            
 
            Page   2
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 The undersigned deputy, having reviewed all of the 
 
            evidence received, finds the following facts:
 
            
 
                 Claimant, Leona Ames, was born on November 7, 1935.  
 
            She graduated from Sheffield Public High School in 1954 and 
 
            described herself as an average student.  She has received 
 
            no further education.
 
            
 
                 Claimant worked as a store clerk for a clothing store 
 
            in Mason City from October 1954 until January 1955.  At that 
 
            time, she married Roger Ames.  From 1956 until 1965, 
 
            claimant was a full-time mother.  From 1963 until 1972, she 
 
            worked part-time at Mercy Hospital as a nurse's aide.  Her 
 
            duties included feeding residents, changing beds and helping 
 
            patients walk and exercise.
 
            
 
                 Claimant began working for defendant Libby-Owens Ford 
 
            Company in 1972.  Her initial job was in the dehydration 
 
            department, a department in which she worked for sixteen or 
 
            seventeen years.  Her primary duties included filing, 
 
            grommet, and testing and sealing various sizes of panes of 
 
            glass.
 
            
 
                 In approximately 1989, claimant began duties as an 
 
            inspector due to cutbacks and layoffs at the plant.  As an 
 
            inspector, she would remove glass from the assembly rack and 
 
            move it to a conveyor.  The conveyor belt had lights 
 
            underneath which showed through the glass to reflect flaws.  
 
            Claimant was responsible for removing any flaws in the panes 
 
            of glass.
 
            
 
                 On October 2, 1990, claimant was working as an 
 
            inspector.  On this particular day, she was lifting panes of 
 
            glass weighing between 20 to 55 pounds.  She stated that she 
 
            would lift 800 units per day during an eight hour shift.  
 
            Her entire shift was spent standing, although she was 
 
            allowed two breaks during the day.
 
            
 
                 At approximately 3:00 p.m. on October 2, 1990, claimant 
 
            noticed that her back hurt.  For the next one and one-half 
 
            hours, claimant continued to lift "very big" glass and 
 
            eventually went to her foreman to complain of back pain.  
 
            She was told to see a physician at the North Iowa Medical 
 
            Center.  Claimant was treated at the emergency room by D. 
 
            Studder, who diagnosed muscle spasms in the low back.  He 
 
            instructed claimant to remain off of work until October 6, 
 
            1990 (Claimant's Exhibit 8).
 
            
 
                 The following day, claimant sought treatment from 
 
            Kenneth Washburn, the company physician.  She was actually 
 
            treated by the physician's assistant, D. Frakes.  An 
 
            examination revealed that claimant displayed symptoms of a 
 
            right sacroiliac strain and low back strain.  Claimant was 
 
            given Flexeril and was advised to continue off of work.  On 
 
            October 8, 1990, claimant returned to Mr./Ms. Frakes who 
 
            recommended continued physical therapy activities (Cl. Ex. 
 
            13, p. 14; Cl. Ex. 9).
 
            
 
                 Claimant returned to the Washburn/Frakes team on 
 

 
            
 
            Page   3
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            October 16, 1990, and was told to continue with physical 
 
            therapy exercises.  She reported that she continued to feel 
 
            tenderness and aching in the SI joint.  Claimant was to 
 
            receive a functional capacities evaluation.  X-rays of the 
 
            lumbar spine showed a narrowing of the L5-S1 disc space and 
 
            some degenerative changes (Cl. Exs. 10, 11, 12 and 13).
 
            
 
                 From October 22 to November 12, 1990, claimant 
 
            continued to seek treatment from the team of 
 
            Washburn/Frakes.  The progress notes indicate that claimant 
 
            was placed in a work hardening program with the ultimate 
 
            goal of regaining her ability to lift between 30 to 40 
 
            pounds.  Claimant continued to ask for additional 
 
            medications, with Flexeril and Ansaid being prescribed.  She 
 
            displayed slow progress, and Dr. Washburn eventually 
 
            referred her to D. Fisher, M.D.  Dr. Fisher had performed 
 
            surgery in 1974 on claimant's lower back, specifically the 
 
            L5-S1 portion of the lower back.  Defendants intercepted 
 
            this referral and told claimant to receive additional 
 
            treatment from Daniel J. McGuire, M.D. (Cl. Ex. 14, pp. 18-
 
            20).
 
            
 
                 On November 29, 1990, claimant saw Dr. McGuire.  He 
 
            reviewed radiographs which showed degenerative changes from 
 
            the L4 to the sacrum of the spine.  His examination revealed 
 
            flexibility of the spine, although claimant exhibited some 
 
            tenderness about the midline spine.  He recommended physical 
 
            therapy and anticipated minimal disability, which the 
 
            undersigned believes is meant to evaluate her impairment 
 
            (Cl. Ex. 20, pp. 26-27).
 
            
 
                 Claimant returned to Dr. McGuire in December of 1990.  
 
            His examination showed minimal objective findings and 
 
            increased flexibility of the lower back.  He encouraged her 
 
            to undertake a more aggressive rehabilitation program (Cl. 
 
            Ex. 20, p. 27).
 
            
 
                 A review of the physical therapy notes dated December 
 
            27, 1990, revealed that claimant had decreased flexibility 
 
            of the spine with positive sacroiliac tests on the right 
 
            with extreme tenderness.  It was recommend that claimant 
 
            continue with a reconditioning program with emphasis on 
 
            strengthening the abdominal and paraspinal muscles (Cl. Ex. 
 
            20, pp. 39-41).
 
            
 
                 Claimant returned to Dr. McGuire on January 21, 1991.  
 
            Results of a CT scan showed "terrible degenerative changes 
 
            at the facet joints at L5-S1 and terrible changes at the 
 
            disc space of L5-S1." (Cl. Ex. 20, p. 28)  An MRI showed a 
 
            bulging disc at the L4-L5 level.  Dr. McGuire did not 
 
            necessarily recommend surgery to remove the L4-L5 disc, but 
 
            recommended that all parties contemplate an anterior 
 
            discectomy and fusion at the L5-S1 level.  He agreed with 
 
            claimant that she should seek a second opinion (Cl. Ex. 20, 
 
            pp. 28-30).
 
            
 
                 Claimant sought a second opinion from David Boarini, 
 
            M.D., on February 18, 1991.  His examination revealed that 
 
            claimant had low back pain with no radiation of pain to the 
 
            legs and no neurological complaints.  Claimant had a normal 
 

 
            
 
            Page   4
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            gait and a normal range of motion of the back.  Ankle 
 
            reflexes were absent.  Dr. Boarini reviewed claimant's 
 
            studies and also diagnosed mild degenerative changes with a 
 
            very small disc bulge at the L4-5 level.  He agreed that 
 
            claimant had a nonsurgical problem and recommended 
 
            anti-inflammatories, back strengthening exercises and a 
 
            gradual increase in work tolerance activities (Cl. Ex. 31).
 
            
 
                 In March of 1991, Dr. McGuire reviewed additional films 
 
            comparing diagnostic studies of the lumbar spine from 1974 
 
            to the present.  Although he agreed with Dr. Boarini in that 
 
            claimant was not a candidate for surgical intervention, he 
 
            did feel that if she continued to have persistent back pain 
 
            which significantly interfered with her lifestyle and 
 
            prevented her from leading a normal life, he would be 
 
            willing to do a one level fusion.  However, he felt he could 
 
            not perform the operation based solely on attempting to 
 
            return her to work as a laborer (Cl. Ex. 20, p. 31).
 
            
 
                 Claimant returned to Dr. McGuire later in March and 
 
            again in mid April of 1991.  He continued to be of the 
 
            opinion that her back pain was a legitimate complaint and 
 
            originated from the arthritis resulting from her previous 
 
            laminectomy at the L5-S1 level.  He estimated a 50 percent 
 
            chance of relieving her back pain via surgical intervention 
 
            (Cl. Ex. 20, p. 32).
 
            
 
                 In April of 1991, Dr. McGuire again did not recommend 
 
            surgery with the goal of returning claimant to work as a 
 
            laborer.  He did not think her bulging disc at the L4-5 
 
            level was important, but felt that most of her problems 
 
            stemmed from the degenerative changes at the L5-S1 level.  
 
            Specifically, he stated that:
 
            
 
                 I believe very strongly that her problems are the 
 
                 antecedent degenerative changes at L5-S1.  She has 
 
                 had a previous discectomy approximately 15 years 
 
                 ago.  She has had two or three episodes of back 
 
                 pain in the intervening time that fit with this.  
 
                 I believe this is the source of her back problems.  
 
                 I suppose there's some way to think that she 
 
                 aggravated it very slightly with her recent work 
 
                 related injury, but I don't think it's really 
 
                 significant.
 
            
 
            (Cl. Ex. 20, p. 32)
 
            
 
                 Dr. McGuire goes on to opine that claimant displayed a 
 
            1 percent permanent partial [impairment] based on subjective 
 
            pain and a slight decrease of range of motion of her lumbar 
 
            spine.  He believed that she had reached maximum medical 
 
            improvement on April 15, 1991 (Cl. Ex. 20, p. 33).
 
            
 
                 It should be noted that in September of 1991, claimant 
 
            developed symptoms of depression and was treated by her 
 
            family physician, J.K. Coddington, M.D.  Initially, his 
 
            notes indicated that she was "[f]eeling depressed about 
 
            losing job with Libby-Owens [sic].  Faces back surgery."  
 
            Dr. Coddington prescribed Xanax. (Cl. Exs. 32-33)
 
            
 

 
            
 
            Page   5
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 Claimant continued to see Dr. Coddington from October 
 
            1991 through March 1992.  His notes reflect claimant's 
 
            complaints of back pain and frustration with the workers' 
 
            compensation laws (Cl. Exs. 32 and 33).
 
            
 
                 Claimant returned to Dr. McGuire in May of 1992 with 
 
            complaints of continued back pain.  She reported to Dr. 
 
            McGuire that she was unable to attend church and unable to 
 
            perform various duties around the house.  At this 
 
            appointment, Dr. McGuire was provided with a video tape of 
 
            claimant's activities during a two day span.  The video 
 
            tape, defendants' exhibit D, shows claimant picking up, 
 
            playing with and carrying a toddler.  The video tape shows 
 
            that claimant is able to bend from the waist and is able to 
 
            run.  After reviewing the tape, Dr. McGuire characterized 
 
            claimant's information about her condition as a "blatant 
 
            misrepresentation." (Cl. Ex. 20, p. 34).  David W. Beck, 
 
            M.D., stated that the video tape was an improper tool to 
 
            show the amount of pain claimant felt.  The undersigned 
 
            reviewed the tape of claimant's activities.  While she 
 
            agrees with Dr. Beck's assertion that a video tape would not 
 
            be able to show or measure the amount of pain claimant 
 
            endured due to these activities, she is unable to detect any 
 
            substantial, or even insubstantial limitation of claimant's 
 
            activities while playing with her grandchild.
 
            
 
                 Dr. McGuire's physical examination showed that claimant 
 
            was neurologically intact and was able to perform limited 
 
            forward flexion.  He was unable to detect any swelling, 
 
            warmth or erythema in the spine.  No muscle spasms were 
 
            present.  He did not believe that surgery was necessary, 
 
            especially in light of claimant's activities shown on the 
 
            video tape.  Additionally, he felt that claimant could 
 
            perform some job duties, particularly a job as a greeter at 
 
            K-Mart.  He had nothing further to offer claimant (Cl. Ex. 
 
            20, pp. 34-35; Cl. Ex. 22, pp. 37-38).
 
            
 
                 In June of 1992, claimant without any authorization 
 
            from the defendants, sought treatment from Dr. Beck, a 
 
            neurological surgeon in Mason City, Iowa.  Although 
 
            initially seen for an independent medical examination, after 
 
            reviewing the CT scan of January 1991, Dr. Beck recommended 
 
            a discectomy but later changed his mind and recommended a 
 
            lumbar fusion from L5 to S1.  Apparently, the surgery was 
 
            recommended due to degenerative disc disease at the L5-S1 
 
            level (Cl. Exs. 34, 35, 36 and 37).
 
            
 
                 Claimant underwent surgery on July 31, 1992.  She 
 
            underwent an L5-S1 fusion using a bone graft from her hip.  
 
            Dr. Beck's final diagnosis was that of degenerative disc 
 
            disease (Cl. Exs. 38 and 39).
 
            
 
                 In August of 1992, Dr. Beck formed the following 
 
            opinion:
 
            
 
                    Leona Ames had a degenerative disc at L5-S1.  
 
                 This is degenerated because she had an L5-S1 
 
                 discectomy 16 years prior to this.  I cannot 
 
                 relate the surgery that we performed recently, 
 
                 that being a lumbar fusion, to a work injury of 
 

 
            
 
            Page   6
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 October 20, 1990.  It may have exacerbated the 
 
                 pre-existing degenerative disc, however.  As far 
 
                 as healing, I am unable to determine when Ms. Ames 
 
                 will be able to return to work or whether she will 
 
                 be.  Recuperation from a lumbar fusion is six 
 
                 months.
 
            
 
            (Cl. Ex. 40)
 
            
 
                 Later, Dr. Beck restated his opinion:  "Again I cannot 
 
            state with a degree of medical certainty whether the work 
 
            injury two years ago aggravated Leona Ames degenerative disc 
 
            to the point that it required surgery two years later." (Cl. 
 
            Ex. 42)
 
            
 
                 The undersigned has also reviewed more than 75 pages of 
 
            vocational rehabilitation reports (Cl. Exs. 43-67).  The 
 
            reports focus on the medical treatment received by claimant 
 
            and various job opportunities and employment strategies 
 
            provided to claimant by Carol Echtenkamp, R.N., a medical 
 
            services consultant and Susan White, M.S., a vocational 
 
            consultant, both employed by Crawford & Company Health and 
 
            Rehabilitation Services.  These reports confirm that the 
 
            defendants provided claimant with suitable and appropriate 
 
            potential job opportunities in an effort to return her to 
 
            work.  Although it appears that claimant, for the most part, 
 
            cooperated with the efforts of the consultants, she did 
 
            display a lack of motivation to seriously pursue any work.  
 
            Specifically, she presented herself in a negative way to any 
 
            perspective employers by stating that she would be unable to 
 
            perform the job duties due to her back condition.
 
            
 
                 The parties were unable to stipulate to claimant's 
 
            rate, and were unable to stipulate to her gross weekly 
 
            earnings.  Claimant offered exhibit 69 which reveals 
 
            claimant's weekly earnings for one year prior to the injury 
 
            date.  Some of the weeks shown on claimant's exhibit 69 
 
            confirm that claimant did not work any hours for some weeks 
 
            and fewer than 40 hours per week during other weeks.  
 
            Apparently, claimant contends that her gross weekly earnings 
 
            for the 13 weeks prior to the injury total $5,381.96.  This 
 
            figure, divided by 13, equals $414 as an average gross 
 
            weekly earning rate for claimant.  If this is correct, her 
 
            workers' compensation rate based on her marital status and 
 
            the number of exemptions (married with two exemptions) 
 
            equals $260.55.  Defendants argue that claimant failed to 
 
            prove that the short weeks included in the 13 consecutive 
 
            weeks prior to her injury were based on illness or reasons 
 
            personal to the employee, or due to plant layoffs.  They 
 
            argue that claimant's workers' compensation rate, excluding 
 
            the weeks of September 3, 1990; July 4, 1990; and, May 30, 
 
            1990, should be based on a gross weekly rate of $349.35, and 
 
            argue that claimant's workers' compensation rate is $223.62 
 
            per week.  To support their argument, defendants rely on Ed 
 
            Myer's testimony indicating that a lack of orders at the 
 
            company would require work weeks of less than 40 hours per 
 
            week.
 
            
 
                         ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
 
            
 

 
            
 
            Page   7
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 The first issue to be addressed is whether there is a 
 
            causal relationship between claimant's injury of October 2, 
 
            1990 and her disability.
 
            
 
                 An employee is entitled to compensation for any and all 
 
            personal injuries which arise out of and in the course of 
 
            the employment.  Section 85.3(1).
 
            
 
                 The claimant has the burden of proving by a 
 
            preponderance of the evidence that the injury of October 2, 
 
            1990, is causally related to the disability on which she now 
 
            bases her claim.  Bodish v. Fischer, Inc., 257 Iowa 516, 133 
 
            N.W.2d 867 (1965).  Lindahl v. L. O. Boggs, 236 Iowa 296, 18 
 
            N.W.2d 607 (1945).  A possibility is insufficient; a 
 
            probability is necessary.  Burt v. John Deere Waterloo 
 
            Tractor Works, 247 Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732 (1955).  The 
 
            question of causal connection is essentially within the 
 
            domain of expert testimony.  Bradshaw v. Iowa Methodist 
 
            Hospital, 251 Iowa 375, 101 N.W.2d 167 (1960). 
 
            
 
                 However, expert medical evidence must be considered 
 
            with all other evidence introduced bearing on the causal 
 
            connection.  Burt, 247 Iowa 691, 73 N.W.2d 732.  The opinion 
 
            of experts need not be couched in definite, positive or 
 
            unequivocal language.  Sondag v. Ferris Hardware, 220 N.W.2d 
 
            903 (Iowa 1974).  However, the expert opinion may be 
 
            accepted or rejected, in whole or in part, by the trier of 
 
            fact.  Id. at 907.  Further, the weight to be given to such 
 
            an opinion is for the finder of fact, and that may be 
 
            affected by the completeness of the premise given the expert 
 
            and other surrounding circumstances.  Bodish, 257 Iowa 516, 
 
            133 N.W.2d 867.  See also Musselman v. Central Telephone 
 
            Co., 261 Iowa 352, 154 N.W.2d 128 (1967).
 
            
 
                 Furthermore, if the available expert testimony is 
 
            insufficient alone to support a finding of causal 
 
            connection, such testimony may be coupled with nonexpert 
 
            testimony to show causation and be sufficient to sustain an 
 
            award.  Giere v. Aase Haugen Homes, Inc., 259 Iowa 1065, 146 
 
            N.W.2d 911, 915 (1966).  Such evidence does not, however, 
 
            compel an award as a matter of law.  Anderson v. Oscar Mayer 
 
            & Co., 217 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Iowa 1974).  To establish 
 
            compensability, the injury need only be a significant 
 
            factor, not be the only factor causing the claimed 
 
            disability.  Blacksmith v. All-Amnerican, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 
 
            348, 354 (Iowa 1980).
 
            
 
                 Dr. McGuire, the authorized treating physician, 
 
            indicated that claimant had a 1 percent permanent partial 
 
            disability due to her subjective complaints of pain and a 
 
            slight decrease in range of motion of her lower back.  He 
 
            placed no permanent work or activity restrictions on her and 
 
            was of the opinion that she has back pain as a result of 
 
            degenerative changes at the facet joints due to surgical 
 
            intervention 15 years ago.  He specifically stated that 
 
            although her work activities may have slightly aggravated 
 
            her condition, these work activities were not a substantial 
 
            factor in bringing about claimant's disability.
 
            
 
                 Likewise, Dr. Beck was unable to form an opinion that 
 

 
            
 
            Page   8
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            claimant's work activities were the cause of her need for 
 
            the fusion he performed in July of 1992.
 
            
 
                 Claimant has failed to prove by a preponderance of the 
 
            evidence that the work-related injury caused her permanent 
 
            disability.   Claimant was off of work from October 2, 1990 
 
            until April 15, 1991, when she reached maximum medical 
 
            improvement according to Dr. McGuire.  Claimant is entitled 
 
            to temporary total disability benefits for this time period.
 
            
 
                 The next issue to be addressed is whether claimant is 
 
            entitled to medical benefits.
 
            
 
                 The employer shall furnish reasonable surgical, 
 
            medical, dental, osteopathic, chiropractic, podiatric, 
 
            physical rehabilitation, nursing, ambulance and hospital 
 
            services and supplies for all conditions compensable under 
 
            the workers' compensation law.  The employer shall also 
 
            allow reasonable and necessary transportation expenses 
 
            incurred for those services.  The employer has the right to 
 
            choose the provider of care, except where the employer has 
 
            denied liability for the injury.  Section 85.27.  Holbert v. 
 
            Townsend Engineering Co., Thirty-second Biennial Report of 
 
            the Industrial Commissioner 78 (Review-reopen 1975).
 
            
 
                 Claimant is entitled to medical benefits she received 
 
            from Dr. McGuire.  All other medical care is not only 
 
            unauthorized, but also not causally related to the temporary 
 
            exacerbation of her back due to the work injury.
 
            
 
                 Based on the evidence received on the state of the 
 
            record, it is impossible to award claimant medical benefits 
 
            in this case.  Dr. Beck was unable to form the requisite 
 
            opinion that the injury necessitated surgery.  Dr. McGuire 
 
            opposed surgery, and was of the opinion that the work 
 
            incident slightly aggravated her condition.
 
            
 
                 Dr. Coddington's treatment is rejected as being related 
 
            to claimant's work injury.  Stressors other than the work 
 
            injury contributed to claimant's depression.  Claimant was 
 
            off of work from October 2, 1990 until April 15, 1991, when 
 
            she reached maximum medical improvement according to Dr. 
 
            McGuire.  Claimant is entitled to temporary total disability  
 
            benefits for this time period.
 
            
 
                 The final issue to be addressed is claimant's workers' 
 
            compensation rate.
 
            
 
                 Iowa Code section 85.36 provides:
 
               The basis of compensation shall be the weekly earnings of 
 
            the injured employee at the time of the injury.  Weekly 
 
            earnings means gross salary, wages, or earnings of an 
 
            employee to which such employee would have been entitled had 
 
            the employee worked the customary hours for the full pay 
 
            period in which the employee was injured, as regularly 
 
            required by the employee's employer for the work or 
 
            employment for which the employee was employed, computed or 
 
            determined as follows and then rounded to the nearest 
 
            dollar:
 
               ....
 

 
            
 
            Page   9
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
               6.  In the case of an employee who is paid on a daily, or 
 
            hourly basis, or by the output of the employee, the weekly 
 
            earnings shall be computed by dividing by thirteen the 
 
            earnings, not including overtime or premium pay, of said 
 
            employee earned in the employ of the employer in the last 
 
            completed period of thirteen consecutive calendar weeks 
 
            immediately preceding the injury.
 
            Claimant retains the burden of proving what her workers' 
 
            compensation rate is, and argues that any week which does 
 
            not reflect 40 hours or more worked should be excluded.
 
            Although in broad theory this may be a valid argument, the 
 
            undersigned is unable to ascertain why some of the weeks 
 
            reflect a work period of less than 40 hours.  Claimant's 
 
            testimony provides no guidance to explain the short weeks; 
 
            defendants supplied testimony that at various times the 
 
            plant ceased operation due to lack of work orders.
 
            As a result, the undersigned finds defendants' calculations 
 
            reflect claimant's rate, $223.62.
 
            
 
                                      ORDER
 
            
 
                 THEREFORE, it is ordered:
 
            
 
                 That defendants pay claimant temporary total disability 
 
            benefits from October 2, 1990 through April 15, 1991, at the 
 
            rate of two hundred twenty-three and 62/100 dollars 
 
            ($223.62).
 
            That defendants shall pay accrued weekly benefits in a lump 
 
            sum.
 
            That defendants shall pay interest on benefits awarded 
 
            herein as set forth in Iowa Code section 85.30.
 
            That defendants shall pay the costs of this action, pursuant 
 
            to rule 343 IAC 4.33.
 
            That defendants shall file an activity report upon payment 
 
            of this award as required by this agency, pursuant to rule 
 
            343 IAC 3.1.
 
            
 
                 Signed and filed this ____ day of November, 1992.
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                                          
 
                                        ________________________________
 
                                          PATRICIA J. LANTZ
 
                                          DEPUTY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            
 
            Copies To:
 
            
 
            Mr Max Schott
 
            Mr Robert Pratt
 
            Attorneys at Law
 
            6959 University Ave
 
            Des Moines IA 50311-1540
 
            
 
            Ms Judith Ann Higgs
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            701 Pierce St  Ste 200
 
            P O Box 3086
 
            Sioux City IA 51102
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                             5-1800
 
                                             Filed November 13, 1992
 
                                             Patricia J. Lantz
 
            
 
                     BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                                          :
 
            LEONA AMES,                   :
 
                                          :
 
                 Claimant,                :
 
                                          :
 
            vs.                           :
 
                                          :      File No. 963896
 
            LIBBEY-OWENS FORD COMPANY,    :
 
                                          :     A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                 Employer,                :
 
                                          :       D E C I S I O N
 
            and                           :
 
                                          :
 
            KEMPER INSURANCE,             :
 
                                          :
 
                 Insurance Carrier,       :
 
                 Defendants.              :
 
            ___________________________________________________________
 
            
 
            5-1800
 
            Claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
 
            that her injury resulted in a permanent disability.
 
            
 
 
            
 
       
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                     BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                                          :
 
            WAYNE BOLAND,                 :
 
                                          :
 
                 Claimant,                :
 
                                          :
 
            vs.                           :
 
                                          :       File No. 964044
 
            SHIVVERS, INC.,               :
 
                                          :     A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                 Employer,                :
 
                                          :       D E C I S I O N
 
            and                           :
 
                                          :
 
            CONTINENTAL WESTERN           :
 
            INSURANCE,                    :
 
                                          :
 
                 Insurance Carrier,       :
 
                 Defendants.              :
 
            ___________________________________________________________
 
            
 
                              STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
            
 
                 This is a proceeding in arbitration brought by 
 
            claimant, Wayne Boland, against his former employer, 
 
            Shivvers Enterprises, and its insurance carrier, Continental 
 
            Western Insurance Company.  
 
            
 
                 The record in this case consists of testimony from the 
 
            claimant, Clark Williams, a rehabilitation consultant, Lori 
 
            Boland, claimant's sister, and, Brenda Sergeant, claimant's 
 
            significant other; claimant's exhibits A-Q; and, defendants' 
 
            exhibits 1-5.  The matter came on for hearing before the 
 
            undersigned deputy industrial commissioner on August 10, 
 
            1993 at Des Moines, Iowa. 
 
            
 
                                      ISSUES
 
            
 
                 The parties have submitted the following issues for 
 
            resolution:
 
            
 
                 1.  Whether claimant has sustained a permanent 
 
            disability due to an injury on September 24, 1990 which 
 
            arose out of and in the course of his employment;
 
            
 
                 2.  Whether claimant is entitled to permanent partial 
 
            disability benefits, and further, whether claimant has 
 
            sustained an injury to a scheduled member or to the body as 
 
            a whole; 
 
            
 
                 3.  Whether claimant is entitled to medical benefits 
 
            provided by Dr. Friedgood totaling $175.00; and, 
 
            
 
                 4.  Whether these medical expenses were causally 
 
            connected to the work injury and, whether the expenses were 
 
            authorized. 
 
            
 
                                 FINDINGS OF FACT
 

 
            
 
            Page   2
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 The undersigned deputy, having reviewed all of the 
 
            evidence received, finds the following facts:
 
            
 
                 Claimant, Wayne Boland, was born on October 26, 1955.  
 
            At the time of the hearing, he was 37 years old.  Currently, 
 
            claimant lives in Cincinnati, Iowa. 
 
            
 
                 Claimant dropped out of school in the tenth grade.  He 
 
            has not obtained his General Equivalency Diploma, nor has he 
 
            received any additional education.  He is single with an 
 
            eight year old son.  
 
            
 
                 Mr. Boland has been a farm laborer and truck driver 
 
            most of his adult life (Claimant'S Exhibit N).  His truck 
 
            driving experience includes both long and short term hauls.    
 
            
 
                 Claimant began working for Shivvers Farms on a 
 
            part-time basis.  On September 24, 1990, he sustained 
 
            serious injuries when a large jack used to lift farm 
 
            machinery hit him on the right side of the head.  Claimant 
 
            sustained a right zygoma fracture and a blow out fracture of 
 
            the right orbital floor.  Medical treatment consisted of 
 
            removing a bone chip from the cheek and placing a steel 
 
            plate in the right cheek, along with surgical repair of the 
 
            right eye.  Mr. Boland required a stronger prescription in 
 
            his eyeglasses after the accident, although his physician, 
 
            Bradley Hammer, M.D., was not of the same opinion (Cl. Ex. 
 
            F).  Since the accident, he has noted headaches, sinus 
 
            problems, ringing in the right ear, ear aches, and extreme 
 
            sensitivity to the right side of his mouth.
 
            
 
                 Additionally, claimant sustained four "insulted or 
 
            dislodged" teeth due to the accident.  James Snyder, D.D.S., 
 
            believed that claimant would experience hypersensitivity, 
 
            sporadic pain and discomfort in the right side of his face 
 
            due to nerve damage caused by the accident (Cl. Ex. I).
 
            
 
                 Claimant also began to suffer temporal headaches, which 
 
            were treated with medications.  His physician, Thomas 
 
            Paulson, M.D., suggested continued medical therapy, a nerve 
 
            block or a pain center.  Dr. Paulson was of the opinion that 
 
            claimant had sustained a "disability level of approximately 
 
            5%."  This percentage was estimated based on other 
 
            "analogous head and neck symptoms that are subjective and 
 
            difficult to accurately measure.  This includes symptoms 
 
            such as tinnitus."  He recommended consultation with David 
 
            Friedgood, M.D., a neurologist who "has much more extensive 
 
            dealings with Workman's (sic) Comp (sic) cases."  (Cl. Ex. 
 
            E).
 
            
 
                 Steven Adelman, M.D., a neurologist examined claimant 
 
            in June of 1992.  While he diagnosed persistent paresthesias 
 
            along the right maxillary division of the trigeminal nerve, 
 
            as well as continual right facial and hemicranial pain, he 
 
            was not necessarily convinced that this condition explained 
 
            the chronic pain reported by claimant.  He recommended 
 
            additional medications (Cl. Ex. H).
 
            
 
                 In June of 1993, Dr. Friedgood and J. Dan Smeltzer, 
 

 
            
 
            Page   3
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            M.A., performed a "Pain Disability Screening Evaluation."  
 
            The results of the evaluation reveal that claimant "says 
 
            there aren't many things he cannot do now that he could do 
 
            before the injury.  The primary difficulty he describes 
 
            relates to endurance."  A neurologic evaluation yielded 
 
            normal results, although Dr. Friedgood stated that claimant 
 
            had post traumatic right facial pain, a condition which was 
 
            permanent (Cl. Ex. K).
 
            
 
                 Also in June of 1993, claimant underwent an evaluation 
 
            by Clark Williams, a rehabilitation consultant.  Mr. 
 
            Williams, who also testified at the hearing, commented on 
 
            claimant's high motivation to return to work, questioned 
 
            claimant's ability to bend over on a continual basis, 
 
            proposed that claimant had increased difficulties in reading 
 
            due to the eye injury, and believed claimant was limited in 
 
            the types of employment he could obtain and perform on a 
 
            consistent level.  He noted claimant's transferable skills 
 
            in mechanics, retail sales, farming, construction, 
 
            management and animal care and management.  Mr. Williams 
 
            also recommended retraining and completion of courses to 
 
            obtain a GED (Cl. Ex. L).  
 
            
 
                 Since the accident, claimant has worked as a truck 
 
            driver, pulling anhydrous and fertilizer carts to and from 
 
            fields.  Claimant was able to take breaks throughout long 
 
            working days, but felt the job required too much sitting and 
 
            was stressful.  He has also performed farm labor jobs, such 
 
            as putting up hay, and currently works as an over-the-road 
 
            truck driver for Mahaska Farm Service, where he earns $5.50 
 
            per hour, and is paid by the mile.  Claimant stated he was 
 
            unable to drive much because he "cannot stay with it as long 
 
            as he used to."  The record reflects that during a five  
 
            week period, from May 24, 1993 through June 21, 1993, 
 
            claimant worked 293.5 hours, or an average of 58.7 hours per 
 
            week.  
 
            
 
                 Currently, claimant experiences numbness from his right 
 
            eye to the side of his face, upper lip and teeth.  He finds 
 
            it difficult to eat, and combats drooling which causes him a 
 
            certain amount of embarrassment.  It is difficult for him to 
 
            sleep on his right side and he encounters sleep disturbances 
 
            on a regular basis.  He feels increased fatigue, which 
 
            affects his ability to work.
 
            
 
                 Claimant also stated that his vision was affected, as 
 
            he has blurred vision on the right side.  He does not chew 
 
            food on the right side of his mouth due to difficulties with 
 
            his teeth, and claimant mentioned that he sometimes feels 
 
            dizzy and "blacks  out," although this particular complaint 
 
            is not mentioned in the medical records and reports. 
 
            
 
                 Claimant also stated that he has soreness in his right 
 
            ear, and feels as though there is fluid in his ear.  He has 
 
            also noticed a loss of hearing in the ear, but this has not 
 
            been tested.  
 
            
 
                 Lori Boland, claimant's sister also testified at the 
 
            hearing.  She is certified respiratory therapist and works 
 
            at St. Joseph Mercy Hospital in Centerville, Iowa.  She 
 

 
            
 
            Page   4
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            stated that she had observed claimant's symptoms, including 
 
            headaches, numbness on the right side of his face, 
 
            dizziness, problems with his right eye and increased 
 
            fatigue.  As most of these symptoms are subjective in 
 
            nature, it would be difficult for anyone to actually observe 
 
            them.
 
            
 
                 Brenda Sergeant has lived with claimant since before 
 
            the injury in September of 1990.  She has noticed changes in 
 
            claimant's sleeping habits, increased irritability and 
 
            claimant's need to lie down with the onset of a headache.  
 
            On occasion, Ms. Sergeant has ridden with claimant on long 
 
            haul drives.  She reported that he needed to take breaks to 
 
            rest if he had a headache. 
 
            
 
                         ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
 
            
 
                 The first issue to address is whether claimant has 
 
            sustained a permanent injury.
 
            
 
                 There is no question that claimant sustained very 
 
            serious injuries in the work accident which occurred in 
 
            September of 1990.  He has had a long recuperation period, 
 
            and has had to visit a number of physicians in order to 
 
            treat his injuries. 
 
            
 
                 He has a permanent steel plate in his cheek, and the 
 
            undersigned certainly agrees that this is a permanent 
 
            condition.
 
            
 
                 As a result, it is found that claimant has sustained a 
 
            permanent impairment due to the work-related injuries. 
 
            
 
                 The next issue to address is whether claimant has 
 
            sustained a scheduled member injury, in which case he will 
 
            be compensated under the schedules designated under Iowa 
 
            Code section 85.34, or if he has sustained an injury to the 
 
            body as a whole, in which case he is compensated based on 
 
            how the injuries has impacted his earning capacity.  
 
            
 
                 If a claimant contends he has industrial disability he 
 
            has the burden of proving his injury results in an ailment 
 
            extending beyond the scheduled loss.  Kellogg v. Shute and 
 
            Lewis Coal Co., 256 Iowa 1257, 130 N.W.2d 667 (1964).
 
            
 
                 The case presents injuries to the face, including the 
 
            cheek, eye, and teeth.  None of these body parts are noted 
 
            on schedule, so it is determined that claimant has sustained 
 
            an injury to the body as a whole; therefore, an analysis of 
 
            his industrial disability is warranted. 
 
            
 
                 Functional impairment is an element to be considered in 
 
            determining industrial disability which is the reduction of 
 
            earning capacity, but consideration must also be given to 
 
            the injured employee's age, education, qualifications, expe
 
            rience and inability to engage in employment for which he is 
 
            fitted.  Olson v. Goodyear Service Stores, 255 Iowa 1112, 
 
            125 N.W.2d 251 (1963).  Barton v. Nevada Poultry, 253 Iowa 
 
            285, 110 N.W.2d 660 (1961).
 
            
 

 
            
 
            Page   5
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 A finding of impairment to the body as a whole found by 
 
            a medical evaluator does not equate to industrial disabil
 
            ity.  This is so as impairment and disability are not syn
 
            onymous.  Degree of industrial disability can in fact be 
 
            much different than the degree of impairment because in the 
 
            first instance reference is to loss of earning capacity and 
 
            in the latter to anatomical or functional abnormality or 
 
            loss.  Although loss of function is to be considered and 
 
            disability can rarely be found without it, it is not so that 
 
            a degree of industrial disability is proportionally related 
 
            to a degree of impairment of bodily function.
 
            
 
                 Factors to be considered in determining industrial dis
 
            ability include the employee's medical condition prior to 
 
            the injury, immediately after the injury, and presently; the 
 
            situs of the injury, its severity and the length of healing 
 
            period; the work experience of the employee prior to the 
 
            injury, after the injury and potential for rehabilitation; 
 
            the employee's qualifications intellectually, emotionally 
 
            and physically; earnings prior and subsequent to the injury; 
 
            age; education; motivation; functional impairment as a 
 
            result of the injury; and inability because of the injury to 
 
            engage in employment for which the employee is fitted.  Loss 
 
            of earnings caused by a job transfer for reasons related to 
 
            the injury is also relevant.  These are matters which the 
 
            finder of fact considers collectively in arriving at the 
 
            determination of the degree of industrial disability.
 
            
 
                 There are no weighting guidelines that indicate how 
 
            each of the factors are to be considered.  There are no 
 
            guidelines which give, for example, age a weighted value of 
 
            ten percent of the total value, education a value of fifteen 
 
            percent of total, motivation - five percent; work experience 
 
            - thirty percent, etc.  Neither does a rating of functional 
 
            impairment directly correlate to a degree of industrial 
 
            disability to the body as a whole.  In other words, there 
 
            are no formulae which can be applied and then added up to 
 
            determine the degree of industrial disability.  It therefore 
 
            becomes necessary for the deputy or commissioner to draw 
 
            upon prior experience, general and specialized knowledge to 
 
            make the finding with regard to degree of industrial dis
 
            ability.  See Peterson v. Truck Haven Cafe, Inc., (Appeal 
 
            Decision, February 28, 1985); Christensen v. Hagen, Inc., 
 
            (Appeal Decision, March 26, l985).
 
            
 
                 While claimant has sustained serious injuries, the 
 
            impact his physical condition has had on his ability to earn 
 
            a living has been impacted minimally.  Migraine headaches 
 
            and increased fatigue have been claimant's primary 
 
            complaints in the past few months, and he has stated that he 
 
            has a decreased ability to work as many hours as he had 
 
            prior to the accident.  This is not substantiated by the 
 
            evidence, which shows that claimant's employment has always 
 
            been somewhat erratic.
 
            
 
                 Claimant's actual earnings for the past three years are 
 
            as follows:  1992 - $11,964.00; 1991- $6,823.00; and, 1990 - 
 
            $5,470.83.
 
            
 
                 The defendant employer did not offer claimant any type 
 

 
            
 
            Page   6
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            of a position after claimant was injured.  The agency has 
 
            held many times that a defendant employer's refusal to 
 
            employ a claimant after he or she suffers a work injury may 
 
            justify an award of disability.  McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal 
 
            Co., 288 N.W.2d 181 (Iowa 1980).
 
            
 
                 After considering all of the factors used in 
 
            determining the impact injuries have on a worker's ability, 
 
            or inability to obtain and maintain suitable employment, it 
 
            is found that claimant has sustained a five percent 
 
            industrial disability. 
 
            
 
                 The next issue to be addressed is whether claimant is 
 
            entitled to payment of medical treatment rendered by Dr. 
 
            Friedgood. 
 
            
 
                 Claimant was referred by Dr. Paulson to Dr. Friedgood 
 
            for further evaluation.  At some point, Dr. Paulson was an 
 
            authorized treating physician.  The agency has consistently 
 
            held that a referral from an authorized treating physician 
 
            will be treated as authorized care.  
 
            
 
                 Additionally, defendants have contested the causal 
 
            relationship between the treatment rendered by Dr. 
 
            Friedgood.  The records from his office indicated that the 
 
            only thing he treated claimant for was to evaluate 
 
            claimant's physical condition due to the injuries he 
 
            sustained in the work incident.  
 
            
 
                                      ORDER
 
            
 
                 THEREFORE, it is ordered:
 
            
 
                 That defendants shall pay claimant permanent partial 
 
            disability benefits for 25 weeks at the rate of $156.66 per 
 
            week commencing October 30, 1990.
 
            
 
                 That defendants shall pay Dr. Friedgood's bill totaling 
 
            $175.00.
 
            
 
                 That defendants shall pay accrued benefits in a lump 
 
            sum, and shall receive credit against the award for benefits 
 
            previously paid.
 
            
 
                 That defendants shall pay interest on the award as set 
 
            forth in Iowa Code section 85.30.
 
            
 
                 That the parties did not submit payment of the costs as 
 
            an issue to be determined.
 
            
 
                 Signed and filed this ____ day of September, 1993.
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                                          
 
                                       ________________________________
 
                                          PATRICIA J. LANTZ
 
                                          DEPUTY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            
 

 
            
 
            Page   7
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            Copies To:
 
            
 
            Mr Daniel P Wilson
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            303 W State St
 
            P O Box 367
 
            Centerville IA 52544
 
            
 
            Mr Jeffrey M Margolin
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            Terrace Ctr  Ste 111
 
            2700 Grand Ave
 
            Des Moines IA 50312
 
            
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
              
 
                                         
 
                                              5-1803
 
                                              Filed September 23, 1993
 
                                              Patricia J. Lantz
 
            
 
                     BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                                          :
 
            WAYNE BOLAND,                 :
 
                                          :
 
                 Claimant,                :
 
                                          :
 
            vs.                           :
 
                                          :       File No. 964044
 
            SHIVVERS, INC.,               :
 
                                          :     A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                 Employer,                :
 
                                          :       D E C I S I O N
 
            and                           :
 
                                          :
 
            CONTINENTAL WESTERN           :
 
            INSURANCE,                    :
 
                                          :
 
                 Insurance Carrier,       :
 
                 Defendants.              :
 
            ___________________________________________________________
 
            
 
            5-1803
 
            Claimant suffered serious injuries to his jaw and eye when a 
 
            tire jack hit him in the head.
 
            
 
            Claimant recovered from the injuries, and was able to secure 
 
            suitable employment.
 
            
 
            The defendant employer did not re-employ claimant, and he 
 
            was awarded 5% industrial disability.
 
            
 
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                     BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
            DAN J. ROBBENNOLT,    
 
                        
 
                 Claimant,                           File No. 964311
 
                        
 
            vs.                                       A P P E A L
 
                        
 
            SNAP-ON TOOLS CORPORATION,              D E C I S I O N
 
                        
 
                 Employer,   
 
                 Self-Insured,    
 
                 Defendant.       
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
            
 
            The record, including the transcript of the hearing before 
 
            the deputy and all exhibits admitted into the record, has 
 
            been reviewed de novo on appeal.
 
            
 
                                    ISSUES
 
            
 
            Defendant states the following issues on appeal:
 
            Did the deputy err by limiting the award of healing period 
 
            compensation to full days and by otherwise not ordering 
 
            compensation for lost time to be examined by health care 
 
            providers?
 
            
 
            Did the deputy err by neglecting to determine whether there 
 
            was permanent disability to the right arm?
 
            Did the deputy err by limiting the functional disability 
 
            award to a converted medical rating based on the loss of a 
 
            finger?
 
            
 
            Did the deputy err by failing to find that a 
 
            mental/emotional condition constituted a whole body 
 
            injury/disability?
 
            
 
            Did the deputy err by incorrectly determining the due and 
 
            credit dates for weekly compensation and by forgiving the 
 
            payment of interest?
 
            
 
            Did the deputy err by failing to award section 86.13 
 
            sanctions?
 
            
 
            Did the deputy err in her costs assessment?
 

 
            
 
            Page   2
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                             FINDINGS OF FACT
 
            
 
            The findings of fact contained in the proposed agency 
 
            decision filed January 18, 1994 are adopted as set forth 
 
            below.  Segments designated by asterisks (*****) indicate 
 
            portions of the language from the proposed agency decision 
 
            that have been intentionally deleted and do not form a part 
 
            of this final agency decision.  Segments designated by 
 
            brackets ([ ]) indicate language that is in addition to the 
 
            language of the proposed agency decision.
 
            
 
                 Forty-year-old claimant who graduated from high school 
 
            continues to work for defendant-employer albeit now in the 
 
            paint department and not as a brake press operator, the job 
 
            which he held when injured on August 17, 1990.  Claimant 
 
            currently earns $12.54 per hour; he earned $11.25 per hour 
 
            when injured.  Claimant's current wage reflects 15 cents per 
 
            hour shift bonus.  
 
            
 
                 On August 17, 1990, claimant sustained a one and 
 
            one-half inch deep tendon laceration of his right third 
 
            finger on the dorsal aspect and across the proximal 
 
            interphalangeal joint.  Dilipk Paukh, M.D., sutured the 
 
            wound.  Claimant was advised to remain off work on April 18, 
 
            1990 and April 19, 1990.  A 35 degree extensor lag of the 
 
            PIP joint remained.  M.W. Crane, M.D., prescribed splinting 
 
            of the finger in late August 1990.  Claimant's problems did 
 
            not resolve.  On October 3, 1990, Dr. Crane performed an 
 
            extensor tendon reefing and pinning.  Again, claimant's 
 
            problems with the finger did not resolve.  On January 11, 
 
            1991, Dr. Crane performed open reconstruction of the 
 
            boutonniere deformity of the right third finger as well as 
 
            curettage of bone lesions within the finger.  Dr. Crane 
 
            released claimant to return to work as of February 25, 1991.  
 
            Claimant was then restricted to 5 pounds lifting with his 
 
            right hand taped.  Claimant went off work as of March 6, 
 
            1991 as a result of continued swelling and loss of extension 
 
            in the finger.  On March 11, 1991, Dr. Crane performed a 
 
            fusion of the PIP joint of the injured finger.  On April 25, 
 
            1991, claimant was released to return to left-handed work on 
 
            Monday of the following week.  On June 13, 1991, Dr. Crane 
 
            noted that claimant's finger was "going to nonunion", a 
 
            finding confirmed on radiographic studies.  Dr. Crane then 
 
            referred claimant to Douglas S. Reagan, M.D., an orthopedic 
 
            surgeon.  
 
            
 
                 On July 3, 1991, Dr. Reagan performed a refusion of PIP 
 
            joint with bone graft from the wrist and internal fixation 
 
            of the right third finger.  The refusion was also 
 
            unsuccessful and on August 14, 1991, Dr. Reagan performed 
 
            amputation of the right third finger at or just below the 
 
            condyle of the proximal phalanx.  On September 23, 1991, Dr. 
 
            Reagan opined that claimant had a 94 percent permanent 
 
            partial impairment of the right third finger.  
 
            
 
                 On January 8, 1992, claimant saw Dr. Crane with 
 
            complaints of pain in the finger stump and shooting pain 
 
            into the arm from the stump.  
 
            
 
                 On May 13, 1992, claimant saw Thomas DeBartolo, M.D., 
 

 
            
 
            Page   3
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            apparently an orthopedic surgeon who specializes in 
 
            conditions of the hand.  Dr. DeBartolo did not believe that 
 
            claimant was at maximum medical improvement and prescribed 
 
            therapeutic desensitization techniques as regard the right 
 
            hand and finger stump.  Dr. DeBartolo also advised claimant 
 
            that should he have continuing problems with the finger 
 
            stump, a ray resection would be an appropriate surgical 
 
            procedure.  
 
            
 
                 Dr. Reagan reexamined claimant on October 1, 1992 and 
 
            concurred with Dr. DeBartolo that ray resection would be 
 
            appropriate.  On November 18, 1992, Dr. DeBartolo performed 
 
            a ray resection with centralization.  The ray resection was 
 
            performed in the palmar hand by removing the remaining stump 
 
            of the right third finger and bringing together the 
 
            intermetacarpal ligament from the ulnar side of the index 
 
            finger and the radial side of the ring finger.  
 
            
 
                 On December 10, 1992 office visit, Dr. DeBartolo 
 
            characterized claimant as doing extremely well as regards 
 
            his ray resection.  He reported that claimant's finger 
 
            motion was excellent with full flexion and extension and 
 
            some active abduction and adduction.  Dr. DeBartolo referred 
 
            claimant to the Mercy Work and Sports Center for neck and 
 
            upper extremity evaluation as of December 16, 1992.  
 
            Findings at time of evaluation were:  1) decreased right 
 
            hand grip and pinch strengths; 2) inability to perform 3) 
 
            pinch on the right as a result of pain in the extensor of 
 
            the index finger; 3)  bilateral decreased coordination [of 
 
            the hand]; 4) decreased right grip, wrist flexion, pronation 
 
            and supination per BTE measurement and as compared to 
 
            normative data; and 5) decreased ability to lift as a result 
 
            of discomfort of the right arm, right hand, and wrist.  Work 
 
            conditioning to increase strength of the right upper 
 
            extremity and the right hand and to increase claimant's 
 
            functional use of the right hand was recommended.  Claimant 
 
            remained in work hardening through January 27, 1993.  
 
            Throughout his time in work hardening claimant's abilities 
 
            to lift, push and pull with the right hand increased.  Right 
 
            grip and pinch strength also steadily improved.  Although 
 
            these scores still were from 50 to 33 percent less than 
 
            claimant's grip and pinch strength scores on the left.  
 
            Lifting abilities on the left were not measured.  
 
            
 
                 On February 1, 1993, claimant was returned to work for 
 
            four hours a day on three alternate work days.  Claimant 
 
            apparently received temporary partial disability payments 
 
            for that time during which he was partially returned to 
 
            work.  
 
            
 
                 On March 17, 1993, Dr. DeBartolo stated that claimant 
 
            had symptoms from mild carpal tunnel syndrome including a 
 
            positive Tinel's test and a positive median nerve 
 
            compression test.  He opined that claimant had excellent 
 
            flexion and extension in his remaining digits.  On June 9, 
 
            1993, Dr. DeBartolo placed claimant at maximum medical 
 
            improvement.  He also noted that claimant had an area in the 
 
            midpalm where additional nerve had been amputated in the ray 
 

 
            
 
            Page   4
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            resection and that this area was the significant factor in 
 
            lessening claimant's [right hand] grip.  On June 30, 1993, 
 
            Dr. DeBartolo opined that pursuant to the AMA Guides to 
 
            Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Third Edition, claimant 
 
            had 100 percent partial impairment of the right third or 
 
            long finger which translates into a 20 percent permanent 
 
            partial impairment of the right hand as a result of the loss 
 
            of the right third finger.  It is expressly found that 
 
            claimant has a decreased ability to lift with [her right 
 
            hand] ***** as well as decreased grip and pinch strength in 
 
            the right hand.  These factors are sufficient to demonstrate 
 
            that claimant's overall impairment is an impairment to the 
 
            hand and not an impairment to the right third finger only.  
 
            
 
                 Claimant testified that claimant has had psychological 
 
            difficulties relating to his work injury.  Claimant stated 
 
            that claimant, a recovering alcoholic, has had lapses of 
 
            sobriety since the work injury and has been generally more 
 
            "short fused" as a sequela of the on-going problems with his 
 
            finger and hand.  Claimant saw counselor Dana Quick-Naig on 
 
            September 24, 1991; October 1, 1991; February 3, 1992; 
 
            February 10, 1992; and March 4, 1992.  Ms. Quick-Naig's 
 
            impression was that claimant then had unresolved grief as a 
 
            result of the loss of his finger.  Claimant did not schedule 
 
            further appointments with Ms. Quick-Naig.  The record does 
 
            not reflect that claimant sought other counseling or 
 
            treatment on account of any psychological condition.  It is 
 
            expressly found that claimant's emotional concerns and 
 
            reactions as presented in this record were part of the 
 
            normal sequela of recovery from the significant injury.  It 
 
            is further expressly found that these conditions did not 
 
            raise to the level of an independent debilitating 
 
            psychological condition such that claimant's impairment is 
 
            to the body as a whole and not to the hand.  
 
            
 
                 Claimant had a number of days when claimant was 
 
            partially off work for medical treatment of his injury.  
 
            Claimant also has not been compensated for work missed on 
 
            August 18 and August 19, 1990.  Under section 85.32, 
 
            compensation is due for the days of incapacity prior to the 
 
            fourth day when the period of incapacity extends beyond the 
 
            fourteenth day following the date of the injury.  The 
 
            section in no manner indicates that the period of incapacity 
 
            must be a consecutive period of incapacity only that
 
            
 
            
 
            Page   5
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            the period extend beyond the fourteenth day following the 
 
            date of injury.  Claimant then is entitled to compensation 
 
            for August 18, 1990 and August 19, 1990.  Likewise, claimant 
 
            is entitled to compensation for each complete day on which 
 
            claimant was temporarily totality disabled from work, that 
 
            is absent from work on account of the injury.  The law makes 
 
            no provision for payment of workers' compensation benefits 
 
            on a part day basis for days on which claimant is at work 
 
            but leaves work for a portion of the day to seek medical 
 
            care.  Claimant's employer has voluntarily paid such 
 
            compensation to claimant for a number of days.  Claimant's 
 
            employer has no continuing obligation under the workers' 
 
            compensation law relative to such payments.  Indeed, insofar 
 
            as the need to miss work on account of continuing medical 
 
            treatment arises subsequent to the date that claimant has 
 
            reached maximum medical improvement, that need and reduced 
 
            ability to be available for work is arguably compensated 
 
            through an award of permanent partial disability payment.
 
            
 
                 Claimant seeks interest on compensation payments made.  
 
            He argues interest due must be calculated under what he 
 
            characterizes as the United States Rule.  The industrial 
 
            commissioner has previously held that the deputy 
 
            commissioner is not obligated to figure interest for the 
 
            parties in an arbitration proceeding.  The parties are to 
 
            attempt to determine the interest payable themselves and if 
 
            they are not able to do so to file a separate original 
 
            notice and petition relative to that dispute.  Weishaar v. 
 
            Snap-On Tools Corp. 506 N.W.2d 786 (IA Ct. of App. 1993).  
 
            Nevertheless, section 85.30 provides that compensation 
 
            payments shall be made each week during the period for which 
 
            compensation is payable and if not paid when due interest 
 
            shall be added.  Defendants acknowledge that in the normal 
 
            course of business, payments were mailed from their 
 
            adjusting company to their office on the first day of the 
 
            week after the week of temporary total disability for which 
 
            the compensation payment compensated claimant.  Claimant 
 
            then picked up the checks from the employer's place of 
 
            business during the week in which the checks were issued.  
 
            Claimant argues that interest is due from the first day of 
 
            that week and that already accrued interest should be taken 
 
            before principle is considered for each day after the first 
 
            day of the week in which the check was issued in which 
 
            claimant did not have the check in hand.  While medical 
 
            projections may be made to the length of such periods, 
 
            defendants have no actual knowledge that claimant is 
 
            entitled to payments for healing period or temporary total 
 
            disability until claimant has actually been off work for 
 
            that period of disability.  Compensation payments, 
 
            therefore, do not represent an accrued or liquidated amount 
 
            due claimant until the first day of the week immediately 
 
            following the period of temporary total or healing period 
 
            disability.  The section 85.30
 
            
 
            
 
            Page   6
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            interest provision exists to assure that compensation 
 
            payments are timely made to injured workers.  See Teel v. 
 
            McCord, 394 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa 1986).  Where defendants 
 
            initiate payment on the first business day of the week after 
 
            which compensation for temporary total or healing period 
 
            benefits have actually accrued and defendants take 
 
            reasonable steps to assure that claimant shall actually 
 
            receive the compensation payment on a timely basis, the 
 
            purposes of section 85.30 are not thwarted and claimant 
 
            cannot appropriately request addition of interest to the 
 
            timely initiated weekly compensation payment.  Shirley 
 
            Hoveland, human resources specialist with the employer, 
 
            stated that workers' compensation benefits checks for 
 
            temporary total or healing period disability are generated 
 
            from the employer's claim adjusting agent's place of 
 
            business in Michigan.  They are then sent to the employer's 
 
            plant and distributed to the employee either at the plant or 
 
            if the employer prefers by mail.  Compensation checks in 
 
            this case were either picked up by claimant personally or 
 
            mailed to claimant within the week subsequent to the week 
 
            for which the check compensated claimant.  Defendants are 
 
            expressly found to have acted timely in assuring that 
 
            payment of any liquidated compensation due claimant was made 
 
            to claimant on a timely basis.  Defendants' actions in no 
 
            way thwarted the purposes of section 85.30.  Claimant is not 
 
            entitled to interest as to payments received for healing 
 
            period benefits.
 
            
 
                 Under Teel, the supreme court held that disability 
 
            payments become due an employee when the employee's healing 
 
            period is terminated.  Claimant argues that interest is due 
 
            claimant from September 23, 1991, when Dr. Reagan opined 
 
            that claimant had a 94 percent permanent partial impairment 
 
            to the right hand.  While there is no question that claimant 
 
            suffered some permanency as a result of his August 14, 1991 
 
            right hand amputation, it is questionable whether claimant's 
 
            healing period had terminated on September 23, 1991.  
 
            Indeed, claimant's examining physician, Dr. DeBartolo did 
 
            not opine that claimant had reached maximum medical 
 
            improvement until June 9, 1993.  Claimant's continuing 
 
            problems with his right hand and right third finger from 
 
            September 23, 1991 through his recovery from his ray section 
 
            on June 9, 1993,  also warrant a finding that claimant's 
 
            healing period terminated on June 9, 1993.  Claimant is 
 
            entitled to payment of interest on permanent partial 
 
            disability benefits due and not appropriately paid from that 
 
            date onward. 
 
            
 
                 Claimant seeks penalty benefits for unreasonable delay 
 
            or denial of benefits related to his arguments concerning 
 
            interest due, and relating to defendants having initially 
 
            paid claimant at an inappropriate rate.  Claimant's initial 
 
            compensation payments were based on a calculation of his 
 
            hourly wage times 40 without consideration of overtime 
 
            worked.  Defendants timely corrected
 
            
 
            
 
            Page   7
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            this rate error once claimant's overtime hours and resulting 
 
            additional gross weekly wages were communicated to them.  
 
            The error in the calculation appears to have been 
 
            inadvertent.  While it may have been a negligent act on the 
 
            employer's part, calculation based on the standard hourly 
 
            work week and the claimant's hourly wage cannot be 
 
            considered to have been so unreasonable as to be considered 
 
            denial or delay in compensation without reasonable or 
 
            probable cause or excuse.  Claimant is not entitled to 
 
            penalty benefits relative to the time in which the rate was 
 
            improperly paid.  Likewise, the interest questions claimant 
 
            presented were fairly debatable questions.  Defendants did 
 
            not act unreasonably in not tendering interest payments as 
 
            claimant requested.
 
            
 
                              CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
 
            
 
            The conclusions of law contained in the proposed agency 
 
            decision filed January 18, 1994 are adopted as final agency 
 
            action.
 
            
 
            WHEREFORE, the decision of the deputy is affirmed.
 
            
 
                                   ORDER
 
            
 
            THEREFORE, it is ordered:
 
            
 
                 That defendant pay claimant permanent partial 
 
            disability benefits for thirty-eight (38) weeks at the rate 
 
            of three hundred thirty dollars and 64/100 ($330.64) with 
 
            those payments to commence on June 9, 1993.  
 
            
 
                 That defendant pay claimant additional healing period 
 
            benefits at the rate of three hundred thirty and 64/100 
 
            dollars ($330.64) set forth in the above conclusions of law.
 
            
 
                 That defendant pay claimant temporary partial 
 
            disability benefits for the period of February 22, 1993 
 
            through April 7, 1993 as set forth in the above conclusions 
 
            of law.
 
            
 
                 That defendant receive credit for benefits previously 
 
            paid.
 
            
 
                 That defendant pay accrued amounts in a lump sum.  
 
            
 
                 That defendant pay interest pursuant to section 85.30 
 
            as amended.
 
            
 
            That claimant shall pay the costs of the appeal including 
 
            the transcription of the hearing.  Defendant shall pay all 
 
            other costs.
 
            
 
                 That defendant file claim activity reports as the 
 
            agency orders.  
 
            
 
            Signed and filed this ____ day of June, 1994.
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                                        ________________________________
 
                                                BYRON K. ORTON
 
                                           INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            
 

 
            
 
            Page   8
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
            COPIES TO:
 
            
 
            Mr. Mark S. Soldat
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            714 E. State St.
 
            Algona, Iowa 50511
 
            
 
            Mr. Paul C. Thune
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            P.O. Box 9130
 
            Des Moines, Iowa 50306
 
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                                           1802; 1803; 1803.1; 3800
 
                                           Filed June 29, 1994
 
                                           Byron K. Orton
 
            
 
                      BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
            DAN J. ROBBENNOLT,    
 
                        
 
                 Claimant,                         File No. 964311
 
                        
 
            vs.                                      A P P E A L
 
                        
 
            SNAP-ON TOOLS CORPORATION,              D E C I S I O N
 
                        
 
                 Employer,   
 
                 Self-Insured,    
 
                 Defendant.       
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
            1803; 1803.1
 
            
 
                 Claimant's permanent partial disability was permanent 
 
            partial impairment of the right hand where subsequent to 
 
            amputation of claimant's right third finger claimant 
 
            underwent a ray resection with incision into the palmar 
 
            aspect of the hand and resulting loss of grip and pinch 
 
            strength in the right hand as well as decrease in lifting 
 
            ability relative to the right hand as compared to the left.  
 
            
 
                 Claimant testified as to some psychological adjustment 
 
            problems subsequent to the loss of his finger and attended 
 
            six counseling sessions after which he chose not to 
 
            reschedule counseling sessions.  Claimant's emotional 
 
            response was found to be an expected sequela of adjustment 
 
            to the injury and found not to raise to the level of 
 
            debilitating psychological condition such that claimant 
 
            would be entitled to industrial disability for a body as a 
 
            whole injury.  
 
            
 
            1802
 
            
 
                 Under section 85.32, it is not necessary that 
 
            claimant's period of incapacity consecutively extend to or 
 
            beyond the fourteenth day for claimant to be entitled to an 
 
            amount equal to three days of compensation.  It is only 
 
            necessary that claimant have a period or periods of 
 
            incapacity beyond the fourteenth day for claimant to be 
 
            entitled to an amount equal to the three days of 
 
            compensation for which the section provides.  
 
            
 

 
            
 
            Page   2
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            3800
 
            
 
                 Compensation for temporary total disability, healing 
 
            period, or temporary partial disability is not liquidated or 
 
            accrued and does not become due until the first day 
 
            following the week of disability.  Where an employer 
 
            initiates payment on or about the first business day of the 
 
            first week immediately subsequent to the week for which the 
 
            benefits have accrued and where the claimant receives or 
 
            could receive the payments within that week, the purpose of 
 
            section 85.30 to insure prompt payment of benefits when due 
 
            is not thwarted.  Claimant, therefore, is not entitled to 
 
            interest for each day subsequent to the first day of that 
 
            week before payment is received provided that payment is 
 
            received or available for claimant during that first week.
 
            
 
            
 
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                       BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                      
 
            DAN J. ROBBENNOLT,  
 
                      
 
                 Claimant, 
 
                      
 
            vs.       
 
                                                 File No. 964311
 
            SNAP-ON TOOLS CORPORATION,    
 
                                               A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                 Employer, 
 
                 Self-Insured,                   D E C I S I O N
 
                 Defendant.     
 
                      
 
            ___________________________________________________________
 
                             STATEMENT OF THE CASE
 
            
 
                 This is a proceeding in arbitration brought by the 
 
            claimant, Dan J. Robbennolt, against his self-insured 
 
            employer, Snap-On Tools Corporation, to recover benefits 
 
            under the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act as a result of an 
 
            injury sustained on August 17, 1990.  This matter came on 
 
            for hearing before the undersigned deputy industrial 
 
            commissioner at Fort Dodge, Iowa, on December 15, 1993.  A 
 
            first report of injury has been filed.  The record consists 
 
            of the testimony of claimant, of Connie Jo Robbennolt, of 
 
            James A. Miller, and of Shirley Hoveland, as well as of 
 
            claimant's exhibit A in its entirety and claimant's exhibit 
 
            B but for pages 4 and 5 and 18 which are specifically 
 
            excluded from evidence.  Pages 27 through 36 and 52 through 
 
            60 of claimant's exhibit B are correspondence between 
 
            counsel.  This correspondence contains no discussions 
 
            relative to settlement and the correspondence has some 
 
            relevance to the section 86.16, unnumbered paragraph 4, 
 
            penalty issue.
 
            
 
                                      ISSUES
 
            
 
                 Pursuant to the hearing report and the oral 
 
            stipulations of the parties at hearing, the parties agree to 
 
            the following:
 
            
 
                 1.  Claimant did receive an injury arising out of and 
 
            in the course of claimant's employment on August 17, 1990 
 
            [as held in ruling on Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
 
            filed April 1, 1992];
 
            
 
                 2.  Claimant's injury was causally related to periods 
 
            of temporary total/healing period and permanent partial 
 
            disability; and
 
            
 
                 3.  Claimant was married and entitled to three 
 
            exemptions on August 17, 1990; claimant had a gross weekly 
 
            wage of $530.39 resulting in a weekly compensation rate of 
 
            $330.64.
 
            
 
                 Issues remaining to be decided are:
 
            
 
                 1.  Whether claimant is entitled to payment of 
 

 
            
 
            Page   2
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            additional healing period benefits and payment of temporary 
 
            partial benefits from February 23, 1993 to April 4, 1993; 
 
            
 
                 2.  The nature and extent of permanent disability to 
 
            which claimant is entitled, specifically whether claimant's 
 
            disability is a disability to the right finger or a 
 
            disability to the right hand or a body as a whole disability 
 
            on account of an alleged mental injury;
 
            
 
                 3.  Whether claimant is entitled to an award of 
 
            additional benefits pursuant to section 86.13, unnumbered 
 
            paragraph 4; and
 
            
 
                 4.  Whether claimant is entitled to interest relative 
 
            to certain compensation payments.
 
            
 
                                 FINDINGS OF FACT
 
            
 
                 The deputy, having heard the testimony and considered 
 
            the evidence, finds:
 
            
 
                 Forty-year-old claimant who graduated from high school 
 
            continues to work for defendant-employer albeit now in the 
 
            paint department and not as a brake press operator, the job 
 
            which he held when injured on August 17, 1990.  Claimant 
 
            currently earns $12.54 per hour; he earned $11.25 per hour 
 
            when injured.  Claimant's current wage reflects 15 cents per 
 
            hour shift bonus.  
 
            
 
                 On August 17, 1990, claimant sustained a one and 
 
            one-half inch deep tendon laceration of his right third 
 
            finger on the dorsal aspect and across the proximal 
 
            interphalangeal joint.  Dilipk Paukh, M.D., sutured the 
 
            wound.  Claimant was advised to remain off work on April 18, 
 
            1990 and April 19, 1990.  A 35 degree extensor lag of the 
 
            PIP joint remained.  M.W. Crane, M.D., prescribed splinting 
 
            of the finger in late August 1990.  Claimant's problems did 
 
            not resolve.  On October 3, 1990, Dr. Crane performed an 
 
            extensor tendon reefing and pinning.  Again, claimant's 
 
            problems with the finger did not resolve.  On January 11, 
 
            1991, Dr. Crane performed open reconstruction of the 
 
            boutonniere deformity of the right third finger as well as 
 
            curettage of bone lesions within the finger.  Dr. Crane 
 
            released claimant to return to work as of February 25, 1991.  
 
            Claimant was then restricted to 5 pounds lifting with his 
 
            right hand taped.  Claimant went off work as of March 6, 
 
            1991 as a result of continued swelling and loss of extension 
 
            in the finger.  On March 11, 1991, Dr. Crane performed a 
 
            fusion of the PIP joint of the injured finger.  On April 25, 
 
            1991, claimant was released to return to left-handed work on 
 
            Monday of the following week.  On June 13, 1991, Dr. Crane 
 
            noted that claimant's finger was "going to nonunion", a 
 
            finding confirmed on radiographic studies.  Dr. Crane then 
 
            referred claimant to Douglas S. Reagan, M.D., an orthopedic 
 
            surgeon.  
 
            
 
                 On July 3, 1991, Dr. Reagan performed a refusion of PIP 
 
            joint with bone graft from the wrist and internal fixation 
 
            of the right third finger.  The refusion was also 
 
            unsuccessful and on August 14, 1991, Dr. Reagan performed 
 

 
            
 
            Page   3
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            amputation of the right third finger at or just below the 
 
            condyle of the proximal phalanx.  On September 23, 1991, Dr. 
 
            Reagan opined that claimant had a 94 percent permanent 
 
            partial impairment of the right third finger.  
 
            
 
                 On January 8, 1992, claimant saw Dr. Crane with 
 
            complaints of pain in the finger stump and shooting pain 
 
            into the arm from the stump.  
 
            
 
                 On May 13, 1992, claimant saw Thomas DeBartolo, M.D., 
 
            apparently an orthopedic surgeon who specializes in 
 
            conditions of the hand.  Dr. DeBartolo did not believe that 
 
            claimant was at maximum medical improvement and prescribed 
 
            therapeutic desensitization techniques as regard the right 
 
            hand and finger stump.  Dr. DeBartolo also advised claimant 
 
            that should he have continuing problems with the finger 
 
            stump, a ray resection would be an appropriate surgical 
 
            procedure.  
 
            
 
                 Dr. Reagan reexamined claimant on October 1, 1992 and 
 
            concurred with Dr. DeBartolo that ray resection would be 
 
            appropriate.  On November 18, 1992, Dr. DeBartolo performed 
 
            a ray resection with centralization.  The ray resection was 
 
            performed in the palmar hand by removing the remaining stump 
 
            of the right third finger and bringing together the 
 
            intermetacarpal ligament from the ulnar side of the index 
 
            finger and the radial side of the ring finger.  
 
            
 
                 On December 10, 1992 office visit, Dr. DeBartolo 
 
            characterized claimant as doing extremely well as regards 
 
            his ray resection.  He reported that claimant's finger 
 
            motion was excellent with full flexion and extension and 
 
            some active abduction and adduction.  Dr. DeBartolo referred 
 
            claimant to the Mercy Work and Sports Center for neck and 
 
            upper extremity evaluation as of December 16, 1992.  
 
            Findings at time of evaluation were:  1) decreased right 
 
            hand grip and pinch strengths; 2) inability to perform 3) 
 
            pinch on the right as a result of pain in the extensor of 
 
            the index finger; 3)  bilateral decreased coordination [of 
 
            the hand]; 4) decreased right grip, wrist flexion, pronation 
 
            and supination per BTE measurement and as compared to 
 
            normative data; and 5) decreased ability to lift as a result 
 
            of discomfort of the right arm, right hand, and wrist.  Work 
 
            conditioning to increase strength of the right upper 
 
            extremity and the right hand and to increase claimant's 
 
            functional use of the right hand was recommended.  Claimant 
 
            remained in work hardening through January 27, 1993.  
 
            Throughout his time in work hardening claimant's abilities 
 
            to lift, push and pull with the right hand increased.  Right 
 
            grip and pinch strength also steadily improved.  Although 
 
            these scores still were from 50 to 33 percent less than 
 
            claimant's grip and pinch strength scores on the left.  
 
            Lifting abilities on the left were not measured.  
 
            
 
                 On February 1, 1993, claimant was returned to work for 
 
            four hours a day on three alternate work days.  Claimant 
 
            apparently received temporary partial disability payments 
 
            for that time during which he was partially returned to 
 
            work.  
 
            
 

 
            
 
            Page   4
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 On March 17, 1993, Dr. DeBartolo stated that claimant 
 
            had symptoms from mild carpal tunnel syndrome including a 
 
            positive Tinel's test and a positive median nerve 
 
            compression test.  He opined that claimant had excellent 
 
            flexion and extension in his remaining digits.  On June 9, 
 
            1993, Dr. DeBartolo placed claimant at maximum medical 
 
            improvement.  He also noted that claimant had an area in the 
 
            midpalm where additional nerve had been amputated in the ray 
 
            resection and that this area was the significant factor in 
 
            lessening claimant's [right hand] grip.  On June 30, 1993, 
 
            Dr. DeBartolo opined that pursuant to the AMA Guides to 
 
            Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Third Edition, claimant 
 
            had 100 percent partial impairment of the right third or 
 
            long finger which translates into a 20 percent permanent 
 
            partial impairment of the right hand as a result of the loss 
 
            of the right third finger.  It is expressly found that 
 
            claimant has a decreased ability to lift with the right 
 
            upper extremity as well as decreased grip and pinch strength 
 
            in the right hand.  These factors are sufficient to 
 
            demonstrate that claimant's overall impairment is an 
 
            impairment to the hand and not an impairment to the right 
 
            third finger only.  
 
            
 
                 Claimant testified that claimant has had psychological 
 
            difficulties relating to his work injury.  Claimant stated 
 
            that claimant, a recovering alcoholic, has had lapses of 
 
            sobriety since the work injury and has been generally more 
 
            "short fused" as a sequela of the on-going problems with his 
 
            finger and hand.  Claimant saw counselor Dana Quick-Naig on 
 
            September 24, 1991; October 1, 1991; February 3, 1992; 
 
            February 10, 1992; and March 4, 1992.  Ms. Quick-Naig's 
 
            impression was that claimant then had unresolved grief as a 
 
            result of the loss of his finger.  Claimant did not schedule 
 
            further appointments with Ms. Quick-Naig.  The record does 
 
            not reflect that claimant sought other counseling or 
 
            treatment on account of any psychological condition.  It is 
 
            expressly found that claimant's emotional concerns and 
 
            reactions as presented in this record were part of the 
 
            normal sequela of recovery from the significant injury.  It 
 
            is further expressly found that these conditions did not 
 
            raise to the level of an independent debilitating 
 
            psychological condition such that claimant's impairment is 
 
            to the body as a whole and not to the hand.  
 
            
 
                 Claimant had a number of days when claimant was 
 
            partially off work for medical treatment of his injury.  
 
            Claimant also has not been compensated for work missed on 
 
            August 18 and August 19, 1990.  Under section 85.32, 
 
            compensation is due for the days of incapacity prior to the 
 
            fourth day when the period of incapacity extends beyond the 
 
            fourteenth day following the date of the injury.  The 
 
            section in no manner indicates that the period of incapacity 
 
            must be a consecutive period of incapacity only that the 
 
            period extend beyond the fourteenth day following the date 
 
            of injury.  Claimant then is entitled to compensation for 
 
            August 18, 1990 and August 19, 1990.  Likewise, claimant is 
 
            entitled to compensation for each complete day on which 
 
            claimant was temporarily totality disabled from work, that 
 

 
            
 
            Page   5
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            is absent from work on account of the injury.  The law makes 
 
            no provision for payment of workers' compensation benefits 
 
            on a part day basis for days on which claimant is at work 
 
            but leaves work for a portion of the day to seek medical 
 
            care.  Claimant's employer has voluntarily paid such 
 
            compensation to claimant for a number of days.  Claimant's 
 
            employer has no continuing obligation under the workers' 
 
            compensation law relative to such payments.  Indeed, insofar 
 
            as the need to miss work on account of continuing medical 
 
            treatment arises subsequent to the date that claimant has 
 
            reached maximum medical improvement, that need and reduced 
 
            ability to be available for work is arguably compensated 
 
            through an award of permanent partial disability payment.
 
            
 
                 Claimant seeks interest on compensation payments made.  
 
            He argues interest due must be calculated under what he 
 
            characterizes as the United States Rule.  The industrial 
 
            commissioner has previously held that the deputy 
 
            commissioner is not obligated to figure interest for the 
 
            parties in an arbitration proceeding.  The parties are to 
 
            attempt to determine the interest payable themselves and if 
 
            they are not able to do so to file a separate original 
 
            notice and petition relative to that dispute.  Weishaar v. 
 
            Snap-On Tools Corp. 506 N.W.2d 786 (IA Ct. of App. 1993).  
 
            Nevertheless, section 85.30 provides that compensation 
 
            payments shall be made each week during the period for which 
 
            compensation is payable and if not paid when due interest 
 
            shall be added.  Defendants acknowledge that in the normal 
 
            course of business, payments were mailed from their 
 
            adjusting company to their office on the first day of the 
 
            week after the week of temporary total disability for which 
 
            the compensation payment compensated claimant.  Claimant 
 
            then picked up the checks from the employer's place of 
 
            business during the week in which the checks were issued.  
 
            Claimant argues that interest is due from the first day of 
 
            that week and that already accrued interest should be taken 
 
            before principle is considered for each day after the first 
 
            day of the week in which the check was issued in which 
 
            claimant did not have the check in hand.  While medical 
 
            projections may be made to the length of such periods, 
 
            defendants have no actual knowledge that claimant is 
 
            entitled to payments for healing period or temporary total 
 
            disability until claimant has actually been off work for 
 
            that period of disability.  Compensation payments, 
 
            therefore, do not represent an accrued or liquidated amount 
 
            due claimant until the first day of the week immediately 
 
            following the period of temporary total or healing period 
 
            disability.  The section 85.30 interest provision exists to 
 
            assure that compensation payments are timely made to injured 
 
            workers.  See Teel v. McCord, 394 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa 1986).  
 
            Where defendants initiate payment on the first business day 
 
            of the week after which compensation for temporary total or 
 
            healing period benefits have actually accrued and defendants 
 
            take reasonable steps to assure that claimant shall actually 
 
            receive the compensation payment on a timely basis, the 
 

 
            
 
            Page   6
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            purposes of section 85.30 are not thwarted and claimant 
 
            cannot appropriately request addition of interest to the 
 
            timely initiated weekly compensation payment.  Shirley 
 
            Hoveland, human resources specialist with the employer, 
 
            stated that workers' compensation benefits checks for 
 
            temporary total or healing period disability are generated 
 
            from the employer's claim adjusting agent's place of 
 
            business in Michigan.  They are then sent to the employer's 
 
            plant and distributed to the employee either at the plant or 
 
            if the employer prefers by mail.  Compensation checks in 
 
            this case were either picked up by claimant personally or 
 
            mailed to claimant within the week subsequent to the week 
 
            for which the check compensated claimant.  Defendants are 
 
            expressly found to have acted timely in assuring that 
 
            payment of any liquidated compensation due claimant was made 
 
            to claimant on a timely basis.  Defendants' actions in no 
 
            way thwarted the purposes of section 85.30.  Claimant is not 
 
            entitled to interest as to payments received for healing 
 
            period benefits.
 
            
 
                 Under Teel, the supreme court held that disability 
 
            payments become due an employee when the employee's healing 
 
            period is terminated.  Claimant argues that interest is due 
 
            claimant from September 23, 1991, when Dr. Reagan opined 
 
            that claimant had a 94 percent permanent partial impairment 
 
            to the right hand.  While there is no question that claimant 
 
            suffered some permanency as a result of his August 14, 1991 
 
            right hand amputation, it is questionable whether claimant's 
 
            healing period had terminated on September 23, 1991.  
 
            Indeed, claimant's examining physician, Dr. DeBartolo did 
 
            not opine that claimant had reached maximum medical 
 
            improvement until June 9, 1993.  Claimant's continuing 
 
            problems with his right hand and right third finger from 
 
            September 23, 1991 through his recovery from his ray section 
 
            on June 9, 1993,  also warrant a finding that claimant's 
 
            healing period terminated on June 9, 1993.  Claimant is 
 
            entitled to payment of interest on permanent partial 
 
            disability benefits due and not appropriately paid from that 
 
            date onward. 
 
            
 
                 Claimant seeks penalty benefits for unreasonable delay 
 
            or denial of benefits related to his arguments concerning 
 
            interest due, and relating to defendants having initially 
 
            paid claimant at an inappropriate rate.  Claimant's initial 
 
            compensation payments were based on a calculation of his 
 
            hourly wage times 40 without consideration of overtime 
 
            worked.  Defendants timely corrected this rate error once 
 
            claimant's overtime hours and resulting additional gross 
 
            weekly wages were communicated to them.  The error in the 
 
            calculation appears to have been inadvertent.  While it may 
 
            have been a negligent act on the employer's part, 
 
            calculation based on the standard hourly work week and the 
 
            claimant's hourly wage cannot be considered to have been so 
 
            unreasonable as to be considered denial or delay in 
 
            compensation without reasonable or probable cause or excuse.  
 
            Claimant is not entitled to penalty benefits relative to the 
 

 
            
 
            Page   7
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            time in which the rate was improperly paid.  Likewise, the 
 
            interest questions claimant presented were fairly debatable 
 
            questions.  Defendants did not act unreasonably in not 
 
            tendering interest payments as claimant requested.
 
            
 
                                CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
 
            
 
                 As to the question of claimant's extent of permanent 
 
            partial disability:  
 
            
 
                 The right of an employee to receive compensation for 
 
            injuries sustained is statutory.  The statute conferring 
 
            this right can also fix the amount of compensation payable 
 
            for different specific injuries.  The employee is not 
 
            entitled to compensation except as the statute provides.  
 
            Soukup v. Shores Co., 222 Iowa 272, 268 N.W. 598 (1936).
 
            
 
                 Compensation for permanent partial disability begins at 
 
            termination of the healing period.  Section 85.34(2).  
 
            Permanent partial disabilities are classified as either 
 
            scheduled or unscheduled.  A specific scheduled disability 
 
            is evaluated by the functional method; the industrial method 
 
            is used to evaluate an unscheduled disability. Simbro v. 
 
            Delong's Sportswear, 332 N.W.2d 886 (Iowa 1983); Graves v. 
 
            Eagle Iron Works, 331 N.W.2d 116 (Iowa 1983); Martin v. 
 
            Skelly Oil Co., 252 Iowa 128, 106 N.W.2d 95 (1960).
 
            
 
                 An injury to a scheduled member may, because of after 
 
            effects or compensatory change, result in permanent 
 
            impairment of the body as a whole.  Such impairment may in 
 
            turn be the basis for a rating of industrial disability.  It 
 
            is the anatomical situs of the permanent injury or 
 
            impairment which determines whether the schedules in section 
 
            85.34(2)(a) - (t) are applied.  Lauhoff Grain v. McIntosh, 
 
            395 N.W.2d 834 (Iowa 1986); Blacksmith v. All-American, 
 
            Inc., 290 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1980); Dailey v. Pooley Lumber 
 
            Co., 233 Iowa 758, 10 N.W.2d 569 (1943).  Soukup v. Shores 
 
            Co., 222 Iowa 272, 268 N.W. 598 (1936).
 
            
 
                 Where psychological condition is caused or aggravated 
 
            by a scheduled injury the injury is compensable as a 
 
            nonscheduled injury.  Moritmor v. Purhoff Corp.,   N.W.2d  
 
            (Iowa 1993).  
 
            
 
                 Claimant has established a scheduled member permanent 
 
            partial impairment of 20 percent of claimant's right hand.  
 
            
 
                 Claimant has not established a psychological condition 
 
            caused or aggravated by claimant's scheduled injury such 
 
            that claimant's injury extends into the body as a whole.
 
            
 
                 We consider whether claimant is entitled to additional 
 
            healing period and temporary partial disability benefits.  
 
            
 
                 Section 85.32 provides:
 
            
 
                    Except as to injuries resulting in permanent 
 
                 partial disability, compensation shall begin on 
 
                 the fourth day of disability after the injury.
 
            
 

 
            
 
            Page   8
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                    If the period of incapacity extends beyond the 
 
                 fourteenth day following the date of injury, then 
 
                 the compensation due during the third week shall 
 
                 be increased by adding thereto an amount equal to 
 
                 three days of compensation.
 
            
 
                 Section 85.33(1) provides:
 
            
 
                    Except as provided in subsection 2 to this 
 
                 section, the employer shall pay to an employee for 
 
                 injury producing temporary total disability weekly 
 
                 compensation benefits, as provided in section 
 
                 85.32, until the employee has tenured to work or 
 
                 is medically capable of returning to employment 
 
                 substantially similar to the employment in which 
 
                 the employee was engaged at the time of injury, 
 
                 whichever occurs first.
 
            
 
                 Section 85.34(1) provides that healing period benefits 
 
            are payable to an injured worker who has suffered permanent 
 
            partial disability until (1) the worker has returned to 
 
            work; (2) the worker is medically capable of returning to 
 
            substantially similar employment; or (3) the worker has 
 
            achieved maximum medical recovery.  The healing period can 
 
            be considered the period during which there is a reasonable 
 
            expectation of improvement of the disabling condition.  See 
 
            Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co. v. Kubli, 312 N.W.2d 60 (Iowa 
 
            Ct. App. 1981).  Healing period benefits can be interrupted 
 
            or intermittent.  Teel v. McCord, 394 N.W.2d 405 (Iowa 
 
            1986).
 
            
 
                 Section 85.33(2) provides:
 
            
 
                    "Temporary partial disability" or temporarily, 
 
                 partially disabled" means the condition of an 
 
                 employee for whom it is medically indicated that 
 
                 the employee is not capable of returning to 
 
                 employment substantially similar to the employment 
 
                 in which the employee was engaged at the time of 
 
                 injury, but is able to perform other work 
 
                 consistent with the employee's disability.  
 
                 "Temporary partial benefits" means benefits 
 
                 payable, in lieu of temporary total disability and 
 
                 healing period benefits, to an employee because of 
 
                 the employee's temporary partial reduction in 
 
                 earning ability as a result of the employee's 
 
                 temporary partial disability.  Temporary partial 
 
                 benefits shall not be considered benefits payable 
 
                 to an employee, upon termination of temporary 
 
                 partial or temporary total disability, the healing 
 
                 period, or permanent partial disability, because 
 
                 the employee is not able to secure work paying 
 
                 weekly earnings equal to the employee's weekly 
 
                 earnings at the time of injury.
 
            
 
                 Claimant has established that claimant is entitled to 
 
            payment of additional healing periods for August 18, 1990 
 
            and August 19, 1990 as well as for each full day subsequent 
 
            thereto and before June 9, 1993, where claimant was actually 
 
            off work on account of for injury or on account of treatment 
 

 
            
 
            Page   9
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            for injury.   
 
            
 
                 Claimant has established entitlement to temporary 
 
            partial disability from February 22, 1994 through April 7, 
 
            1993 for those days when claimant was released for partial 
 
            work only.  
 
            
 
                 We consider the legal issue of interest.  The 
 
            applicable law relative to interest has been cited in the 
 
            above findings of fact.  Claimant is not entitled to 
 
            interest relative to healing period, temporary total or 
 
            temporary partial disability compensation payments where 
 
            defendants made payments and claimant received payment in 
 
            the week immediately subsequent to the week to which the 
 
            compensation payment related.  
 
            
 
                 Claimant is entitled to interest on permanent partial 
 
            disability payments due and not timely made on and after 
 
            June 9, 1993.
 
            
 
                 We consider claimant's claim for penalty.  The 
 
            applicable law as regards the penalty question is as 
 
            follows:
 
            
 
                 Section 86.13 permits an award of up to 50 percent of 
 
            the amount of benefits delayed or denied if a delay in 
 
            commencement or termination of benefits occurs without 
 
            reasonable or probable cause or excuse.  The standard for 
 
            evaluating the reasonableness of defendants' delay in 
 
            commencement or termination is whether the claim is fairly 
 
            debatable.  Where a claim is shown to be fairly debatable, 
 
            defendants do not act unreasonably in denying payment.  See 
 
            Stanley v. Wilson Foods Corp., File No. 753405 (App. August 
 
            23, 1990); Seydel v. Univ. of Iowa Physical Plant, File No. 
 
            818849 (App. November 1, 1989).
 
            
 
                 Additionally, penalty cannot be based upon interest due 
 
            on late compensation payments.  Weishaar v. Snap On Tools 
 
            Corp., 506 N.W.2d 786 (IA Ct. of App. 1993).
 
            
 
                 Claimant has not established entitlement to payment of 
 
            additional benefits pursuant to section 86.13, unnumbered 
 
            paragraph 4.  
 
            
 
                                     ORDER
 
            
 
                 THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED:
 
            
 
                 Defendants pay claimant permanent partial disability 
 
            benefits for thirty-eight (38) weeks at the rate of three 
 
            hundred thirty dollars and 64/100 ($330.64) with those 
 
            payments to commence on June 9, 1993.  
 
            
 
                 Defendants pay claimant additional healing period 
 
            benefits at the rate of three hundred thirty and 64/100 
 
            dollars ($330.64) set forth in the above conclusions of law.
 
            
 
                 Defendants pay claimant temporary partial disability 
 
            benefits for the period of February 22, 1993 through April 
 
            7, 1993 as set forth in the above conclusions of law.
 

 
            
 
            Page  10
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                 Defendants receive credit for benefits previously paid.
 
            
 
                 Defendants pay accrued amounts in a lump sum.  
 
            
 
                 Defendants pay interest pursuant to section 85.30 as 
 
            amended.
 
            
 
                 Claimant and Defendants pay costs equally pursuant to 
 
            rule 343 IAC 4.33.
 
            
 
                 Defendants file claim activity reports as the agency 
 
            orders.  
 
            
 
                 Signed and filed this ____ day of January, 1994.
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                                          ______________________________
 
                                          HELENJEAN M. WALLESER
 
                                          DEPUTY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER    
 
            
 
            Copies to:
 
            
 
            Mr. Mark S. Soldat
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            714 E. State Street
 
            Algona, IA  50511
 
            
 
            Mr. Paul C. Thune
 
            Attorney at Law
 
            P.O. Box 9130
 
            Des Moines, IA  50306
 
            
 
            
 
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
            
 
                                           1802; 1803; 1803.1; 1838
 
                                           Filed January 18, 1994
 
                                           Helenjean M. Walleser
 
            
 
                       BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
            ____________________________________________________________
 
                      
 
            DAN J. ROBBENNOLT,  
 
                      
 
                 Claimant, 
 
                      
 
            vs.       
 
                                                  File No. 964311
 
            SNAP-ON TOOLS CORPORATION,    
 
                                               A R B I T R A T I O N
 
                 Employer, 
 
                 Self-Insured,                     D E C I S I O N
 
                 Defendant.     
 
                      
 
            ___________________________________________________________
 
            1803; 1803.1
 
            
 
                 Claimant's permanent partial disability was permanent 
 
            partial impairment of the right hand where subsequent to 
 
            amputation of claimant's right third finger claimant 
 
            underwent a ray resection with incision into the palmar 
 
            aspect of the hand and resulting loss of grip and pinch 
 
            strength in the right hand as well as decrease in lifting 
 
            ability relative to the right hand as compared to the left.  
 
            
 
                 Claimant testified as to some psychological adjustment 
 
            problems subsequent to the loss of his finger and attended 
 
            six counseling sessions after which he chose not to 
 
            reschedule counseling sessions.  Claimant's emotional 
 
            response was found to be an expected sequela of adjustment 
 
            to the injury and found not to raise to the level of 
 
            debilitating psychological condition such that claimant 
 
            would be entitled to industrial disability for a body as a 
 
            whole injury.  
 
            
 
            1802
 
            
 
                 Under section 85.32, it is not necessary that 
 
            claimant's period of incapacity consecutively extend to or 
 
            beyond the fourteenth day for claimant to be entitled to an 
 
            amount equal to three days of compensation.  It is only 
 
            necessary that claimant have a period or periods of 
 
            incapacity beyond the fourteenth day for claimant to be 
 
            entitled to an amount equal to the three days of 
 
            compensation for which the section provides.  
 
            
 
            1838
 
            
 
                 Compensation for temporary total disability, healing 
 
            period, or temporary partial disability is not liquidated or 
 
            accrued and does not become due until the first day 
 
            following the week of disability.  Where an employer 
 

 
            
 
            Page   2
 
            
 
 
 
            
 
            
 
            initiates payment on or about the first business day of the 
 
            first week immediately subsequent to the week for which the 
 
            benefits have accrued and where the claimant receives or 
 
            could receive the payments within that week, the purpose of 
 
            section 85.30 to insure prompt payment of benefits when due 
 
            is not thwarted.  Claimant, therefore, is not entitled to 
 
            interest for each day subsequent to the first day of that 
 
            week before payment is received provided that payment is 
 
            received or available for claimant during that first week.
 
            
 
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
                       BEFORE THE IOWA INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER 
 
         _________________________________________________________________
 
                                         :
 
         DAN J. ROBBENNOLT,              :       File No. 964311
 
                                         :
 
              Claimant,                  :           O R D E R
 
                                         :
 
         vs.                             :            N U N C
 
                                         :
 
         SNAP-ON TOOLS CORPORATION,      :             P R O
 
                                         :
 
              Employer,                  :            T U N C
 
              Self-Insured,              :
 
              Defendant.                 :
 
         _________________________________________________________________
 
         
 
              The appeal decision filed June 29, 1994 is hereby amended as 
 
         follows:
 
         
 
              In that claimant has suffered a permanent partial 
 
         disability, claimant is entitled to healing period benefits for 
 
         August 18 and August 19, 1990, pursuant to Iowa Code sections 
 
         85.30 and 85.34(1).  Iowa Code section 85.32 is inapplicable to 
 
         cases in which the injury results in permanent partial 
 
         disability.  That portion of the analysis on pages four and five 
 
         of the appeal decision filed June 29, 1994 remains applicable to 
 
         cases under Iowa Code section 85.32.
 
         
 
              Signed and filed this ____ day of July, 1994.
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
         
 
                                       ________________________________
 
                                                BYRON K. ORTON
 
                                           INDUSTRIAL COMMISSIONER
 
         
 
         Copies To:
 
         
 
         Mr. Mark S. Soldat
 
         Attorney at Law
 
         714 E. State St.
 
         Algona, Iowa 50511
 
         
 
         Mr. Paul C. Thune
 
         Attorney at Law
 
         P.O. Box 9130
 
         Des Moines, Iowa 50306